United States v. Windham

• Decision Date: 21 November 2022
• Docket Number: 21-3881
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Seth T. WINDHAM, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

53 F.4th 1006

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Seth T. WINDHAM, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 21-3881

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Decided and Filed: November 21, 2022

ON BRIEF: Agnes Trujillo, TRUJILLO & ASSOCIATES, PLLC, Strawberry Plains, Tennessee, for Appellant. Damoun Delaviz, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Akron, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: COLE, CLAY, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

CLAY, Circuit Judge.

In May 2021, Defendant Seth Windham pleaded guilty to federal kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201. Windham now argues on appeal that no factual basis supported his guilty plea, and that he was unaware of the nature of the charges against him. For the reasons set forth below, the Court AFFIRMS Windham's conviction based on the district court's acceptance of Windham's guilty plea.

I. BACKGROUND

In March 2021, a grand jury charged Windham with one count of kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The grand jury charged that Windham "did willfully and unlawfully ... kidnap, abduct, and carry away a person" referred to as M.S., and held M.S. "for ransom and reward and otherwise, and did use a means, facilities, and instrumentalities of interstate and foreign commerce, namely, a cellular telephone and a motor vehicle, in committing and in furtherance of such offense ...."

Windham's attorney told the district court at the arraignment that he had gone over the indictment "word by word" with Windham. The court then advised Windham that in the first and only count, he was "charged with kidnapping and with aiding and abetting kidnapping" in violation of the federal kidnapping statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). In a pro se motion, Windham later wrote that he had "been indicted [on] one count of ‘kidnapping[,]’ " confirming that he understood that he had been charged with a single count.

Despite initially pleading not guilty, Windham pleaded guilty in May of 2021 pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. Windham's plea agreement provided that he pleaded guilty to a single count of kidnapping. The ninth paragraph of that agreement listed the elements of the offense to which he pleaded guilty, listing the elements of both 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) and of aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2. The plea agreement also included a written factual basis for the crime. By signing that section, Windham stipulated that he willfully and unlawfully kidnapped M.S. and held him "for ransom and reward and otherwise ...." According to the plea, during the kidnapping, Windham and his accomplices "demanded of M.S. where the money was and demanded that M.S. return the money." In addition, Windham admitted that he and his accomplices held M.S. at gunpoint for an extended period of time. Importantly, Windham also confirmed that he used a cell phone and a motor vehicle in furtherance of that offense.

At his change of plea hearing, the district court asked Windham about the plea agreement. Windham confirmed to the court that he: (1) signed the plea agreement; (2) initialed each page; and (3) read and reviewed each paragraph with his attorney. Subsequently, the court told Windham, "in Count 1, you are charged with kidnapping in violation, and with aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 18 United States Code § 1201(a)(1) and § 2." Shortly thereafter, Windham pleaded guilty. Several months later, the court sentenced Windham to 120 months in prison.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Factual Basis for the Guilty Plea

1. Standard of Review

When, as in this case, a defendant pleads guilty before a district court and fails to challenge the factual sufficiency of that plea, the Court reviews the record for plain error. See United States v. Mobley , 618 F.3d 539, 544 (6th Cir. 2010) ; United States v. Berryhill , 587 F. App'x 310, 312 (6th Cir. 2014) ; United States v. Taylor , 627 F.3d 1012, 1017 (6th Cir. 2010). "To show plain error, a defendant must show (1) error (2) that was obvious or clear, (3) that affected defendant's substantial rights and (4) that affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings." United States v. Wallace , 597 F.3d 794, 802 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Vonner , 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) ).

This appeal also involves questions of statutory interpretation and constitutional law. The Court reviews such questions de novo . United States v. Young , 533 F.3d 453, 460 (6th Cir. 2008) ; First Choice Chiropractic, LLC v. DeWine , 969 F.3d 675, 681 (6th Cir. 2020).

2. Analysis

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3) requires a district court to determine whether a factual basis supports a defendant's guilty plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). That requirement exists "to ensure the accuracy of the plea through some evidence that a defendant actually committed the offense." Mobley , 618 F.3d at 545 (quotation and citations omitted). In determining whether a plea agreement satisfies Rule 11(b)(3), this Court may consider "the entire record ...." United States v. Pitts , 997 F.3d 688, 697 (6th Cir. 2021) (quotation and citations omitted). In this case, Windham contends that there was not sufficient evidence to establish that he committed the federal crime of kidnapping.

A person may be guilty of federal kidnapping if he: (1) unlawfully kidnaps a person; (2) holds that person "for ransom or reward or otherwise"; and (3) "travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the mail or any means, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce in committing or in furtherance of the commission of the offense ...." 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1).

a. Ransom or Reward or Otherwise

Windham incorrectly contends that the record fails to set forth a sufficient factual basis that he held M.S. for ransom, reward, or otherwise.

Section 1201(a) of the federal kidnapping statute makes it a crime to unlawfully confine "and hold[ ] for ransom or reward or otherwise any person ...." 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a). This Court interprets the word "otherwise" broadly. United States v. Small , 988 F.3d 241, 250 (6th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). Indeed, the Court has recognized that "Congress intended the statute to apply to persons who had been held not only for reward, but for any other reason ." Id. (emphasis added) (quotation and citation omitted). Thus, the word "otherwise" refers to "any objective of a kidnaping which the defendant may find of sufficient benefit to induce him to commit the kidnaping." United States v. Sensmeier , 2 F. App'x 473, 476 (6th Cir. 2001). In this case, Windham admitted in his plea agreement that he and his accomplices kidnapped M.S. and repeatedly demanded money from him. That admission is more than sufficient to serve as a factual basis that he unlawfully held M.S. "for ransom or reward or otherwise ...." 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) ; see also Small , 988 F.3d at 250.

b. Instrumentalities of Interstate Commerce

In 2006, Congress amended the federal kidnapping statute. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 213, 120 Stat. 587, 616 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) ). The statute now applies "when ‘the offender travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the mail or any means, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce in committing or in furtherance of the commission of the offense.’ " Small , 988 F.3d at 251 (emphasis removed) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) ). Thus, the statute now reaches "kidnappings in which the defendant crosses state lines or channels or facilities of interstate commerce were used to commit the crime, even when the physical kidnapping occurred within the borders of a single state." Id. (citation omitted). In this case, neither party contests that the kidnapping took place intrastate. Similarly, neither party challenges that Windham pleaded guilty to using both a cell phone and an automobile while committing the crime. The issue is whether, where the record does not establish that Windham used the cell phone or automobile to conduct interstate activity, the cell phone and automobile constitute instrumentalities of interstate commerce under § 1201(a)(1). In what appears to be a question of first impression for this Court, the Court finds that Windham's intrastate use of a cell phone and automobile satisfies § 1201(a)(1) ’s interstate commerce requirements.

The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution "delegates to Congress the power ‘[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.’ " United States v. Lopez , 514 U.S. 549, 552, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ). That clause "contemplates congressional efforts ‘to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses.’ " Small , 988 F.3d at 252 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States , 379 U.S. 241, 256, 85 S.Ct. 348, 13 L.Ed.2d 258 (1964) ). To that end, the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate some activities that occur entirely intrastate. See United States v. Morrison , 529 U.S. 598, 609, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000). However, even under the Supreme Court's "modern, expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Congress’ regulatory authority is not without effective bounds." Id. at 608, 120 S.Ct. 1740 (citing Lopez , 514 U.S. at 557, 115 S.Ct. 1624 ). Thus,

the scope of the interstate commerce power must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized government.

Lopez , 514 U.S. at 557, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (quotation and citations omitted).

With those limitations in mind,

modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence has identified three

...