United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council of New Orleans

• Decision Date: 25 March 1893
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. WORKINGMEN'S AMALGAMATED COUNCIL OF NEW ORLEAN et al.

54 F. 994

UNITED STATES v. WORKINGMEN'S AMALGAMATED COUNCIL OF NEW ORLEAN et al.

United States Circuit Court, E.D. Louisiana.

March 25, 1893

F. B Earhart, U.S. Atty.

A. H Leonard, M. Marks, and Evans & Dunn, for defendants.

BILLINGS District Judge.

This cause is submitted upon an application for an injunction on the bill of complaint, answer, and numerous affidavits and exhibits. The bill of complaint in this case is filed by the United States under the act of congress entitled 'An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraint and monopolies,' (26 St.at Large, p. 209.) The substance of the bill is that there is a gigantic and widespread combination of the members of a multitude of separate organizations for the purpose of restraining the commerce among the several states and with foreign countries. It avers that a disagreement between the warehousemen and their employes and the principal draymen and their subordinates had been adopted by all the organizations named in the bill until, by this vast combination of men and of organizations it was threatened that, unless there was an acquiescence in the demands of the subordinate workmen and draymen, all the men in all of the defendant organizations would leave work, and would allow no work in any department of business; that violence was threatened and used in support of this demand; and that this demand included the interstate and foreign commerce which flows through the city of New Orleans. The bill further states that the proceedings on the part of the defendants had taken such a vast and ramified proportion that, in consequence of the threats of the defendants, the whole business of the city of New Orleans was paralyzed, and the transit of goods and merchandise which was being conveyed through it from state to state, and to and from foreign countries, was totally interrupted. The elaborate argument and brief of the solicitors for the defendants presents six objections.

The defendants urge (1) that, the strike or cessation of labor being ended, and labor resumed throughout all branches of business, there is no need for an injunction. I know of no rule which is better settled than that the question as to the maintenance of a bill, and the granting of relief to a complainant, is to be determined by the status existing at the time of filing the bill. Rights do not ebb and flow. If they are invaded, and recourse to courts of justice is rendered necessary, it is no defense to the invasion of a right, either admitted or proved, that since the institution of the suit the invasion has ceased. With emphasis would this be true where, as here, the right to invade is not disclaimed. The question, then, is, what was the state of facts at the time of and prior to the filing of the bill? or whether, if the facts alleged in the bill were true at that time, there was need of an injunction.

The defendants urge (2) that the right of the complainants depends upon an unsettled question of law. The theory of the defense is that this case does not fall within the purview of the statute; that the statute prohibited monopolies and combinations which, using words in a general sense, were of capitalists, and not of laborers. I think the congressional debates show that the statute had its origin in the evils of massed capital; but, when the congress came to formulating the prohibition which is the yardstick for measuring the complainant's right to the injunction, it expressed it in these words: 'Every contract or combination in the form of trust, or otherwise in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. ' The subject had so broadened in the minds of the legislation that the source of the evil was not regarded as material, and the evil in its entirety is dealt with. They made the interdiction include combinations of labor, as well as capital; in fact, all combinations in restraint of commerce, without reference to the character of the persons who entered into them. It is true this statute has not been much expounded by judges, but, as it seems to me, its meaning, as far as relates to the sort of combinations to which it is to apply, is manifest, and that it includes combinations which are composed of laborers acting in the interest of laborers.

The defendants urge (3) that, the answer being under oath, and denying all the allegations of the bill, the injunction cannot issue. Before the adoption of the amendment to the forty-first rule in equity, it was a rule in chancery practice that, where the answer was under oath, and denied all the equities of the bill, the injunction should be refused; but, since in this case the oath of the respondents is waived in the bill, their answer, under rule 41, can be used at this hearing with the probative force of an affidavit alone, and no longer has necessarily the effect claimed for it by the defendants' solicitors.

The defendants urge (4) that the proofs in the case are vague, and insufficient to establish the allegations of the bill. When I consider the affidavits of individuals, and the proclamations of the governor of the state of Louisiana and the mayor of the city of New Orleans, and the statements in the public journals, supported by testimony, and the affidavits filed in this cause, I find the material allegations of the bill fully sustained. Not only was the flow of commerce through the city of New Orleans purposely arrested, but even the transportation of the goods and merchandise from the government warehouses to the landings was forcibly stopped. The following exhibits in the case, consisting of proclamations of the governor of Louisiana and the mayor of New Orleans, taken from the official journals, manifestoes, and the recitals of the sayings of the defendants, taken from the public newspapers, which have not been disproved by the respondents, show, as matter of history, the vast proportions of the interruption caused by the defendants to the prosecution of all the branches of business within the city of New Orleans, and the purpose with which it was done, to wit, that no business was to be transacted till the demands made by the employes of the warehousemen and the subordinate draymen were complied with:

'A General Strike Ordered by the Amalgamated Council for To-Morrow, Unless the Merchants Recognize the Union this Evening.

'President Leonard's Statement.

'When the people of New Orleans awake to-morrow morning, they will probably find that one of the largest strikes that has ever taken place in this city has been inaugurated. To-day, at 12:30 o'clock, President Leonard, of the Amalgamated Council, made his promised statement to the members of the press relative to last night's meeting of the council. Mr. Leonard said that it had been decided at the meeting to order a general strike for to-morrow morning, unless the merchants ask for a conference this afternoon. The unions were determined to compel the employers to recognize them, and they took this step to force this recognition, if possible. Mr. Leonard further said that every trade and line over which the council has jurisdiction will go out, barring none. If at any time during the strike the merchants manifest a desire to recognize committee appointed to meet a similar committee from the merchants. The committee of fifteen of the Amalgamated Council will remain in session for some hours this evening, and the employers will thus be given their last chance to accede to the demands of the strikers.'

'The Strike Ordered.

'Hall Amalgamated Council, New Orleans, November 4, 1892.

'At a meeting of presidents of the labor unions and organizations, held on Friday, November 4, 1892, at the Screwmen's Hall, the following manifesto was adopted and ordered submitted to all the members of labor unions and organizations in the city of New Orleans:

'To

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