United States v. Young
| Decision Date | 02 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. CR 17-0694 JB,CR 17-0694 JB |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. APACHE YOUNG, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant Apache Young's Motion For a New Trial, filed July 23, 2019 (Doc. 209)("Motion"). The Court held a hearing on the Motion on August 14, 2019. See Clerk's Minutes at 1, filed August 14, 2019 (Doc. 216). The primary issue before the Court is whether the Supreme Court of the United States of America's decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), entitles Defendant Apache Young to a new trial when his conviction's jury instructions did not require the jury to find that Young knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The Court concludes that Young is not entitled to a new trial, because he fails to prove either that the missing jury instruction affects his substantive rights, or that it seriously affects the judicial proceedings' fairness, integrity, or public reputation.
On March 14, 2017, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Young with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).1 See Indictment at 1, filedMarch 14, 2017 (Doc. 2). The Court declared a mistrial after his first trial, because of "the Jury's inability to reach a decision as to the Indictment." Order of Mistrial, filed September 19, 2018 (Doc. 97). Young was tried again and was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm by a new jury. See Jury Verdict as to Apache Young, filed December 10, 2018 (Doc. 175). The jury instructions required the jury to find that Plaintiff United States of America proved the following elements:
Court's Final Jury Instructions (Trial 2) at 13, filed December 10, 2018 (Doc. 172). After the verdict, but before the Court sentenced Young, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Rehaif v. United States. In Rehaif v. United States, the Supreme Court held that, in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the United States must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm, and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm. See Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. at 2200.
Young filed his Motion on July 23, 2019. See Motion at 1. The Court held a hearing on the Motion on August 14, 2019. See Clerk's Minutes at 1, filed August 14, 2019 (Doc. 216). Afterthe hearing, the Court requested additional briefing on several issues. See Order, filed August 21, 2019 (Doc. 219)("Order").
The Court issued a written opinion memorializing its rulings for Young's pretrial motions on January 8, 2019. See United States v. Young, No. CR. 17-0694 JB, 2019 WL 133268 (D.N.M. Jan. 8, 2019)(Browning, J.)("MOO"). In the MOO, the Court justified excluding Young's probation officer's testimony under rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 2019 WL 133268, at *25. The probation officer had planned to testify that, "in 2008, he advised Young that, pursuant to state and federal law, Young could no longer possess a firearm." See 2019 WL 133268, at *26. After Young requested that the Court exclude this testimony, see 2019 WL 133268, at *27, the Court concluded that the probation officer's testimony was "not probative to proving knowledge, or to showing absence of mistake and lack of accident." 2019 WL 133268, at *28. It further concluded that "[t]estimony regarding conditions that resulted from Young's criminal conduct leans heavily towards propensity evidence; its probative value decreases when the jury will not interpret the evidence for a purpose other than propensity, and the prejudicial effect is substantial, thus, warranting exclusion." 2019 WL 133268, at *28. The Court also noted that the United States could "satisfy its burden" without the evidence, and therefore excluded the testimony. See 2019 WL 133268, at *28.
Young argues that he is entitled to a new trial under rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Motion at 1. He states that the jury instructions at his second trial did not require the jury to find that three elements were satisfied to find him guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).See Motion at 2 (citing Court's Final Jury Instructions (Trial 2), filed December 10, 2018 (Doc. 172)). Young argues that these jury instructions do not require the jury to find that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm, and "at neither trial or other proceeding did the Government produce evidence to the jury that, due to a felony conviction, the Defendant was aware at the time of the offense, he was prohibited from possessing a firearm as defined by law." Motion at 2. He argues that Rehaif v. United States held that the United States "must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused both knew he possessed a firearm and that he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm," Motion at 2, and that he is therefore entitled to a new trial, see Motion at 3.
The United States responded and requests that the Court deny Young's Motion. See United States Response to Defendant's Motion for New Trial at 1 (Doc. 209), filed August 6, 2019 (Doc. 214)("Response"). The United States first says that Young did not preserve his objection to the jury instructions. See Response at 7. It argues that, because Young did not object to the instructions, the Court must review the jury instructions for plain error under rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Response at 7 (citing United States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2002); Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 273 (2013); 3B Fed. Prc. & Proc. Crim § 851 (4th ed. 2013)). The United States argues that Young cannot show plain error, because "he cannot meet his burden of showing prejudice to his substantial rights, and because the error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings." Response at 7-8.
The United States provides the standard for granting a defendant relief under rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures: " " Response at 8 (citing Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993)). It argues that, to prove the third prong -- prejudice to Young's substantial rights -- he must "'show a reasonable probability that, but for the error,' the outcome would have been different." Response at 8 (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 76, (2004)). It notes that, if these three prongs are met, the Court must determine whether the error "'seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'" Response at 9 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. at 736). The United States argues that, including this last "discretionary factor," Young does not show he is entitled to relief at three out of four analysis stages. Response at 9.
First, the United States argues that Young cannot show prejudice to his substantial rights, because he cannot show a reasonable probability of acquittal. See Response at 9. The United States says he cannot show a reasonable probability of acquittal, because there is ample evidence that Young knew he was a felon, and Rehaif v. United States suggests that it is easy for the United States to prove a felon's knowledge of his status. See Response at 10 (citing Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. at 2198). The United States argues that United States v. Liparota, 471 U.S. 419, 434 (1985), suggests that proving a defendants' knowledge of his or her status is not a heavy burden, and the case's facts make it "abundantly clear that Young knew that he was a convicted felon." Response at 10. The United States notes that Young stipulated to the fact that he was a convicted felon. See Response at 10. He also lied to the arresting officer about whether he had firearms in his truck. See Response at 11. The United States argues that, because "lying about firearms is strong evidence of consciousness of guilt," had the jury "been instructed that knowledgeof status was an element of the crime, they would have undoubtedly been able to recollect this evidence and find Young guilty." Response at 11. It then asserts that, had the Court known that felony status knowledge was an element, it would have also admitted the probation officer's testimony that he told Young in 2008 that he could no longer possess a firearm. See Response at 11-12 (citing United States v. Young, 2019 WL 133268, at *26-27). The United States also asserts that it "would have sought to introduce each and every piece of evidence indicating that Young knew he was a convicted felon." Response at 12. It argues that Young likely would have stipulated to his knowledge and that "[t]o pretend otherwise is folly." Response at 12.
The United States also argues that the Court should deny the Motion, because the error "does not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or reputation of the judicial proceedings." Response at 13. It insists that the Court should follow United States v. Johnson, 520 U.S. 461 (1997), where the Supreme Court did not analyze whether a missing jury instruction prejudiced the defendant, but instead denied relief where the trial court's...
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