United States v. Wright
| Decision Date | 29 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-50361 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joel Alexander WRIGHT, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Jessica Agatstein (argued) and Katie Hurrelbrink, Federal Defenders of San Diego Inc., San Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph S. Green (argued), Assistant United States Attorney; Daniel E. Zipp, Chief, Appellate Section, Criminal Division; Randy S. Grossman, Acting United States Attorney; United States Attorney's Office, San Diego, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before: Marsha S. Berzon and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges, and Richard D. Bennett,* District Judge.
After pleading guilty in 2016 to the attempted enticement of a minor, Joel Alexander Wright was sentenced to 188 months' imprisonment followed by lifetime supervised release. After serving about five years of that sentence, Wright petitioned for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), requesting a sentence reduction to time served and immediate release, or, in the alternative, home detention for the balance of his sentence. After reviewing Wright's motion and his briefings, the district court denied this motion. On appeal, Wright contends the court abused its discretion by denying his motion based on the dangerousness finding imposed by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, and by declining to consider his alternative request to serve the rest of his sentence under home confinement.
We affirm the holding of the district court as to both issues. We have recently held that a district court abuses its discretion by construing the U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 policy statement as binding. See United States v. Aruda , 993 F.3d 797, 799, 802 (9th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). Nevertheless, any error by the district court here in relying on § 1B1.13 was harmless in light of the court's alternative holding under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. Additionally, as Wright did not adduce any evidence or advance any arguments in support of his alternative request for home confinement, the district court adequately addressed that request.
In January 2016, Wright was arrested at the San Diego Airport for the attempted enticement of a minor and related charges. In April 2016, Wright waived indictment and pleaded guilty to violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). During his sentencing in July 2016, defense counsel recommended the statutory mandatory minimum 120 months' imprisonment, while the Government requested 168 months. Defense counsel spoke to the unusual hardships Wright would experience in custody, and argued that "the reality of supervision, combined with his disabilities ... should speak somewhat to the court's legitimate concern for incapacitation." The Government highlighted the very serious nature of Wright's offenses and noted that he had made "a sophisticated attempt" to commit them "despite all of his physical struggles."
On balance, the district court found that the facts of Wright's case were "most deserving of punishment for punishment's sake alone, and most deserving of imposing a sentence that will protect society." The court recognized that Wright's "overwhelmingly positive" personal history and characteristics—including his family support, his faith, and his remorse—counselled mitigation. Nevertheless, the Court noted that Wright had "continued to pursue this activity" despite his "remorse and misgivings," and notwithstanding his physical disabilities. Accordingly, commensurate with the advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines, and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, the court sentenced Wright to 188 months' imprisonment followed by a lifetime period of supervised release. Wright is housed at the Federal Correctional Institution ("FCI") Danbury, Connecticut, and is projected to be released in June of 2029.
Wright has struggled with disabilities throughout his life. Although Wright received some treatment in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, his health continued to decline.
In September 2020, Wright filed a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. Through this motion, Wright requested a reduced sentence of time served, and argued in the alternative that his sentence "be modified to allow him to serve the rest of his sentence under home confinement as a condition of supervised release." At the time of this motion, Wright had served about five years of his 188-month sentence, with approximately ten years remaining. In support of his request for a time-served sentence, Wright argued that his medical conditions rendered him particularly susceptible to COVID-19 and that the prisons were not equipped to protect him from the spread of the virus. In addition, Wright argued that the prison's COVID-19 lockdown protocols had prevented him from receiving the assistance he requires due to his disabilities.
Although Wright argued in favor of a time served sentence, he provided no additional arguments to support his alternative request for home confinement. Home confinement was mentioned in passing throughout the body of the motion, and Wright concluded by "respectfully request[ing] that the Court grant a reduction in his sentence to time served with a condition of home detention for the rest of his sentence," but he failed entirely to discuss why this request was appropriate. Nowhere in the motion was there any discussion of the specific conditions to be imposed, how such conditions would suffice to protect the public and prevent Wright from reoffending, or why such conditions would amount to just punishment in this case.
The district court denied Wright's motion on December 21, 2020. Declining to address whether Wright's medical conditions constitute "extraordinary and compelling" reasons for a sentence reduction, the court found that the U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 policy statement and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors weighed against a sentence reduction. Under § 1B1.13, the court found Wright had failed to show that he was "not a danger to others or the community" given "the disturbing nature of Defendant's crime" and the fact that he had committed it while he "was already" suffering from the same disabilities. Under § 3553(a), the court reiterated its concerns about dangerousness, and concluded that the "overarching goals of punishment, deterrence, protection of society, and rehabilitation" weighed "squarely against" compassionate release. The court did not specifically address Wright's request for home confinement as a condition of supervised release.
This appeal followed.
A district court's ruling on a compassionate release motion under § 3582(c)(1) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Aruda , 993 F.3d at 799. "A district court may abuse its discretion if it does not apply the correct law or if it rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of material fact." Id. (quoting United States v. Dunn , 728 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2013) ); see United States v. Hinkson , 585 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (); Dunn , 728 F.3d at 1159 ().
Ordinarily, "a federal court ‘may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.’ " United States v. Keller , 2 F.4th 1278, 1281 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) ). Through the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, Congress created a limited exception to this rule by authorizing courts to grant compassionate release when "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant a reduction in sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). As compassionate release derogates from the principle of finality, it is a "narrow" remedy, see Freeman v. United States , 564 U.S. 522, 526, 131 S.Ct. 2685, 180 L.Ed.2d 519 (2011), and the court's disposition of a compassionate release motion "is discretionary, not mandatory," United States v. Jones , 980 F.3d 1098, 1106 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v. Curry , 606 F.3d 323, 330 (6th Cir. 2010) ).
The First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, established significant changes to the procedures for filing a motion for compassionate release. As originally enacted, § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) vested the Bureau of Prisons with exclusive discretion to file compassionate release motions. Aruda , 993 F.3d at 799. The Department of Justice found in 2013 that this process was marked by delays and mismanagement, and that the Bureau exercised this discretion so "sparingly" that "an average of only 24 imprisoned persons were released each year by BOP motion." United States v. McCoy , 981 F.3d 271, 276 (4th Cir. 2020) ; United States v. Brooker , 976 F.3d 228, 230–32 (2d Cir. 2020) (). Accordingly, "Congress amended § 3582(c)(1)(A) to ‘remove the Bureau of Prisons from its ... role as a gatekeeper over compassionate release petitions,’ " and to expand the use of the compassionate release process. McCoy , 981 F.3d at 276. Following the passage of the First Step Act, defendants are authorized to directly petition the court for compassionate release after exhausting their administrative remedies within the Bureau of Prisons.2 Keller , 2 F.4th at 1281.
The First Step Act grants courts the discretion to consider compassionate release motions on an individualized basis. See Brooker , 976 F.3d at 230. As the Sixth Circuit...
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