United States v. Wren, 11-2491
| Decision Date | 11 June 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 11-2491,11-2491 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAJUAN LAMARR WREN Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 13a0564n.06
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Before: MARTIN and COOK, Circuit Judges; GRAHAM, District Judge*
COOK, Circuit Judge. Following convictions for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin and felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, defendant Dajuan Wren appeals, challenging the denial of his motions to suppress evidence obtained by a search warrant and wiretaps, the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions, and the reasonableness of his sentence. We AFFIRM.
The DEA began investigating co-defendant Michael Cathey aka "Moe Green" after receiving information about his involvement in narcotics trafficking. The DEA identified Dajuan Wren asCathey's heroin supplier. DEA Special Agent Bryan Sartori observed an encounter between Wren's white Range Rover and Cathey's car. Wren and Cathey's cars pulled next to one another briefly before going their separate ways. Approximately 50 minutes after this meeting, a wiretap recorded Cathey telling an associate that he had a new source of heroin.
Two days later, additional intercepted calls between Cathey and Wren alerted Sartori that the two planned to meet that day. Sartori followed Cathey as he went to a nearby hotel where he noticed the white Range Rover parked. Cathey exited the hotel's bar area fifteen minutes later and left the hotel. A credit card receipt showed Wren stayed at the hotel during this time.
Cathey spoke to Antonio Simmons, a co-defendant, after the hotel meeting. Sartori interpreted the call to mean that Cathey had just obtained narcotics. Another intercepted call between Wren and Cathey informed the DEA that they were going to conduct a transaction in which Wren's vehicle would approach Cathey's car and Wren would roll down his back window. Soon after, Sartori observed Cathey's vehicle approach Wren's white Range Rover, before the two suddenly drove away. Authorities pulled over Cathey because he was the target of the investigation at that time and seized $18,000.
The DEA executed a search warrant at 137 Allenhurst Avenue, a residence owned by Wren that the DEA had staked out. Inside the residence's master bedroom, the DEA found a money counter, a bag containing over $50,000 (rubber-banded and vacuum sealed in plastic), a vacuumsealer with plastic packaging, a package of rubber gloves, and rubber bands. Agents also found a gun safe containing a 100-round drum magazine for an assault rifle in the bedroom.
The government also presented evidence of a drug ledger found in the master bedroom at the Allenhurst house. One name found in the ledger was "Razor" or "Razor Blade," whom authorities identified as co-defendant David Wynn. Wynn testified that Wren supplied him with 250 grams of heroin for $20,000. There was also an entry for a sale to "Moe," indicating Wren sold Cathey 200 grams of heroin for $15,000.
In the residence's attached garage, agents found a loaded Glock 9mm, semi-automatic handgun with an extended magazine and laser sight in the glove compartment of a 2007 burgundy Mercedes. The vehicle's certificate of title was found in the residence and listed Dirty Glove Entertainment, Wren's company, as the owner.
The government indicted Wren for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846, and felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Wren filed motions to suppress evidence seized from wiretaps and from the search of 137 Allenhurst. The district court denied these motions. After a jury trial, Wren was convicted of both charges and received a 216-month sentence. Wren timely appeals, challenging the denial of his motions to suppress, the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions, and the reasonableness of his sentence.
Wren challenges the validity of the warrant issued to search his home for lack of probable cause. We bypass the probable-cause inquiry because we conclude that the officers relied in good faith on a facially-valid warrant issued by a "neutral and detached" magistrate. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905, 913-15, 922 (1984) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, courts should not suppress "evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant." United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922) (internal quotation marks omitted). An officer's reliance on a warrant is objectively unreasonable when the affidavit so lacks indicia of probable cause that it "states suspicions, or conclusions, without providing some 'underlying factual circumstances regarding veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge.'" United States v. Van Shutters, 163 F.3d 331, 337 (6th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted); accord United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744, 748 (6th Cir. 2005). This court reviews de novo the applicability of the good-faith exception. United States v. Washington, 380 F.3d 236, 241 (6th Cir. 2004).
The facts set forth in Special Agent Sartori's affidavit evidence the agents' objective reasonableness in relying on the search warrant. Sartori observed what he believed to be two narcotics transactions between Cathey and Wren, and both involved Wren's white Range Rover. Corroborating one of these transactions, co-defendant Simmons told Sartori that he met Cathey because Cathey wanted him to "mix" or "cut" heroin Cathey had received from Wren. A public database listed Wren as the owner of 137 Allenhurst, and Wren's white Range Rover was parked there. The affidavit connected Wren to the residence and to the white Range Rover, and also connected the Range Rover to the residence. The agents' reliance on the search warrant was objectively reasonable. See Washington, 380 F.3d at 243 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (good-faith exception met where "[t]here was a visible nexus connecting [the defendant] to the house, [the defendant] to the [the car], and the [car] to the house"). We therefore affirm the district court's denial of the motion to suppress evidence seized from 137 Allenhurst.
Wren also asserts that the affidavit supporting authorization of the wiretaps lacked a showing of necessity.
A law-enforcement official's application for wiretap authority requires "a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). This ensures that a wiretap is not used as the initial step in an investigation or when more traditionalinvestigative techniques could suffice. United States v. Rice, 478 F.3d 704, 710 (6th Cir. 2007). Law enforcement officials must give serious consideration to non-wiretap techniques prior to applying for wiretap authority and explain why, under the particular circumstances, such techniques would be, or are, inadequate. United States v. Stewart, 306 F.3d 295, 305 (6th Cir. 2002). The government is not required to show the impossibility of other means of obtaining information and the mere fact that some investigative techniques produced evidence does not foreclose the need for a wiretap. Id. "Generally, a district court's finding that the requirements of § 2518(1)(c) have been met are afforded considerable discretion." Id. at 304 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Wren attacks Special Agent Sartori's affidavit in support of the wiretap, claiming the statement of necessity was "simply boilerplate language and mere opinion" and applies in most narcotic investigations. Reading the affidavit as a whole, United States v. Landmesser, 553 F.2d 17, 20-21 (6th Cir. 1977) (), the fact that some of Special Agent Sartori's language could apply to most narcotics investigations does not render the affidavit insufficient. See id. at 20. Congress intended the necessity requirement to "be tested in a practical and common sense fashion." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The entire affidavit, notwithstanding any "boilerplate" or "mere opinions," demonstrates that the government seriously considered non-wiretap techniques and it explained why such techniques would be inadequate under the circumstances. Special Agent Sartori's affidavit included a detailedsummary of the investigative techniques used prior to seeking the wiretap. This included searches of Cathey's residence and vehicles, interviews with Cathey and those who had dealings with him, multiple confidential sources and a cooperating defendant, unrecorded meetings between confidential sources and Cathey, recorded calls between a confidential source and Cathey at the direction and under the supervision of the DEA, phone records, pen registers, and surveillance.
Sartori followed this summary with a ten-page, nineteen-paragraph statement as to why a wiretap was necessary. Sartori referred to previous investigatory efforts and explained why they were unlikely to provide a clearer picture of Cathey's drug organization. For example, the four confidential sources and one cooperating defendant provided the government with useful evidence; much of the evidence, however, was historical and did not provide a clear picture of the organization. Confidential informants could not identify the breadth of Cathey's operations, all the sources of supply, stash locations, or distribution activity. Cathey trusted a confidential...
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