United States v. Young, Case No. 2:12-CR-502-TC
| Decision Date | 30 January 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:12-CR-645-TC,Case No. 2:12-CR-502-TC |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. DAVID YOUNG, et al., Defendants. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT G. LUSTYIK, JR., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Utah |
In these related criminal prosecutions, two defendants (Michael Taylor and American International Security Corporation) have filed a Motion To Vacate September 13, 2012 Transfer Order And To Transfer Or, In The Alternative, To Recuse And For An Evidentiary Hearing.1 For the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED.
This court presides over two related criminal matters: United States v. Young (2:12cr502)("Taylor 1" or '502) and United States v. Lustyik (2:12cr645) ("Taylor 2" or '645). This court was randomly assigned to preside over Taylor 1 on August 22, 2012, when the United States brought an indictment against four defendants, including Michael Taylor and American International Security Corporation (AISC). On October 18, 2012, the United States indicted Mr. Taylor and two other defendants in Taylor 2, a case alleging bribery of an FBI agent and obstruction of the investigation and indictment in Taylor 1. Taylor 2 was assigned to Chief Judge Ted Stewart. Because Taylor 1 and Taylor 2 are related cases, Judge Stewart transferred Taylor 2 to this court on October 29, 2012, under Local Rule DUCrimR 57-3(a).2 This transaction is not questioned by Mr. Taylor or AISC. Rather, the events that occurred in Taylor 1 (before Mr. Taylor was indicted in Taylor 2) are at issue here.
After this court was assigned to preside over Taylor 1, the court learned through an August 27, 2012 pleading on the docket3 that Mr. Taylor and AISC had retained local counsel (their principal retained attorneys were based in Boston, Massachusetts) from the firm of Parsons Behle & Latimer. The counsel making an appearance were Francis W. Wikstrom and Michael W. Young. Upon seeing Mr. Wikstrom's name, the court recused. (See September 4, 2012 Order of Recusal (Docket No. 23 in '502).) The recusal was done as a matter of course because this court routinely recuses in any case in which Mr. Wikstrom appears. Upon this court'srecusal, the case was randomly re-assigned to Judge Clark Waddoups.
Days after the court recused, it learned that Mr. Wikstrom and Parsons Behle & Latimer had actually withdrawn as local counsel and were not working on the criminal matter (apparently Mr. Wikstrom and Parsons Behle & Latimer were local counsel for Mr. Taylor and AISC in a civil forfeiture proceeding before a different federal district court judge in this district and so had some relationship with the defendants before the Taylor 1 indictment occurred). (See also September 12, 2012 Notice of Attorney Appearance by Rebecca H. Skordas as local counsel for Mr. Taylor and AISC (Docket No. 28 in '502).) Because of this error, the court, to whom the case had originally been assigned, spoke to Judge Waddoups about transferring the case back in light of the misunderstanding about local counsel and the fact that no conflict actually existed. Judge Waddoups, who had been assigned to the case for approximately nine days, returned the case to this court. (See September 13, 2012 Docket Text Order transferring case back to Judge Tena Campbell (Docket No. 29 in '502).)
Mr. Taylor and AISC seek to have the September 13, 2012 Order vacated, for they contend it was issued in violation in the rule requiring judges to be randomly assigned to new cases.4 They further contend that Taylor 1 must go back to Judge Waddoups, who had been assigned after this court's mistaken recusal, and that Taylor 2 must be transferred by Judge Stewart to Judge Waddoups under the local case transfer rule. In the alternative, Mr. Taylor and AISC attempt to show that a separate conflict (or a serious appearance of impropriety) requiresthis court to recuse again or allow an evidentiary hearing to proceed before a different judge to shed light on the events surrounding the transfer of the case from Judge Waddoups to this court and alleged relationships between certain parties allegedly related to this matter.
