United States v. Wright

• Decision Date: 16 December 2021
• Docket Number: 19-13388
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EUGENE WRIGHT, a.k.a. Burt, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
EUGENE WRIGHT, a.k.a. Burt, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-13388

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

December 16, 2021

DO NOT PUBLISH

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 5:18-cr-00013-LGW-BWC-5

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Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Eugene Wright appeals the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I

In 2018, law enforcement began investigating a methamphetamine conspiracy in Ware County, Georgia. Through a confidential informant, the investigators learned that Wright was involved in at least two methamphetamine transactions, each for a kilogram of the illicit substance. Police then executed a search warrant at Wright's residence, where they found a ledger noting apparent drug transactions, two firearms, digital scales, plastic baggies, and a large box of Tupperware containers. Wright was arrested. And he confessed to travelling to Atlanta to obtain methamphetamine for distribution.

A grand jury returned a multi-count indictment against Wright and his alleged co-conspirators. For his part, Wright was charged with conspiring to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine-an offense that carried a mandatory-minimum sentence of ten years, and a maximum of life in prison. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846. Wright, however, pleaded down to a lesser-included offense involving an unspecified quantity of methamphetamine. That

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carried a punishment of not more than 20 years' imprisonment. See id. § 841(b)(1)(C).

Following a Rule 11 hearing, the district court accepted Wright's guilty plea. It found that Wright had "participated intelligently" in the process and that his offer to plead guilty was both "knowing" and "voluntary." The district court then received testimony from one of the investigating agents recounting Wright's participation in the conspiracy. And Wright admitted under oath to picking up a quantity of methamphetamine in Atlanta to bring back to South Georgia, as he had stated in his video confession. Based on this evidence, the district court found that there was a factual basis to support the guilty plea.

In Wright's presentence report, the probation officer agreed that the two transactions involving Wright amounted to "a total of approximately 2 kilograms of methamphetamine." Even so, the probation officer recommended "conservatively attribut[ing]" one kilogram of methamphetamine to Wright for sentencing purposes.

A few months later, Wright informed his counsel for the first time at his sentencing hearing that he wished to withdraw his plea. The district court instructed Wright to state his reasons, to which Wright responded: "I feel like there's not . . . evidence that's been . . . explored, and I know that I didn't do what was done.... I'm not guilty, and I feel like . . . I'm getting offered months that I should not be receiving." The court denied Wright's motion, explaining that Wright had "made a voluntary and knowing waiver of [his] rights to have a jury trial" and that Wright

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"admitted under oath a factual basis for a plea of guilty." The court added that Wright coming in at the last minute and saying, "I change my mind; there's not enough evidence," was not a "fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal" of his plea. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B).

After hearing two hours of testimony from investigating agents, other witnesses, and Wright himself, the district court found it "clear that the drug amount that should be attributed to" Wright for sentencing was "at least" in the range of 500 grams to 1.5 kilograms of methamphetamine. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(5). The court proceeded to impose a within-Guidelines sentence of 103 months.

Wright appealed, raising several arguments related to the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. First, he argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion. Second, he faults the district court for failing to explain that he could be held responsible at sentencing for 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, even though he pleaded guilty to a lesser-included offense corresponding to an unspecified quantity of the drug. Third, Wright suggests that the court should have held an evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw. And fourth, he claims that the district court's denial of his motion is insufficient for us to engage in meaningful review.

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II

We begin with the basics. Once a district court accepts a defendant's guilty plea, "[t]here is no absolute right to withdraw" from it. United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994). Instead, the defendant must "show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion and will reverse the district court's decision only if it is "arbitrary or unreasonable." United States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted).

When evaluating a defendant's motion to withdraw, a district court "may consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea," using the four Buckles factors as guideposts. Id. (quoting United States v. Buckles, 843 F.2d at 469, 471-72 (11th Cir. 1988)). The Buckles factors are "(1) whether close assistance of counsel was available; (2) whether the plea was knowing and voluntary; (3) whether judicial resources would be conserved; and (4) whether the government would be prejudiced if the defendant were allowed to withdraw his plea." Id. (quoting Buckles, 843 F.2d at 472). If an appellant does not satisfy the first two factors, we need not thoroughly analyze the others. See United States v. Gonzalez-Mercado, 808 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1987).

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The district court did not abuse its discretion here. Starting with the first Buckles factor, Wright plainly had the close assistance

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of counsel. For one thing, he signed a plea agreement confirming that he "had the benefit of legal counsel in negotiating" the plea. Doc. 284 at 7. The plea also states that Wright was "completely satisfied" with his counsel's assistance and "believe[d] that his attorney ha[d] represented him faithfully, skillfully, and diligently." Id. Later, Wright testified to the same effect under oath. He confirmed that he and his counsel had the opportunity to talk about his case, review the indictment, discuss the Sentencing Guidelines, and go over the terms of his plea agreement together. Further, Wright averred that he had no complaints whatsoever regarding his counsel's performance. There is a "strong presumption" that these statements made under oath were all true. Medlock, 12 F.3d at 187. And Wright fails to rebut that presumption on appeal.^[1]Thus, the district court did not err in finding that Wright "had the services of a competent defense lawyer who ha[d] gone over all the requisite pleadings and concepts with him."

The second Buckles factor favors the government as well. Before accepting Wright's plea, the district court conducted an extensive Rule 11 inquiry to ensure that the plea was both knowing and voluntary. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11; United States v. Stitzer, 785 F.2d 1506, 1513 (11th Cir. 1986).

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During that colloquy, Wright testified that he had no mental disabilities and had held down several responsible positions as a mechanic. He confirmed that he understood the government's burden of proof, as well as his right to plead not guilty. And he said he knew that by pleading guilty, he was waiving various constitutional rights. After that, the district court walked through the elements of the lesser-included offense to which Wright pleaded guilty. It described the maximum penalties available for that crime. It explained the general operation of the Sentencing Guidelines and how Wright would be sentenced. And it summarized the terms of the plea agreement. Throughout the process, Wright consistently testified that he understood, and he confirmed that he had read the plea agreement before signing it. The district court found it "clear" from watching Wright and listening to his answers that he had "participated intelligently" in entering his guilty plea. We see no reason to...