United States v. Winn, 170-68-172-68.
Decision Date | 23 June 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 170-68-172-68.,170-68-172-68. |
Citation | 411 F.2d 415 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul Arthur WINN, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Thomas CHANDLER, a/k/a Tommy Chandler, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mannie Mayo BRAGG, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
James Edward Douglas, Oklahoma City, Okl., for appellants Winn and Chandler.
Carroll Samara, Oklahoma City, Okl., for appellant Bragg.
John E. Green, Oklahoma City, Okl. (B. Andrew Potter, Oklahoma City, Okl., with him on brief), for appellee.
Before MURRAH, Chief Judge, and LEWIS and HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judges.
Appellants Paul Arthur Winn and Thomas Chandler were convicted by a jury on four substantive violations relating to the illegal manufacture of intoxicating liquors and for conspiring to violate the Internal Revenue Laws. Sections 5601(a) (1), (4), and (7), 5686(a) of Title 26, United States Code, and Section 371 of Title 18. Appellant Bragg was charged and convicted only on the conspiracy count. They were jointly tried and sentence was imposed on the jury verdicts.
On appeal, all three challenge their convictions on the following grounds: 1. The trial court gave a coercive Allen-type instruction after the jury had deliberated and reported itself deadlocked; 2. They were denied a fair and impartial trial due to bias on the part of the trial judge; and 3. The sentences imposed were excessive. In addition, Bragg alone alleges the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. For reasons we shall state, we affirm the judgments.
Once again we face the vexatious issue of the propriety of an Allen-type instruction. This instruction received its name from one approved by the Supreme Court in Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896).
Despite much criticism levelled at this type of charge1 this Court since Berger v. United States, 62 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1932) has cautiously approved such an instruction in appropriate circumstances.2 At the same time we have said more than once that an instruction of this kind would be more "appropriately influential and far less vulnerable to the charge of coercion" if given before the jury initially retires. Burroughs v. United States, 365 F.2d 431, 434 (10th Cir. 1966).
The fear has always been that an admonitory word from the judge to a deadlocked jury will undermine the sanctity of their deliberations. But we have thought that a proper supplemental charge can be given without prejudicial effect "provided the jury is given to understand they are not required to give up their conscientiously held convictions." Burrup v. United States, supra 371 F.2d at 558. Actually, the inquiry in each case is whether the language used by the judge can be said to be coercive, or merely the proper exercise of his common law right and duty to guide and assist the jury toward a fair and impartial verdict. Elbel v. United States, supra 364 F.2d at 136. In our case the jury reported itself unable to agree after 4 hours of deliberations. The jury was thereupon recalled and instructed:
One hour and 15 minutes after again retiring, the jury returned the verdicts herein challenged.
The brunt of Appellants' argument is that the statement that "this is a comparatively simple case" prejudicially intimidated the minority jurors and was not remedied by the later statement that "The Court never wants to force a verdict of any kind under any circumstances". And that this is especially true because of the court's failure to remind the jury that the defendants were presumptively innocent and the Government had the burden of proving them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, citing Berger v. United States, supra.
It would, of course, be more palatable if the jury were again reminded of the presumption of innocence and burden of proof, and, more importantly, told they must not give up their conscientiously held views. But there is no ritual of words for common law instructions in federal courts. The question is whether the language used was coercive, not whether the judge used the magic words. Appraising the instruction as a whole, in its context, we think the jury was given to understand that the judge had no intention to force any kind of verdict and if, after a little more deliberation, they were unable to reach a verdict, appropriate action would be taken. We cannot say that the words used were reversibly coercive.
The final issue of substance is Bragg's assertion that the evidence was insufficient to support his conspiracy conviction. Viewing the evidence with its reasonable inferences in favor of the Government, we cannot agree with Appellant. Cotton v. United States, 409 F. 2d 1049 (10th Cir. 1969).
No objection was made to the court's instructions on conspiracy and they thus come to us as the law of the case. Rule 30, Fed.R.Cr.P. 18 U.S.C. The trial judge pertinently and clearly told the jury that And see Jones v. United States, 365 F.2d 87 (10th Cir. 1966). It is not enough that the evidence might have been sufficient to support an aider and abettor conviction. Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 620, 69 S.Ct. 766, 93 L.Ed. 919 (1949).
The record reveals the following situation: Winn, Chandler, and Madison were convicted of operating and conspiring to operate an illegal still south of Guthrie, Oklahoma, for the manufacture of intoxicating liquor. On appeal, neither Winn nor Chandler challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to convict them and Madison does not appeal. Winn and Chandler were both observed by government agents working at the still. As to Bragg, the record reveals the following: A red truck, owned by Bragg, was used by Winn on three occasions to pick up large quantities of sugar (a prime ingredient in the manufacture of alcoholic beverages). On the last occasion,...
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