United States v. Williams, Criminal No. 09–0026(PLF).

• Decision Date: 24 May 2013
• Docket Number: Criminal No. 09–0026(PLF).
• Citation: 946 F.Supp.2d 112
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, v. Rico Rodrigus WILLIAMS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

946 F.Supp.2d 112

UNITED STATES of America,

v.Rico Rodrigus WILLIAMS, Defendant.

Criminal No. 09–0026(PLF).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

May 24, 2013.

April E. Fearnley, Debra L. Long–Doyle, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, John Leslie Hill, Christine L. Duey, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

A.J. Kramer, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Amanda S. Hitchcock, Jonathan Jeffress, Federal Public Defender, Phyllis A. Jones, Covington & Burling LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

OPINION AND RESTITUTION ORDER

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge.

On April 20, 2012, 2012 WL 6654056, this Court sentenced defendant Rico Rodrigus Williams to twenty-two years of incarceration on his conviction on one count of second degree murder and ten years of incarceration on his conviction on one count of witness tampering, the sentences to run concurrently. The Court also imposed five years of supervised release, with conditions, following the period of incarceration. At sentencing, the Court heard brief argument from counsel regarding restitution. The Court informed the defendant that restitution would be ordered but, pursuant to statutory authorization, see18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5), it deferred determination of the amount of restitution until after the government and the defendant had the opportunity to file supplemental briefs on the issue. This briefing is now complete. Upon careful considerationof the parties' initial sentencing memoranda and supplemental briefs, including letters from experts attached as exhibits, the relevant legal authorities, and the entire record in this case, the Court will order restitution to the estate of the deceased, Sergeant Juwan Johnson, in the amount of $756,000.¹

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant Rico Rodrigus Williams, a former member of the United States Air Force, killed Army Sergeant Juwan Johnson during a Gangster Disciples gang initiation that took place on July 3, 2005, near the Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany. On November 15, 2010, after a twelve-day jury trial, Mr. Williams was found guilty of one count of second degree murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a), and one count of witness tampering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3). See Verdict Form at 1–2. The Court subsequently denied defendant's post-trial motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial. See June 3, 2011 Tr., Dkt. No. 150; Order, Dkt. No. 161 (Nov. 17, 2011) (denying motion on count two); Order, Dkt. No. 163 (Nov. 17, 2011) (denying motion on count one).

The parties then filed sentencing memoranda with the Court. The government sought a sentence of life imprisonment, while Mr. Williams urged the Court to sentence him to no more than ten years of incarceration. In addition, the government requested that the Court order Mr. Williams to pay $250,000 in restitution for Sergeant Johnson's lost future income, pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (“MVRA”). The government estimated that Sergeant Johnson would have earned approximately $1,600,000 over the course of his lifetime, far in excess of what the government mistakenly believed was a $250,000 statutory cap on restitution. See Govt.'s Mem. at 21. Mr. Williams, through counsel, conceded that restitution may be ordered in cases such as his, but he challenged the government's estimate as purely speculative. Def.'s Initial Reply at 8.

On April 20, 2012, the Court sentenced Mr. Williams to imprisonment for a period of twenty-two years on his second degree murder conviction and ten years on the witness tampering count, the two sentences to run concurrently. See Apr. 20, 2012 Tr. at 99; Judgment at 3. The Court also concluded that Mr. Williams was required to pay restitution but that more information was required before it could determine the appropriate amount. Apr. 20, 2012 Tr. at 99. ² Upon agreement by the parties, the Court postponed determination of the restitution amount until after the government and the defendant filed supplemental briefs. Id. at 60–64, 99; Judgment at 5, 7. ³

