United States v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 15 March 2016
• Docket Number: 04-CR-1016 (NGG)
• Citation: 170 F.Supp.3d 347
• Parties: United States of America v. Ronell Wilson, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

170 F.Supp.3d 347

United States of America

v.Ronell Wilson, Defendant.

04-CR-1016 (NGG)

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed March 15, 2016

Carter H. Burwell, Colleen Elizabeth Kavanagh, Jack Smith, James G. McGovern, Jason Allen Jones, Celia Cohen, Shreve Ariail, United States Attorneys Office, Brooklyn, NY, for United States of America.

Colleen Quinn Brady, The Law Office of Colleen Quinn Brady, David Stern, Robert Soloway, Rothman, Schneider, Soloway & Stern, P.C., Richard Jasper, Law Offices of Richard Jasper, Beverly Van Ness, New York, NY, Sean Joseph Bolser, Federal Defenders of New York, Brooklyn, NY, Barry Fisher, Office of the Federal Defender, Albany, NY, Michael N. Burt, Law Office of Michael Burt, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS

, United States District Judge

On February 7, 2013, the court found that Defendant Ronell Wilson was not intellectually disabled¹ and, therefore, was eligible to receive the death penalty for the 2003 murder of two undercover police detectives. See United States v. Wilson, 922 F.Supp.2d 334 (E.D.N.Y.2013)

( “Wilson II”).² In reaching that decision, the court determined that Wilson had failed to show that he suffered from significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, a necessary prerequisite to a finding of intellectual disability. Id. at 368. Accordingly, the court declined to consider other requirements for a finding of intellectual disability—namely, whether Wilson suffered from significant deficits in adaptive functioning.³

Id. On July 24, 2013, a jury returned a unanimous verdict of death. (July 24, 2013, Special Jury Verdict Form (Dkt. 1437).) Consistent with this verdict, the court sentenced Wilson to death on September 11, 2013. (Addendum to J. & Order (Dkt. 1469).)

On June 25, 2014, the Second Circuit issued an order, sua sponte, remanding Wilson's case to this court to “reconsider its decision that Wilson is not intellectually disabled, in light of Hall v. Florida, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2014)

.” United States v. Wilson, 571 Fed.Appx. 19, 19 (2d Cir.2014) (Mem.) (internal citations omitted). The Second Circuit further instructed:

The District Court should address whether it needs to consider evidence of Wilson's adaptive deficits given Wilson's IQ scores. The District Court may consider any other issue it deems appropriate and conduct additional factfinding if warranted. We express no opinion regarding how, if at all, Hall

affects the District Court's original analysis.

Id. at 19–20

.

Here, the court interprets Hall

as holding that, where application of the standard error measurement with a confidence interval of 95% results in a range of possible intelligence quotient (“IQ”) test scores that reach 70 or below, the defendant has demonstrated that he or she suffers from significantly subaverage intellectual functioning. Under this interpretation, Wilson has satisfied this first requirement; therefore, the court must consider evidence of Wilson's adaptive functioning in order to determine whether he is intellectually disabled. For the reasons stated below, the court finds that Wilson has demonstrated significant deficits in adaptive functioning, and he therefore meets the legal standard for proving intellectual disability. Accordingly, Wilson is ineligible to receive the death sentence that has been imposed on him.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

The court presumes familiarity with the facts of this case. However, an overview of the procedural history is in order. On December 20, 2006, a jury convicted Wilson of five capital counts⁴ stemming from his 2003 robbery and murder of New York Police Department detectives James Nemorin and Rodney Andrews. (Jury Verdict (Dkt. 351); see also Second Superseding Indictment (Dkt. 179) ¶¶ 7, 9.) The same jury voted unanimously to impose the death penalty (Jan. 30, 2007, Special Jury Verdict Form (Dkt. 360)), and the court accordingly sentenced Wilson to death (J. (Dkt. 407)). On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed Wilson's convictions but vacated his death sentence on the ground that the penalty proceeding had been corrupted by prosecutorial misconduct. United States v. Whitten, 610 F.3d 168 (2d Cir.2010)

. The circuit court remanded the case to this court for a retrial of the penalty phase. Id. at 205.