Mr. Taylor and AISC contend that Judge Waddoups' September 13, 2012 docket text order returning the case to Judge Campbell is void because it was entered in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 137 and the random selection case assignment system approved by the judges of this district in local rule DUCivR 83-2. The United States code provides that "[t]he business of a court having more than one judge shall be divided among the judges as provided by the rules and orders of the court." 28 U.S.C. § 137. Following that statutory mandate, as Mr. Taylor and AISC point out, the District of Utah adopted a local rule providing that "[a]ll case assignments are randomly assigned by an automated case assignment system approved by the judges of the court and managed by the clerk under the direction of the chief judge." DUCivR 83-2(a).5 Mr. Taylor and AISC also cite to two cases that, they contend, support their position: United States v. Phillips, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (D. Utah 1999), and Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Ritter, 461 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir. 1972). They cite to Ritter, asserting that "no judge has the authority to unilaterally assign or reassign a case other than as permitted by the Court's Rules." (Mot. Vacate at 2.) Similarly, they rely on Phillips to support their contention that "a judge assigned to a caseunder the Court's Random Selection Case Assignment System has 'no express power . . . to reassign a case.'" (Id. (quoting Phillips, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1185).) Both of these cases are factually distinguishable and inapposite because they do not address the issue before this court.
In Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Ritter, 461 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir. 1972), which pre-dates the existing version of rules under which the court now operates, the court was faced with an entirely different situation. There, the judge had unilaterally promulgated case assignment rules without approval from the other judges in their district (indeed, over their objection). To resolve the disagreement, the Tenth Circuit issued a standing order designating how cases were to be assigned in light of the disagreement among the judges. When the judge again reassigned cases in violation of the procedures set forth in the valid, still-effective Tenth Circuit order, the Tenth Circuit held that the reassignments were void. The Ritter case simply stands for the proposition that the rules are applicable and effective until modified by the actives judges through written agreement. Apart from the fact that a different set of rules applies now (thirty years later), the transfer from Judge Waddoups does not run astray of the overall concepts articulated in Ritter, particularly in light of other Tenth Circuit precedent discussed below.
In United States v. Phillips, the defendant was re-indicted after his previous criminal case was dismissed without prejudice for violation of the Speedy Trial Act. After Phillips was assigned to a new judge through the random case assignment process, the United States filed a motion requesting transfer back to the judge who had presided over the originally-indicted case. The United States cited to reasons such as judicial efficiency, avoidance of duplicated efforts, and wasted resources. The Phillips court denied the motion to transfer on the basis that the random case assignment process was put in place for good reason and to override that systemwould improperly allow a party to engage in "judge shopping."
The situation in Phillips is distinctly different from the one facing this court. Judge Waddoups' September 13, 2012 Order corrected an administrative error and reinstated the initial random assignment. In other words, this court essentially vacated the recusal order on the basis that it was entered in error. There was no conflict. Judges have a duty to handle cases assigned to him or her. "There is as much obligation for a judge not to recuse when there is no occasion for him to do so as there is for him to do so when there is." Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987).
Moreover, two Tenth Circuit cases more on point support the court's conclusion that the September 13, 2012 Order was valid.
First, there is United States v. Diaz, 189 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 1999). In Diaz, the Tenth Circuit held that the assignment of five district judges to handles various portions of Mr. Diaz's criminal case was not a violation of his due process rights. Mr. Diaz argued that "the [case] assignment procedure [of rotating assignments of judges in the District of New Mexico] is not authorized by rule or order, and that, even if the district court had authority to adopt the procedure, judicial efficiency is an improper purpose to justify rotating judicial assignments." Id. at 1243. As part of its ruling, the Tenth Circuit discussed the discretion of the court to manage court business, and cited to 28 U.S.C. § 137, "which vests the district court with broad discretion in assigning court business to individual judges." Id. The Tenth Circuit also cited to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57(b), which "provides that when there is no controlling law, '[a] judge may regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal law, these rules, and local rules of the district." Id. at 1243-44. The court concluded that:
[i]n light of this discretion in managing court business, we agree with the Fifth Circuit that:
Id. at 1244 (quoting United States v. Martinez, 686 F.2d...
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