United States v. Williams

Decision Date06 March 2014
Docket NumberCriminal No. 06–00079 JMS–KSC.
Citation1 F.Supp.3d 1124
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Naeem J. WILLIAMS, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Steven D. Mellin, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Darren W.K. Ching, Office of the United States Attorney, Honolulu, HI, for Plaintiff.

Barry D. Edwards, Kaneohe, HI, Michael N. Burt, Law Office of Michael Burt, John Timothy Philipsborn, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT NAEEM WILLIAMS' MOTION FOR PRETRIAL DETERMINATION THAT THE DEATH PENALTY CANNOT BE CARRIED OUT AGAINST NAEEM WILLIAMS BECAUSE OF A DISQUALIFYING MENTAL CAPACITY WITHIN THE MEANING OF 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c) AND ATKINS v. VIRGINIA, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)

J. MICHAEL SEABRIGHT, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The United States has charged Defendant Naeem Williams (Defendant or “Williams”) with crimes that qualify him for possible imposition of the death penalty under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591 & 3592. Defendant has moved pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), for a pretrial determination that the death penalty cannot be carried out against him because of a disqualifying mental capacity— i.e., that he is “intellectually disabled.” 1 Doc. No. 2064. The court has analyzed the extensive evidence taken during nine days of testimony in September and December 2013 (as well as other evidence in the record specifically proffered by the parties 2), and has carefully considered the written arguments filed by both sides. Based on the following, the court concludes that Defendant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he has such a disqualifying condition.3 Accordingly, Defendant's Motion is DENIED.

The court first explains the relevant procedural background leading to the Atkins hearings, and summarizes the witnesses who testified in September and December 2013 (and in prior related proceedings in this case). The substance of the evidence, however, is best understood in light of the applicable legal and clinical standards. The court thus analyzes the specific testimony and evidence in the Analysis section of this Order, after examining the relevant standards in the Discussion section.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Charges Against Defendant

The Second Superseding Indictment (“Indictment”) charges Defendant with two capital-eligible Counts arising out of his role in allegedly beating and killing his five-year-old daughter. Specifically, Count One charges Defendant with first degree felony murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 7 & 1111. Doc. No. 1004, Indictment at 2. It alleges that on July 16, 2005, Defendant, with malice aforethought, unlawfully killed a child, in the perpetration of child abuse, at Wheeler Army Airfield. Id. Count Two charges Defendant with first degree felony murder, and aiding and abetting first degree felony murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 7 & 1111. It alleges that sometime after December 13, 2004, and culminating on July 16, 2005, Defendant and his wife, Delilah Williams, with malice aforethought, unlawfully killed, and aided and abetted each other in the killing of, a child in the perpetration of a pattern and practice of assault and torture against a child. Id. at 3.

The Indictment contains a Notice of Special Findings section, alleging mental state eligibility factors and statutory aggravating factors under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591(a) & 3592(c). In particular, it alleges that Defendant:

a. intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury that resulted in the death of Talia Williams (18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2)(B));

b. intentionally and specifically engaged in an act of violence, knowing that the act created a grave risk of death to a person, other than one of the participants in the offense, such that participation in the act constituted a reckless disregard for human life and the victim, Talia Williams, died as a direct result of the act (18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2)(D));

c. committed the offense charged in the indictment in an especially heinous, cruel, and depraved manner in that it involved torture and serious physical abuse to the victim, Talia Williams (18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(6)); and

d. committed the offense charged in the indictment against a victim, Talia Williams, who was particularly vulnerable due to her youth (18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(11)).

Id. at 4.

At the time of the alleged crimes, Defendant was a Specialist (enlisted rank of E–4) on active duty in the United States Army, stationed at Schofield Barracks in Wahiawa, Hawaii. See, e.g., Gov't's Ex. 3, Denney Rpt. at 6. Federal jurisdiction arises because the alleged crimes occurred “within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, to wit, Wheeler Army Airfield[.] Doc. No. 1004, Indictment at 2.

B. Prior Expert Witness Testimony and Evidence

On November 9, 2007 and April 12, 2008, Defendant filed Notices of Expert Evidence of a Mental Condition pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2(b).4 Doc. Nos. 416 & 554. By these Notices, Defendant indicated that he “intends [to] introduce expert evidence relating to mental condition bearing on (1) the issue of guilt during the guilt trial and (2) on the issue of punishment during any penalty hearing in this capital case [.] Doc. No. 554, Def.'s Notice at 1. In this regard, several expert witnesses—clinical and social psychologists, neuropsychologists, and psychiatrists—had previously been or were later retained and proffered opinions as to (among other matters) Defendant's mental condition as related to his capacity to form the requisite intent charged in the Indictment. Specifically, Defendant has claimed he is or was suffering from “borderline intellectual functioning” (“BIF”) (a distinct, although perhaps related, issue from the Atkins question presently before the court). As described in a prior Order, BIF is a condition (or description of a condition) the existence of which might be relevant in understanding whether Defendant had the necessary “mens rea” as charged in the Indictment. See, e.g., Doc. No. 780, Order Denying Government's Amended Motion To Exclude the Defendant's Mental Health Expert Witnesses at the Guilt–Phase (“Guilt Phase Order”) at 18–19 (Feb. 20, 2009) (Ezra J.).