On remand, Wilson argued that he was intellectually disabled and, therefore, ineligible for the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment, see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)

, and the Federal Death Penalty Act (the “FDPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c). After a nine-day evidentiary hearing (the “Atkins hearing”) (Atkins Hr'g Tr. (“Tr.”) (Dkts. 1002, 1008, 1528-30, 1531-34)), and the submission of post-hearing briefs (Def.'s Mem. (Dkt. 982); Gov't's Mem. (Dkt. 984); Def.'s Reply (Dkt. 999)), the court found that Wilson was not intellectually disabled, because his IQ scores indicated sufficient intellectual functioning. Wilson II, 922 F.Supp.2d at 368. As a result, the court did not consider evidence of deficits in Wilson's adaptive functioning. Id. Wilson proceeded to a second penalty trial before a new jury. The second jury also voted unanimously to impose the death penalty (July 24, 2013, Special Jury Verdict Form), and the court again sentenced Wilson to death (Addendum to J. & Order).

On May 27, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Hall v. Florida.

In that case, the petitioner challenged a Florida law that foreclosed further exploration of a capital defendant's purported intellectual disability if his or her IQ score was greater than 70. 134 S.Ct. at 1990. The Florida Supreme Court had affirmed the lower court ruling that Hall was not intellectually disabled, based on his IQ scores above 70, without conducting further analysis.⁵

Id. at 1992. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that Florida law conflicted with the majority of states that had rejected strict IQ score cutoffs in favor of considering a score's “standard error of measurement,” or “SEM.” Id. at 1996. The Court also observed that Florida's approach disregarded the “unanimous professional consensus” in the medical field that IQ scores should be read not as a single fixed number but as a range quantified by the SEM. Id. at 2000. Accordingly, the Court held that Florida's strict cutoff rule created an “unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed,” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1990. The Court further declared that “[b]y failing to take into account the standard error measurement, Florida's law not only contradicts the test's own design but also bars an essential part of a sentencing court's inquiry into adaptive functioning.” Id. at 2001.

It was in light of Hall

that the Second Circuit remanded Wilson's case a second time. See Wilson, 571 Fed.Appx. at 19. However, the Circuit's remand order did not indicate precisely how or even whether Hall affected this court's original analysis of Wilson's Atkins claim. Id. at 19–20. Accordingly, the court ordered the parties to submit additional briefing setting forth the pertinent issues from Hall and proposing what further steps the court should take pursuant to the remand order. (See Tr. of July 1, 2014, Proceedings (Dkt. 1504) at 5.) Wilson filed his briefing as a motion for reconsideration, along with six expert declarations.

(Mot. for Recons. (“Def.'s Mot.”) (Dkt. 1505).) The Government submitted a response in opposition (Resp. in Opp'n (“Gov't's Resp.”) (Dkt. 1508)), and Wilson submitted a reply (Ltr. in Reply (“Def.'s Reply”) (Dkt. 1509)).

On April 28, 2015, the court ordered further briefing on the question of whether the 2013 publication—after the original Atkins

hearing—of an updated version of the American Psychiatric Association's (the “APA”) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders(5th ed. 2013) (the “DSM-V”), required the court to conduct additional factfinding with regard to Wilson's Atkins claim. (Apr. 28, 2015, Order (Dkt. 1510).) Wilson filed a response requesting a hearing (Def.'s Not. in Resp. (Dkt. 1513)), and he submitted an additional expert declaration in support thereof (Def.'s Ltr.-Reply (Dkt. 1520)). The Government filed a response opposing a further hearing. (Gov't's Ltr.-Resp. (Dkt. 1519).)

On October 22, 2015, the court ordered the parties to further brief the following question: “In analyzing Wilson's adaptive functioning, what additional evidence, if any, would the court need to consider, beyond that which is already in the record from the previous Atkins

hearing?” (Oct. 22, 2015, Order (Dkt. 1522) at 2.) Wilson filed a response (Def.'s Ltr.-Resp. (Dkt. 1524)), as did the Government (Gov't's Pre-Trial Mem. (Dkt. 1525)).

B. Issues Presented on Remand

As outlined below, the court has identified three main issues presented by the Second Circuit's remand. First, the court addresses whether the intervening publication of the DSM-V fundamentally alters the legal standard or requires the court to re-open the Atkins

hearing to conduct further factfinding. Second, the court must determine whether Hall's treatment of IQ scores requires the court to reconsider its prong one analysis of Wilson's intellectual functioning. Third, assuming Wilson demonstrates significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, the court must determine whether Wilson satisfies the remaining independent requirements of the legal standard for intellectual disability—namely, significant deficits in adaptive functioning and onset of the condition before the age of 18.

II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY

In 1988, Congress enacted the FDPA, which provides that “a sentence of death shall not be carried out upon a person who is [intellectually disabled].” 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c)

. In 2002, the Supreme Court held in Atkins that the execution of intellectually disabled defendants violates the Eighth Amendment's bar on cruel and unusual punishment. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321...