United Transportation Union v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist.

• Decision Date: 23 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. B058211,B058211
• Citation: 7 Cal.App.4th 804,9 Cal.Rptr.2d 702
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 143 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2050 UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION, AFL/CIO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 702

9 Cal.Rptr.2d 702

7 Cal.App.4th 804, 143 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2050

UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION, AFL/CIO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.

No. B058211.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

June 23, 1992.

Review Denied Sept. 17, 1992.

[7 Cal.App.4th 806] Lawrence Drasin, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and appellant.

Suzanne B. Gifford, Jeffrey J. Lyon, Richard A. Katzman and Sharon G. Sanders, Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent.

CROSKEY, Associate Justice.

In this appeal we are asked to determine whether a controversy which arose between a labor organization and an employer concerning one of its employees is subject to arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the parties. The controversy centers around the rights of a part-time employee who took a pregnancy leave of absence. The specific provisions in the parties' collective bargaining agreement regarding leaves of absence apply only to full-time employees and the

question presented here is whether certain other language in the agreement, more general in nature, can be construed to give leave of absence protection to the employee. The employer refused to send the issue to arbitration, contending the arbitration clause in the agreement does not cover it. The trial court agreed. However, we conclude that the dispute between the parties is indeed subject to arbitration and we reverse the order of the trial court which denied the labor organization's petition to compel arbitration.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Cyndi Ortega ("Ortega") was employed by the Southern California Rapid Transit District (the "District") as a part-time bus operator and was represented by the United Transportation Union, AFL/CIO (the "Union"). On June 10, 1989, Ortega took a pregnancy leave of absence. The District states that Ortega was given a 4-month leave of absence pursuant to Government Code section 12940 et seq.

Ortega's pregnancy necessitated a birth by Cesarean section and her doctor did not release her to return to work until November 20, 1989, a little over five months after she temporarily stopped working. In the meantime, the District had taken action regarding her extended absence. On October 13, 1989, it wrote a letter to her which states that (1) the District had requested (by an earlier letter, mailed on September 5, 1989) that Ortega return to work and she had not done so; (2) Ortega, as a part-time employee, is not covered under article 31, section 1 ¹ of the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the District; and (3) because Ortega had not yet returned to work, the District would consider her to have resigned from her job as of October 10, 1989.

The Union appealed the District's decision through various administrative appeal (grievance) processes set out in the collective bargaining agreement but its efforts on behalf of Ortega were to no avail. The Union demanded arbitration of the dispute but the District refused to arbitrate. Thereafter, the Union filed a petition to compel arbitration and the District filed an answer to the petition in which it denied there was an arbitrable dispute. Each side filed points and authorities. On March 29, 1991, the trial court denied the petition to compel arbitration and the Union filed its appeal from that order, as permitted under Code of Civil Procedure section 1294.

DISCUSSION

1. The Governing Law

Section 1281.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that, except in situations not relevant here, "On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists...." Thus, under section 1281.2, it is the trial court that determines if there is a duty to arbitrate the particular controversy which has arisen between the parties. (Freeman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 473, 480, 121 Cal.Rptr. 477, 535 P.2d 341.) In performing its duty to determine if the parties have agreed to arbitrate that type of controversy, the court is necessarily required "to examine and, to a limited extent, construe the underlying agreement." (Ibid.)

Doubts as to whether an arbitration clause applies to a particular dispute are to be resolved in favor of sending the parties to arbitration. The court should Our Supreme Court has stated that broad contractual provisions for arbitration are to be liberally construed. In Posner v. Grunwald-Marx, Inc. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 169, 175, 14 Cal.Rptr. 297, 363 P.2d 313, the Court said: "[W]here the collective bargaining agreement provides for arbitration of all disputes pertaining to the meaning, interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement and its provisions, any dispute as to the meaning, interpretation and application of any specific matter covered by the collective bargaining agreement is a matter for arbitration. Doubts as to whether the arbitration clause applies are to be resolved in favor of coverage. The parties have contracted for an arbitrator's decision and not for that of the courts." Then, quoting from a United States Supreme Court case, the Posner Court stated: "The high court declared that 'The function of the court is very limited when the parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator. It is confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by the contract. Whether the moving party is right or wrong is a question of contract interpretation for the arbitrator. In these circumstances the moving party should not be deprived of the arbitrator's judgment, when it was his judgment and all that it connotes that was bargained for.' (United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co. [1960] 363 U.S. 564, 567-568 [80 S.Ct. 1343, 1346, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403].)" ( Ibid.)

