United States v. Wilson
| Decision Date | 05 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:15-cr-00046-NE |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. LANCE AARON WILSON, Defendant-Movant. |
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT A SENTENCE UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255 IN LARGE PART AND SETTING SCHEDULE FOR FURTHER BRIEFING AS TO ONE CLAIM (DOC NOS. 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 152, 155, 156, 161, 163 201)
Lance Aaron Wilson, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se moves to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. Nos. 146-49, 150, 152, 155-56, 161 163, 201.) The government filed its opposition and movant filed his reply thereto. (Doc. Nos. 227, 237.) For the reasons explained below, movant's motion will in large part be denied at this time and the court will direct the filing of a sur-reply by the government addressing movant's claim 2(f) in which he has alleged that he received ineffective assistance due to his counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal.
In 2016, movant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to conspiring to distribute oxycodone and hydrocodone in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). (Doc. Nos. 94 at 2; 95.) It was determined that the advisory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines called for a term of imprisonment in his case of between 70 and 87 months, but the U.S. Probation Office recommended a downward variance based upon consideration of the sentencing factors set out at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and a sentence of 48 months in prison. (Doc. No. 107 at 29.) Movant elected to delay his sentencing so he could participate in a drug rehabilitation program at Delancey Street in an effort to ultimately be sentenced to a term of imprisonment below the recommended 48 months, despite the then-assigned District Judge's explicit warning to movant that he would receive a sentence well above probation's 48-month recommendation if he were to be unsuccessful in completing that rehabilitation program. (Doc. No. 178 at 7-11.) Shortly after entering, movant was terminated from Delancey Street for violating the program's rules. (Doc. Nos. 130, 142.) On March 19, 2018, movant returned to court for sentencing and was sentenced to 96 months in prison. (Doc. Nos. 141; 143 at 2.)
On May 29, 2018, movant filed a motion with the court seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. No. 149.) The motion was one of several simultaneously filed documents, all of which collaterally attacked his sentence, and the additional filings are construed as raising additional grounds for habeas relief or as supplementing movant's § 2255 motion. (Doc. Nos. 146-148; 150-52.) Movant also filed additional § 2255 motions, construed as amendments and supplements on May 31, 2018; June 7, 2018; October 3, 2018; October 12, 2018; and April 19, 2019. (Doc. Nos. 155, 156, 161, 163, 201.) Due in part to the number of movant's filings, the government was given additional time to respond thereto on several occasions. (Doc. Nos. 164, 172, 191, 200, 212, 219, 226.) Broadly speaking, movant's grounds for relief include claims of ineffective or conflicted assistance of counsel; an unknowing or involuntary plea of guilty; and various alleged sentencing errors. On September 27, 2019, the government filed its opposition to the cumulative grounds raised in the § 2255 motion, amendments, and supplements. (Doc. No. 227.) On December 30, 2019, movant filed his reply. (Doc. No. 237.)
A federal prisoner making a collateral attack against the validity of his or her conviction or sentence must do so by way of a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence pursuant to § 2255, filed in the court which imposed sentence. Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 1988). A § 2255 motion entitles a federal prisoner to relief “[i]f the court finds that . . . there has been . . .a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).
Generally, only a narrow range of claims fall within the scope of § 2255. United States v. Wilcox, 640 F.2d 970, 972 (9th Cir. 1981). To warrant relief, a movant must demonstrate the existence of an error of constitutional magnitude that had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the guilty plea or the jury's verdict. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993); see also United States v. Montalvo, 331 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2003) (). The alleged error of law must be “a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)).
As a pro se litigant, the movant's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore an obvious failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim. “Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.” James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989) (); Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1980) (); Neighbors v. United States, 457 F.2d 795, 795 (9th Cir. 1972) ().
Movant's motion, amendments, and supplements present many issues often overlapping and frequently repetitious. The claims may be consolidated into five primary grounds for relief, three of which include subclaims. The first category concerns whether movant's guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) related to his change of plea. In this regard, movant alleges that: (a) his attorney had a conflict of interest throughout his representation that arose when the attorney represented a co-defendant; (b) movant was not told by his attorney that he had a defense to the charges brought against him; (c) movant was pressured into accepting a plea bargain; (d) his counsel told movant to plead guilty or he would receive a harsher prison sentence; (e) his counsel promised movant a 48-month sentence because a more culpable co-defendant received a shorter sentence; (f) movant did not know that his sentencing guideline offense level would be increased by a firearm enhancement at sentencing; (g) his counsel would not file motions on movant's behalf or provide discovery to movant; (h) his counsel failed to advise movant of the elements of conspiracy; and (i) his counsel misled movant and convinced him to plead guilty. (Doc. Nos. 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 152, 155, 156, 161.)
The second category covers IAC allegations due to a variety of purported mistakes made by his counsel. Those mistakes encompass each stage of the litigation process and include claims that counsel: (a) failed to argue movant was entitled to a reduction in his offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2D.1(b)(16); (b) failed to argue that the drug quantity involved in his offense of conviction was required to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; (c) failed to argue that movant was not responsible for all the drugs in the conspiracy and failed to ask the court to make particularized findings as to the drug quantity for which movant was responsible; (d) did not have federal experience in that he was only licensed for 14 months; (e) failed to argue for a two-level reduction for a minimal role where movant lacked full knowledge of the conspiracy and failed to profit from it; (f) failed to file a notice of appeal based on the firearm upward adjustment applied to movant's sentencing guidelines; and (g) failed to investigate the reasons why movant was terminated from Delancey Street. (Doc. Nos. 146, 147, 149, 150, 152, 155, 156, 161, 163, 201.)
The third category of grounds for relief involves an alleged Sixth Amendment violation related to the government's claimed failure to prove the drug quantity at issue beyond a reasonable doubt.[1] (Doc. Nos. 147, 149, 150, 152, 156, 163.)
The fourth category of grounds upon which movant seeks relief concerns alleged sentencing errors. In this regard, movant avers that: (a) the sentence imposed in his case exceeded the maximum sentence authorized by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B); (b) the court calculated the advisory sentencing guideline range incorrectly by declining to apply a reduction in the offense level under U.S.S.G. §2D.1(b)(16); (c) a quantity-related upward adjustment in the offense level could not be imposed because the drug quantity was not found beyond a reasonable doubt; (d) movant could not be found responsible, and an upward adjustment applied, for the drug quantity in the entire conspiracy because he had only begun a relationship with his co-defendant five months prior to his arrest; (e) movant received a disparate sentence when the court sentenced him to 96 months in prison yet sentenced his co-defendant to 48 months' imprisonment; and (f) movant was allegedly promised 48 months in prison but received a 96-month sentence. (Doc. Nos. 146, 147, 149, 150, 152, 156, 161, 163.)
As noted at the outset, movant entered into a...
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