Despite its earlier view, the government, in its Addendum to its Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing, now correctly notes that no statutory cap applies in this case. Govt.'s Addendum at 1–2 n. 1. It therefore requests that the defendant be ordered to pay the full value of Sergeant Johnson's lost future earnings, which the government estimates to be $756,000. Govt.'s Reply at 1, 9–10. Mr. Williams maintains that the government has based its estimate of the victim's lost income on mere speculation, thereby failing to meet its burden of proving the amount of the victim's losses by a preponderance of the evidence. Def.'s Opp'n at 7–8. He also argues that the statute does not provide for restitution for the lost future income of a deceased victim. Id. at 5–6.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The MVRA Applies in this Case

Courts have no inherent authority to order restitution; they may do so only as authorized by statute. See United States v. Papagno, 639 F.3d 1093, 1096 (D.C.Cir.2011). In this case, restitution is both authorized and mandated by the MVRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, which requires defendants convicted of certain crimes to pay restitution to the victim, or the estate of the victim, for losses proximately caused by the defendant's criminal conduct. The statute provides as follows:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense described in subsection (c), the court shall order, in addition to ... any other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense or, if the victim is deceased, to the victim's estate.

18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a). Subsection (c) provides that the MVRA applies in sentencing proceedings for convictions of certain offenses, including any offense that constitutes a crime of violence. Id. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(i).

Second degree murder undoubtedly is a crime of violence. See18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (defining crime of violence as offense containing element of physical force against person or property of another or involving substantial risk of such force); United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1114–15 and n. 1 (10th Cir.2007) (applying MVRA to lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter). The MVRA therefore applies to Mr. Williams' conviction for second degree murder. For that reason, this Court must order restitution to Sergeant Johnson's estate“in the full amount of [his] losses [resulting from the murder] as determined by the Court and without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A).

B. The MVRA Requires Restitution for Lost Income in this Case

Mr. Williams raises a threshold question of whether restitution for lost income is authorized under subsection (b) of Section 3663A. See Def.'s Opp'n at 5 (“[Section] 3663A seemingly does not provide for restitution of lost income as a result of death.”). That subsection provides, in relevant part:

The order of restitution shall require that such defendant ...

...

(2) in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury to a victim—

(A) pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care ...

(B) pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and

(C) reimburse the victim for income lost by such victim as a result of such offense;

(3) in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury that results in the death of the victim, pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary funeral and related services; and

(4) in any case, reimburse the victim for lost income and ... other expenses incurred during participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense or attendance at proceedings related to the offense.

18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b).⁴

Defendant points to subsection (b)(2) of the statute, which provides that for “an offense resulting in bodily injury to a victim,” the defendant must reimburse the victim for income lost as a result of the offense. Def.'s Opp'n at 5. The defendant then notes that the following subsection—subsection (b)(3)—authorizes restitution for funeral expenses where the offense “causes ‘bodily injury that results in the death of the victim.’ ” Def.'s Opp'n at 5–6 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(3)) (emphasis added). Defendant argues that because subsection (b)(2) does not contain the phrase “that results in the death of the victim,” while subsection (b)(3) does, subsection (b)(2) necessarily does not apply to offenses where the victim died. Id. at 6 (“[I]t appears that the lost income provision of subsection (b)(2) does not provide for lost income where death results.”).

Mr. Williams' argument is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the MVRA. Under the most natural reading of the statute, the phrase “an offense resulting in bodily injury” refers to a category that includes offenses in which the victim died as a result of the bodily injury as well as offenses in which the victim survived the injury. Furthermore, it would make little sense to reduce restitution in cases where the injury suffered was so severe as to be fatal. As the Ninth Circuit has observed,

It would be illogical to assume that the ultimate death of a person who suffered bodily injury eliminates restitution for lost income. To not award restitution for future lost income would lead to a perverse result where murderers would be liable for markedly less in restitution than criminals who merely assault and injure their victims.

United States v. Cienfuegos, 462 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir.2006); see also United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d at 1119 (noting “anomalous result” that would occur if subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3) were read in the disjunctive). And although the D.C. Circuit has not considered this issue, courts of appeals in other circuits have issued thoughtful and...