United States v. Yetisen
| Decision Date | 22 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:18-cv-00570-HZ |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. SAMMY RASEMA YETISEN, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Steven A. Platt Devin Barrett J. Max Weintraub Nancy Pham U.S Department of Justice, Civil Division, Dianne Schweiner U.S Attorney's Office - District of Oregon Attorneys for Plaintiff
Ashley M. Simonsen Isaac D. Chaput Covington & Burling LLP Matthew J. Kalmanson Hart Wagner, LLP Attorneys for Defendant
Plaintiff the United States of America (“the Government”) seeks to revoke Defendant Sammy Rasema Yetisen's naturalized United States citizenship. The Government previously moved for judgment on the pleadings as to Count IV and Count V of its Complaint. This Court granted the Government's motion as to Count IV for illegal procurement of naturalization due to lack of good moral character and declined to address Count V (procurement of naturalization by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation). See United States v Yetisen, 370 F.Supp.3d 1191 (D. Or. 2019). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. United States v. Yetisen, No 19-35200, 2021 WL 4739293 (9th Cir. Oct. 12, 2021).
Defendant who is now represented by counsel, filed an Amended Answer on February 7, 2022. ECF 69. The Government moves for judgment on the pleadings as to four of six affirmative defenses that Defendant asserts in her Amended Answer. The Government also moves to strike Defendant's demand for a jury trial. The Court grants in part and denies in part the Government's motion.
Defendant, who was born in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, became a naturalized U.S. citizen on May 23, 2002. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 87, ECF 1. Defendant is a Bosnian Muslim. Id. ¶ 11. In 1993, during the Croat-Bosniak War, she served in a special forces unit within the Supreme Command Staff of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Id. ¶ 22. After the war, Defendant appeared at the U.S. embassy in Austria seeking refugee status. Id. ¶ 44. Based on representations she made in her Form I-590, Form G-646, and her sworn testimony during her refugee interview, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) approved Defendant's request for refugee status, and she entered the United States as a refugee in May 1996. Id. ¶ 65. Defendant was granted lawful permanent resident status in March 1998 and naturalized in May 2002. Id. ¶¶ 67, 87.
On September 21, 2009, the Prosecutors Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued a warrant for Defendant's arrest for war crimes committed during the Croat-Bosniak War. Id. ¶¶ 90, 91. Prosecutors accused her of participating in the execution-style murders of several Croat civilians and prisoners of war during an attack on the village of Trusina on April 16, 1993. Id. ¶ 90. This Court granted the Government's request for a certificate of extraditability, and Defendant was extradited to Bosnia and Herzegovina in December 2011. Id. ¶¶ 97, 99; In re Handanovic, 829 F.Supp.2d 979 (D. Or. 2011). In April 2012, Defendant entered into a plea agreement and was convicted of participating in war crimes against civilians and prisoners of war under the criminal code of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Id. ¶¶ 101, 102. She was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of five years and six months. Id. ¶ 103. Upon release after serving her term, Defendant returned to Oregon where she currently resides.
In April 2018, the Government filed a civil action to revoke Defendant's naturalized U.S. citizenship. The Government contends that Defendant illegally procured her naturalization because she did not meet the “good moral character” requirement under 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3) and because she willfully misrepresented and concealed her military service and her participation in summary executions of civilians and prisoners of war during the Trusina massacre.
On October 12, 2021, the Ninth Circuit reversed this Court's grant of judgment on the pleadings for the Government as to Count IV (lack of good moral character) and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Government now moves for judgment on the pleadings as to Defendant's affirmative defenses of laches, collateral estoppel, ambiguity, and ineffective assistance of counsel and moves to strike Defendant's demand for a jury trial.
“After the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). “[T]he same standard of review applicable to a Rule 12(b) motion applies to its Rule 12(c) analog,” because the motions are “functionally identical.” Dworkin v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989). In reviewing a motion brought under Rule 12(c), the court “must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). The court will grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings if there is no issue of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. A Rule 12(c) motion may be based on either (1) the lack of a cognizable legal theory, or (2) insufficient facts to allege a cognizable claim. Godecke v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 937 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2019).
The court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). Granting a motion to strike is within the discretion of the district court. See Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 975 (9th Cir. 2010) (motion to strike under Rule 12(f) reviewed for abuse of discretion). Rule 12(f) motions to strike are viewed with disfavor and are infrequently granted. Legal Aid Servs. of Or. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 561 F.Supp.2d 1187, 1189 (D. Or. 2008), aff'd, 608 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Capella Photonics, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 77 F.Supp.3d 850, 858 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“Motions to strike are regarded with disfavor because of the limited importance of pleadings in federal practice and because they are often used solely to delay proceedings.”) (quotation marks and alterations omitted).
The Government moves for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) as to four of Defendant's affirmative defenses: laches, collateral estoppel, ambiguity and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Government also moves to strike Defendant's demand for a trial by jury.
I. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings under Rule 12(c)
As an initial matter, the Court addresses whether a motion under Rule 12(c) is the proper vehicle for the Court to grant the relief the Government seeks. The usual goal of a Rule 12(c) motion is entry of judgment in favor of the moving party. 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1369 (3d ed. 2022). In general, a plaintiff who seeks to strike fewer than all defenses raised in the defendant's pleading should proceed under Rule 12(f) rather than Rule 12(c). Id. Some courts have held that when the substance of the motion is to challenge the legal sufficiency of certain defenses, motions for judgment under Rule 12(c) are not appropriate. E.g., Dysart v. Remington Rand, 31 F.Supp. 296, 297 (D. Conn. 1939). As one court noted, “even if it should be held that each and every of the special defenses attacked was insufficient in law, still it would not follow that the plaintiff would be entitled to judgment.” Id.
However, in more recent years, courts have granted partial motions for judgment on the pleadings. Bradley v. Fontaine Trailer Co., Inc., No. 3:06-cv-62 (WWE), 2009 WL 763548, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 20, 2009) (citing 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur C. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1369 (3d ed. 2004)); see Savage v. Council on Am.-Islamic Relations, Inc., No. C 07-6076 SI, 2008 WL 2951281, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2008) () (internal quotation, citation, and internal brackets omitted). “While Rule 12(c) does not expressly provide for partial judgment on the pleadings, neither does it bar such a procedure.” New York v. Micron Tech, Inc., No. C 06-6436 PJH, 2009 WL 29883, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2009).
Courts have recently held that both motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) and motions to strike under Rule 12(f) are appropriate ways to challenge the sufficiency of an affirmative defense. Aaron v. Martin, No. 4:11CV1661 FRB, 2013 WL 466242, at *2 (E.D. Miss. Feb. 7, 2013). Under either rule, courts apply the same standard of review. Spears v. First Am. eAppraiselt, No. 5-08-CV-00868-RMW, 2013 WL 1748284, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013); Silva v. B&G Foods, Inc., No. 20-cv-00137-JST, 2021 WL 3160865, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2021). But given the nature of the Government's challenges and the relief sought, the Court construes the motion as if it were a motion to strike and addresses it as such.[1] II. Equitable Defenses
The Government contends that Defendant cannot assert the affirmative defenses of laches, collateral estoppel, or ambiguity because they are equitable defenses, which according to the Government, are never available in civil denaturalization cases. The Government argues that equitable defenses are prohibited...
To continue reading
Request your trial