United States v. Young

• Decision Date: 20 December 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–2296.,11–2296.
• Citation: 707 F.3d 598
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Michael Danotus YOUNG, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

707 F.3d 598

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Michael Danotus YOUNG, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 11–2296.

United States Court of Appeals,Sixth Circuit.

Argued: Oct. 5, 2012.

Decided and Filed: Dec. 20, 2012.^*

ARGUED:Paul L. Nelson, Federal Public Defender's Office, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellant. Mark A. Totten, United States Attorney's Office, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:Paul L. Nelson, Federal Public Defender's Office, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellant. Mark A. Totten, United States Attorney's Office, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee.

Before: SILER and COOK, Circuit Judges; STEEH, District Judge. ^**

STEEH, District Judge.

Michael Danotus Young pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He now challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the firearm as the fruit of an illegal seizure.¹ For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 15, 2006, at about 1:15 am, Young was sitting in a reclined position in the passenger seat of a car in a city-owned parking lot outside of Julian's Bar & Restaurant (“Julian's”) in Grand Rapids, Michigan. The lot was regularly used for parking by patrons of Julian's, but the area also had a recent history of violent crime, including assaults and shootings. Officers testified that a person who waits outside is more likely to have a gun because Julian's regularly conducts pat-downs of its patrons; they also testified that officers look for people loitering because “that's usually how problems start.” Given the city's loitering and trespassing ordinances, it would have been a crime for someone to be in the parking lot without having business at the adjacent establishments. See City of Grand Rapids Code of Ordinances § 9.133.

Police Officers Fannon and Johnson described pulling into the parking lot and parking their patrol car behind the car in which Young sat. The officers observed Young for approximately a minute and a half and then approached the car as they were joined by Officer Loeb and began looking through the windows with flashlights. Officer Fannon hit the passenger side window with a flashlight. After a fifteen second pause, Young rolled down the window and Officer Fannon asked Young for identification.

Officer Fannon then asked Young, “You just chillin' out here in the lot or what?” Young responded, “I fell asleep and he ran in.” Officer Fannon asked Young where he lived, Young answered, and then Officer Fannon asked, “What brings you here tonight?” Young responded that he was “gonna go get something to eat” with a friend named Eric. As Young explained during the suppression hearing, his friend had gone in to Julian's to inquire about whether they could get a table or take-out. A few seconds later, he identified his friend, Eric, who was approaching the vehicle. Officers told Eric to go back into the restaurant and told Young to “sit tight.” Around this time, Officer Fannon passed Young's license to Officer Johnson, who took it back to the police car to run a warrant check.

Shortly thereafter, Officer Fannon told Young that the reason they made contact is because he was not allowed to sit in a vehicle in this city-owned lot, that “you gotta do business at the store, whatever, you gotta go in, can't, can't be out here sitting,” and “we're just going to sit tight for a second and we'll get you on your way.” Officer Fannon then asked about past arrests, and Young told him about a 1994 drug-related arrest.

Officer Fannon testified that around this time he noticed that Young moved his left hand a few times, briefly touching the area near his pocket and that this made him suspicious that Young might have a weapon or contraband. He told Young to keep his hands where he could see them and asked whether he had any weapons; Young responded “no.” Officer Fannon testified that the gestures continued, so he reached for his weapon. He then asked Young to step out of the car.

Once Young was out of the car, Officer Fannon told him to turn around. Young then disclosed that he had a gun in his pocket. The officers immobilized Young, searched his person, retrieved the gun, and placed him in handcuffs. Around this time, Officer Johnson returned with Young's license and notified the others that Young had an outstanding arrest warrant. The entire incident lasted less than four minutes.

Young was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. He filed a motion to suppress the gun on Fourth Amendment grounds, arguing that the officers had no reasonable basis to approach a legally parked car in a public parking lot and that Mr. Young did nothing during the encounter to suggest he had done anything illegal. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that there was no seizure—and thus Fourth Amendment considerations did not apply—until Young was ordered out of the car, by which time the officers had the justification of “furtive gestures.” Even if Young was seized earlier, the court found that the parking lot's recent history of shootings, the fact that Julian's conducts pat-downs of patrons, a possible trespassing violation, and the fact that Young was “dozing” gave the officers the authority to at least approach the vehicle and request identification to check for warrants. The court held that officers had authority to detain Young while checking for warrants and to arrest him for the outstanding warrant, and that this would have led to discovery of the gun absent anything else that occurred. Young pled guilty and was sentenced to 180 months in prison.

II. ANALYSIS

An appeal of a district court's denial of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of fact and law. United States v. Howard, 621 F.3d 433, 450 (6th Cir.2010). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed at the district court and review factual findings for clear error. Id.;United States v. Smith, 594 F.3d 530, 535 (6th Cir.2010). “A factual finding will only be clearly erroneous when, although there may be evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Smith, 594 F.3d at 535 (internal quotation marks omitted). The ultimate finding of reasonable suspicion, however, is a legal conclusion that we review de novo. See United States v. Gross, 662 F.3d 393, 398 (6th Cir.2011); United States v. See, 574 F.3d 309, 311 (6th Cir.2009).

Young first argues that he was seized when the officers parked behind him or, at least, when the officers told him to “sit tight.” He further argues that the officers had no reasonable suspicion to seize him because he was engaged in lawful activity and because suspicion of “mere trespassing” is not sufficient to support a seizure. Finally, he argues that even if the officers had reasonable suspicion of trespass initially, the seizure exceeded permissible scope once Young explained his purpose for being in the parking lot.

A. Seizure

Fourth Amendment considerations governing unreasonable seizures are not triggered unless and until a person in question is actually “seized.” SeeU.S. Const. amend. IV; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). “Seizure” extends to any circumstance in which a police officer, “by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Minor seizures, sometimes referred to as “Terry stops,” occur when, in light of all the circumstances, “a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980).

This court has issued two opinions—both since the district court's denial of Young's motion to suppress—that address the question of whether a person was seized in circumstances similar to the present facts. In United States v. See, 574 F.3d 309, 311 (6th Cir.2009), an officer parked a police cruiser in front of a parked car in which the defendant and two companions sat so that the defendant could not drive away. We held that under such circumstances, a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave and that the incident was a Terry stop. Id. at 313. In United States v. Gross, 662 F.3d 393, 396 (6th Cir.2011), a police cruiser parked directly behind a legally parked car in which the defendant sat slumped down in the passenger seat, and the police officer approached the passenger-side window on foot. The officer's actions were markedly similar to the officer's actions in See, and we held that the incident was also a Terry stop. Id. at 400.²

While the record is unclear as to whether the police cruiser in the present case actually blocked the parked car, we assume that it did because the Video shows another car directly in front of the parked car. In this case, Young's position and activity was identical to that of the defendant in Gross. The presence of three officers shining flashlights into the car and authoritative instructions from Officer Fannon also suggest that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave anytime thereafter. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (listing “the threatening presence of several officers, ... or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled” as indications of a seizure). Thus, we find that Young was subject to a Terry stop at the time the police cruiser parked behind the car in which he sat.

B. Reasonable Suspicion

In a Terry stop, officers may briefly detain a person for investigative purposes so long as it is “reasonable.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20–22, 88 S.Ct. 1868. This is an exception to the general rule that seizures are per se unreasonable when conducted without a warrant. Id.;see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). We...