                order them to arbitrate unless it is clear that the arbitration clause cannot be interpreted to cover the dispute.  (O'Malley v. Wilshire Oil Co.  (1963) 59 Cal.2d 482, 491, 30 Cal.Rptr. 452, 381 P.2d 188.)   Additionally, "If the court determines that a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy exists, an order to arbitrate such controversy may not be refused on the ground that the petitioner's contentions lack substantive merit."  (Code Civ.Proc., § 1281.2;  O'Malley v. Wilshire Oil Co., supra, 59 Cal.2d at pp. 486-487, 30 Cal.Rptr. 452, 381 P.2d 188;  Amalgamated Transit Union v. San Diego Transit Corp.  (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 874, 879, 159 Cal.Rptr. 775.)   Thus, we see that if there is a rule of thumb regarding contractual arbitration, it is that such arbitration [7 Cal.App.4th 809] is a highly favored means of dispute resolution.  This includes labor disputes involving collective bargaining agreements.  (Griggs v. Transocean Air Lines (1960) 176 Cal.App.2d 843, 847, 1 Cal.Rptr. 803, disapproved on another point in Posner v. Grunwald-Marx, Inc.  (1961) 56 Cal.2d 169, 183, 14 Cal.Rptr. 297, 363 P.2d 313.)
                

Additionally, our high court, in O'Malley v. Wilshire Oil Co., supra, 59 Cal.2d, at p. 488, 30 Cal.Rptr. 452, 381 P.2d 188, while discussing the United States Supreme Court decision in the United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co. case, stated: "The [Supreme Court] concluded: 'The courts, therefore, have no business weighing the merits of the grievance, considering whether there is equity in a particular claim, or determining whether there is particular language in the written instrument which will support the claim. The agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely those which the court will deem meritorious. The processing of even frivolous claims may have therapeutic values of which those who are not a part of the plant environment may be quite unaware.' (363 U.S. at pp. 567-568 ....)"

2. The Breadth of the Arbitration Clauses at Issue in the Instant Case

Looking at the collective bargaining agreement at issue in this case, we find that article 50 of the agreement makes articles 26 and 27 applicable to part-time employees like Ortega. Both articles 26 and 27 contain broad contractual provisions for arbitration, similar to the kind addressed in the Posner, O'Malley and United Steelworkers decisions.

a. Article 26

Article 26 is entitled "Filing of Claims--Procedure--Limitations." Section 1 of article 26 shows that the "claims" referred to in the title of article 26 have to do with "Claims or disputes with respect to the interpretation or application of the

                terms of this Contract."  (Emphasis added.)   Section 11 of article 26 further defines "claims" by stating:  "The term 'Claim' as used herein means any time claim, or other claim other than discipline which may arise under the application or interpretation of this Contract."  (Emphasis added.)   Section 7 of article 26 states, in part, that "If the claim is not satisfactorily settled and the Union desires, the claim may be submitted to arbitration upon the Union's written request."
                

b. Article 27

Specific provisions regarding article 27 actually begin in section 15 of article 26. Section 15 of article 26 states: "It is understood and agreed that the provisions of this Article and Article 27 shall be the sole and exclusive means of settling any dispute or controversy arising out of the application or interpretation of this Contract." (Emphasis added.) Article 27 is entitled "Discipline Rule." Section 2 of article 27 is entitled "Types of Discipline" and it sets out the two main classes of improper behavior for which discipline will be imposed--"major infractions of the District's rules" and "other infractions of District rules." Among the infractions included as "major infractions" are excessive absenteeism and being absent...