In July and October 2008, the government filed Motions seeking to exclude Defendant's mental health expert witnesses at the guilt phase, and requested hearings under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). See Doc. Nos. 639 & 715. Accordingly, Judge Ezra conducted a Daubert evidentiary proceeding from November 3 through 6, 2008, and ultimately denied the government's request to exclude Defendant's witnesses at the guilt phase. See Doc. No. 780, Guilt Phase Order at 47. As part of these 2008 Daubert proceedings, Defendant proffered testimony and opinions from Dr. Myla Young (a neuropsychologist) and Dr. Pablo Stewart (a clinical psychiatrist). They opined, among other beliefs, that Defendant suffers from BIF and brain damage which impairs his ability to understand and adapt to stressful situations. Id. at 4. The government responded with Dr. Philip Resnick (a forensic psychiatrist) and Dr. Harold Hall (a psychologist and forensic neuropsychologist), who critiqued Drs. Young and Stewart's diagnoses and methodology. Id. Some of the evidence from this 2008 proceeding is relevant towards Atkins issues, as explained further below.

As a result of testimony during the November 2008 hearings, a question arose regarding Defendant's competency to stand trial. On March 9, 2009, Judge Ezra issued an Amended Order Granting the Government's Motion for: (1) a Hearing to Determine the Mental Competency of the Defendant to Stand Trial; and (2) a Psychiatric and Psychological Examination of the Defendant. Doc. No. 796. That Order led to examinations in 2009 of Defendant by United States Bureau of Prisons Drs. Elizabeth Tyner and Dr. Lea Ann Preston Baecht, and a June 2009 Forensic Report by Dr. Preston Baecht. See, e.g., Doc. No. 826, Order Re. Competency Rpt.; Doc No. 2065–5, Tr. June 25, 2012 (Dr. Tyner) at 27–28. On August 31, 2009, Defendant was found competent to stand trial. See Doc. Nos. 859 (oral ruling), 865 (written order).

For various reasons, the competency proceedings eventually led to Defendant's May 29, 2012 Motion to Exclude or Limit Testimony of Dr. Preston Baecht or Other Competence–Related Examiners. Doc. No. 1853. As a result, Judge Ezra held Daubert evidentiary hearings in June and August 2012, during which the court heard testimony from Drs. Tyner, Preston Baecht, and defense witness Dr. Kyle Boone. These 2012 Daubert hearings, like the 2008 Daubert hearings, resulted in some evidence also relevant to Atkins issues—and the parties have also proffered specific testimony from these 2012 proceedings for the court's consideration here.

Meanwhile, the government retained a neuropyschologist, Dr. Diana Goldstein, as a rebuttal witness as to Defendant's BIF theory. As part of her duties, Dr. Goldstein evaluated Defendant and conducted various neuropsychological tests in 2010. Dr. Goldstein's opinions were not proffered in this Atkins proceeding, but the parties have agreed that “raw test scores reported by Dr. Diana Goldstein, including Dr. Goldstein's WAIS–IV scores, and her neuropsychological assessment scores, can be used by the parties' mental health experts as bases for opinions on Mr. Williams's intellectual functioning and mental condition at the time of testing.” Doc. No. 2176, Stipulation Concerning Dr. Diana Goldstein's Data and Scoring Opinions at 2. The parties also stipulated that Dr. Goldstein's actual opinions as reflected in her reports shall not be the basis for any opinion by another expert—that is, the parties were permitted to consider Dr. Goldstein's test results but not rely on her opinions, interpretations, or analysis of those results. Id. at 2–3. Accordingly,...

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  • Smith v. Ryan
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • February 4, 2016
    ...altered the diagnosis of intellectual disability [cited in Atkins ] but have provided new terminology."); United States v. Williams, 1 F.Supp.3d 1124, 1146–47 (D.Hawaii 2014). Most important, the Arizona Court of Appeals strongly questioned Atkins and expressly rejected the more recent vers......
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    ...most credible, testimony from fact witnesses the Court finds most credible, and historical evidence from Roland's life. See Williams , 1 F.Supp.3d at 1147–48 ; Montgomery , 2014 WL 1516147, at *47 ; Davis , 611 F.Supp.2d at 492.iii. Analysis of the Experts' Assessment of Roland's Adaptive F......
  • Carr v. State
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    ...materially altered the diagnosis of intellectual disability but have provided new terminology." Id. (citing United States v. Williams , 1 F. Supp. 3d 1124, 1146 (D. Haw. 2014) ).¶26. The AAIDD articulates the skills domains as follows:The conceptual skills domain includes "language; reading......
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