United Steelworkers of America v. Roemer Indust.

• Decision Date: 06 July 1999
• Docket Number: No. 4:98CV1428.,4:98CV1428.
• Citation: 68 F.Supp.2d 843
• Parties: UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ROEMER INDUSTRIES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

68 F.Supp.2d 843

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ROEMER INDUSTRIES, Defendant.

No. 4:98CV1428.

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

July 6, 1999.

Michael Ernest Jackson, Mark A. Rock, Schwarzwald & Rock, Cleveland, OH, for Plaintiff.

Michael J. Angelo, Jeffrey C. Miller, Johnson & Angelo, Cleveland, OH, Ronald James Rice, Hubbard, OH, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ECONOMUS, District Judge.

On June 19, 1998, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO CLC ("the Steelworkers") filed the above-captioned action against Roemer Industries, inc. ("Roemer") seeking confirmation of a labor arbitration award rendered December 7, 1997, by Calvin Sharpe ("Arbitrator"). Jurisdiction is predicated upon § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA").

On October 6, 1998, the Steelworkers filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 11). On October 23, 1998, Roemer filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 16). For the following reasons, the Steelworkers' motion is GRANTED and Roemer's motion is DENIED.

FACTS

The litigants are parties to a 1993 collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") governing employer-employee labor relations and dispute resolution. On September 8, 1995, Roemer terminated employee Paul Kurelko for falsification of his time card. On September 11, 1995, Kurelko ("grievant") filed a grievance pursuant to the terms of the above-mentioned CBA. The parties were unable to settle their differences during the time period between the filing of the grievance and a subsequent arbitration hearing.

On August 12, 1997, an arbitration hearing was held to decide whether or not the termination violated the CBA, and if so, what is the appropriate remedy. Roemer asserted that it had just cause for Kurelko's discharge, and made four arguments in support: (1) company policy provided for discharge as a penalty for falsifying company documents since 1973; (2) Roemer did not have to produce Kurelko's supervisor to dispute the claim that the supervisor authorized Kurelko's timecard notation; (3) another employee, Ellison, testified that he would not falsify his start time, even if so instructed, suggests that no circumstances justify Kurelko's conduct; and (4) the delay in holding the arbitration hearing should bar any claim for relief. (Plaintiff's Motion, Exhibit A. at 5-6)

After the testimony of the Steelworkers' first witness, Roemer's representatives, led by Roemer's president, Joseph O'Toole, Jr., expressed their unwillingness to cross-examine any employee who testified for the Steelworkers and left the hearing. Roemer representatives also suggested that the hearing continue in their absence.

The hearing continued and the Steelworkers contended that Roemer had failed to prove just cause. The Steelworkers' argue that Kurelko's supervisor authorized the notation on his time card is evidenced by (1) Ellison's testimony; (2) Roemer's refusal to interview Ellison at the suspension meeting; (3) the testimony of Kurelko's supervisor at an unemployment hearing; and (4) Roemer's failure to call the supervisor as a witness. The Steelworkers further argue that no time clocks or related policies existed prior to the discharge but were promulgated after the discharge.

As to the alleged altercation between Kurelko and O'Toole, the Steelworkers claimed no incident occurred and pointed to the absence of any police report. The Steelworkers also dispute the timeliness issue and argued any delays were the result of the company's move from Pennsylvania to Ohio, the reorganization of the union, and ongoing attempts to settle the dispute short of arbitration. The Steelworkers also argued that Roemer raised the timeliness issue for the first time at the hearing.

On December 5, 1997, the arbitrator concluded that the termination was unjust and upheld the grievance. He then awarded reinstatement with full back-pay, benefits, and seniority.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Summary Judgment

FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c) governs summary judgment and provides, in pertinent part:

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact, and for these purposes, the evidence submitted must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970).

"The burden on the moving party may be discharged if the moving party demonstrates that the non-moving party has failed to establish an essential element of his or her case for which he or she bears the ultimate burden of proof at trial." Morales v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 71 F.3d 531, 535 (1995). If the moving party meets this burden, then the nonmoving party must present additional evidence beyond the pleadings. Id. The nonmoving party must present more than a scintilla of evidence in support of his or her position. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment must be granted unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a judge or jury to return a verdict for that party. Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

B. Arbitration Reviews

"The standard of review in arbitration cases is very narrow." Mercy Mem. Hospital v. Hospital Employees' Division of Local 779, 23 F.3d 1080, 1083 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 961, 115 S.Ct. 421, 130 L.Ed.2d 335 (1994)(quoting Anaconda v. District Lodge No. 27, International Assn. Of Machinists, 693 F.2d 35, 36 (6th Cir.1982)). "As long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision." United Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987). "It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his." United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960).

However, an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement and may not implement his own brand of industrial justice. When an arbitrator's words manifest a breach of this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award. Id. at 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358.

ANALYSIS

A. Roemer's Available Defenses

Roemer asks this Court to deny enforcement of the arbitration award for the reason that the arbitrator abused his powers and applied his own brand of justice. Roemer's request is the equivalent of a motion to vacate an arbitration award. In support of this request, Roemer argues that the arbitrator decided issues that were moot due to the Steelworkers' 19-month delay in submitting this matter to arbitration.¹

The Steelworkers contend that Roemer's motion is untimely as the Sixth Circuit, in Occidental Chemical v. Intern. Chemical Wkrs, Union, 853 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir.1988), held that there is a three month statute of limitations period in which a party may file a motion to vacate an arbitrator's award.

Courts have generally held that because Congress provided no statute of limitations for suits under § 301, the timeliness of a § 301 suit is to be determined, as a matter of federal law, by reference to the appropriate state statute of limitations. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704-05, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966); See also International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 969 v. Babcock & Wilcox, 826 F.2d 962, 964 (10th Cir.1987). In Ohio, the appropriate state statute provides that motions to vacate an arbitration award must be served within three months after the award is delivered to the parties in interest. OHIO REV. CODE § 2711.13.²

In the case sub judice, the arbitrator rendered his decision on December 7, 1997. As such, Roemer had until March 7, 1998³ to file an action in this Court to vacate the award.

Roemer argues that, although it immediately recognized that the arbitrator "illogically and improperly" decided that the matter was timely submitted to arbitration, it could not move to vacate the award "because the arbitrator's malfeasance was not a sufficient ground for a Motion to Vacate." (Def. Cross-Motion at 8). Roemer bases this argument on the Federal Arbitration Act (the "FAA") which enumerates the following grounds for a party to move to vacate an arbitration award:

1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud and undue means.

2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.

3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other behavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.

4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them at a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.

9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4).

Roemer contends that as they had no evidence of any of the aforementioned grounds, they did not have an avenue to challenge the award. Roemer further argues that its only alternative was to refuse to comply with the award until the Union brought it to judicial review.

Roemer's reliance upon the FAA is misplaced. It is well...