United States v. Williams
| Decision Date | 27 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 18-143-JWD-RLB |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. LEON WILLIAMS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress (Doc. 19) filed by Leon Williams ("Defendant" or "Williams"). The Government opposes the motion. (Doc. 21.) Defendant filed a reply. (Doc. 22.) Following the May 21, 2019, evidentiary hearing (Doc. 30), both parties submitted post-hearing briefs (Docs. 35, 36), and the Government filed a post-hearing reply (Doc. 37). Further argument is not necessary. The Court has carefully considered the law, the facts in the record, and the arguments and submissions of the parties and is prepared to rule. For the following reasons, Defendant's motion is denied.
The basic facts are undisputed. On February 27, 2018, at around 4:15 p.m., Corporal Brian Jones and Sergeant Kyle Callihan of the Baton Rouge Police Department were stationed by a parking lot across from the federal courthouse, near the intersection of Florida Street and North Ninth Street. Defendant was a passenger in a silver 2003 Mercedes C230 sedan that was traveling down North Ninth Street toward Florida Street—though how they got to North Ninth Street is a contentious fact at issue.
The parties agree that Corporal Jones effectuated the stop and had the Mercedes pull into the parking lot. After the stop, Jones smelled marijuana. After prompting, the driver, Jerry Thomas, produced a small bag of marijuana and said that he and the Defendant had rolled a blunt. When asked about the blunt, Defendant said he ate it. Eventually, Callihan searched under the passenger seat, where Defendant had previously been sitting. Callihan found a pistol and more marijuana.
The parties also agree that, during the encounter, Callihan made some attempt at providing a Miranda warning, but they disagree as to whether it was done properly. Ultimately, however, Defendant made incriminating statements to the police.
Defendant was arrested and later indicted by a federal grand jury with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He now moves to suppress the evidence seized and all statements he made to the police.
As will be discussed below, there are four main questions in this case. The first is whether Corporal Jones had reasonable suspicion to believe that the Mercedes made an illegal left turn from Laurel Street onto North Ninth Street (the alleged basis for the stop). The second is whether Defendant has standing to complain about the search of the vehicle when he was a mere passenger and the gun was found underneath his seat. The third is whether, if there is standing, there was still probable cause to search the vehicle despite the driver producing a small bag of marijuana and the Defendant saying he swallowed a blunt.1 And the fourth is whether Defendant's statements to the police were the result of a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." United States v. Hunt, 253 F.3d 227, 230 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting U.S. Const. amend.IV). "The essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of 'reasonableness' upon law enforcement agents and other government officials in order to prevent arbitrary invasions of the privacy and security of citizens." Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-654, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979)). Accordingly, "the Supreme Court has determined that warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless they fall within a few narrowly defined exceptions." United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1147 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971)).
"While in general, on a motion to suppress, the defendant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the material in question was seized in violation of his constitutional rights, there are several situations where the burden shifts to the government." United States v. Roch, 5 F.3d 894, 897 (5th Cir. 1993). The Fifth Circuit has stated that one situation in which the burden shifts to the Government is when a defendant shows that he was subject to search without a warrant. Id. Consequently, because it is undisputed that Defendant was subject to a warrantless search, if he establishes standing, the Government bears the burden of proving the legality of the stop and the warrantless search by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178 n. 14, 94 S. Ct. 988, 996, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1974).
Defendant first contends that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop at the outset. Defendant maintains that their stated reason is "not supported by the officers' body camera footage nor do the police reports authored by the officers provide any detail or context as to the alleged illegal left turn." (Doc. 19-1 at 4.)
The Government responds that the officers had reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stopat the onset. Again, according to the Government, the officers were stationed under the overpass near the 900 block of Laurel Street. Corporal Jones observed the 2003 Mercedes exit the interstate at the Laurel Street exit and make an illegal left turn onto North Ninth Street. The Government urges that this location is well marked with signs prohibiting left turns.
Defendant replies: (Doc. 22 at 5.)
In post-hearing briefing, Defendant reiterates that Corporal Jones's alleged observations are "not corroborated by his partner and [are] not shown on his body camera recording." (Doc. 36 at 3 (footnote omitted).) According to Defendant, Jones could not have seen the Mercedes make an illegal left turn off I-110 from his position and the obstructions in his view. Defendant emphasizes that the illegal left turn was "nearly a block away" with "numerous trees, several large signs, and parked vehicles in between Jones and the location where the left turn would have occurred." (Doc. 36 at 3.) Defendant also asserts that "Jones's own body camera footage provides the best evidence of his obstructed view," as these videos show "trees and a large white sign directly between Jones and the intersection" at issue. (Doc. 36 at 3.) There was also a white sedan on Laurel Street at the intersection with North Ninth Street which, Defendant says, would have obstructed the view of the Mercedes. The footage also shows the Mercedes in the center lane of North Ninth Street, not the far-left lane. Neither Thomas nor Defendant agree or admit to making the turn, and Sergeant Callihan did not see the turn either. In sum: "Given Jones's obstructed view, the lack of corroboration by his camera or partner, and the evidence contradicting a left turn, Jones was simply mistaken [in] his belief that the Mercedes had turned left." (Doc. 36 at 4.) This maynot have been intentional, but, if wrong, Jones, by his own admission, had no reasonable suspicion to effectuate the stop.
After the Government concedes that Defendant has standing as a passenger to dispute the validity of the stop (Doc. 37 at 1), the Government argues that the video is not the best evidence of the alleged violation. The Government asserts: (1) the "camera was only activated after Corporal Jones witnessed the infraction and was moving toward[] flagging down the vehicle[,]" so "it did not capture the vehicle turning onto [North] Ninth Street nor did it capture the exact view Corporal Jones had at the time he observed the violation" (Doc. 37 at 2.); and (2) "the camera is not positioned in the area of Corporal Jones'[s] eyes/face." (Doc. 37 at 2.) Thus, according to the Government, Corporal Jones's testimony is the best evidence of what he saw. The Government then looks at the video and highlights how it does not support Defendant; for example, Defendant is wrong to say that he would have been in the far left lane, because (1) he falsely assumes that Defendant would have made a proper turn into the appropriate lane of traffic, and (2) the median at the corner of Laurel Street and North Ninth Street would have required a wide left turn, which would have put the Mercedes in the center lane. Moreover, Defendant made a certain statement to the police admitting that Thomas had made an illegal turn and that he was at fault.
Additionally, in its own original post-hearing briefing, the Government details the parts of Jones's testimony that supports reasonable suspicion, including a statement that he had a "clear line of sight from where he was standing to observe the traffic violation," that he was "positive he saw the vehicle illegally turn from the Laurel Street exit ramp, and there is no way to make a legal turn from that intersection." (Doc. 35 at 2 (citations omitted).) Further, while Sergeant Callihan did not observe the illegal turn, he confirmed that there was no legal way to make a left turn from that intersection and that the intersection is clearly marked with signs. The Government also pointsto the Defendant's own statements, where he said he could not believe all that happened from a wrong turn.
The Fifth Circuit analyzes the constitutionality of traffic stops under the standard articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). United States v. Berry, 664 F. App'x...
To continue reading
Request your trial