Univ. of Fla. Bd. of Trs. v. Rojas
| Decision Date | 22 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1D21-3430 |
| Parties | University of Florida Board of Trustees, Appellant, v. Anthony Rojas, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. No extensions of time will be granted for the filing of such motions.
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County. Monica J Brasington, Judge.
Robert J. Sniffen, Matthew Joseph Carson, and Jeffrey D. Slanker Sniffen & Spellman, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Adam A. Schwartzbaum, Adam Moskowitz, Howard Bushman, Barbara Lewis, The Moskowitz Law Firm, Coral Gables, for Appellee.
We review the trial court's conclusion that sovereign immunity does not bar Anthony Rojas's breach of contract claim against the University of Florida Board of Trustees. Because the assorted documents attached to the complaint do not constitute an express written contract sufficient to overcome sovereign immunity, the trial court should have dismissed the claim. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court for entry of judgment for the University's Board.
Because state universities and colleges across Florida are facing lawsuits like the one here,[1] we also certify the following question of great public importance to the Florida Supreme Court:
Whether sovereign immunity bars a breach of contract claim against a state university based on the university's failure to provide its students with access to on-campus services and facilities?
I.
When COVID-19 first impacted Florida in Spring 2020, the State University System Board of Governors directed Florida's public universities to commence online learning. Soon after the University of Florida instructed its students to leave campus and closed its on-campus facilities. The University remained partially closed during the spring and summer semesters of 2020. During this time, classes were offered online, and students were advised to remain off campus. Yet students were still required to pay various fees along with their tuition (such as an activity and service fee, a health fee, a transportation access fee, and an athletic fee).
This prompted graduate student Anthony Rojas to file a class action complaint against the University. On behalf of all similarly situated students, Rojas alleged that the University's failure to offer on-campus services or refund the related fees for those impacted semesters constituted a breach of contract. He attached several documents to the complaint in support of his claim including a Spring 2020 tuition statement, a general statement of tuition and various fee estimates for the 2019-2020 academic year, and a copy of the University's financial liability agreement. Rojas asserted that these documents, in the aggregate, made up an express written contract between him and the University "for specific on-campus resources and services during the Spring and Summer 2020 terms." Rojas also alleged an unjust enrichment claim.
The University moved to dismiss, arguing that both claims were barred by sovereign immunity. The trial court dismissed the unjust enrichment claim but allowed the breach of contract claim to proceed. This appeal followed under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130, which authorizes appellate review of non-final orders that deny a motion that "asserts entitlement to sovereign immunity." Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(F)(iii); Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const. (providing that district courts of appeal "may review interlocutory orders in such cases to the extent provided by rules adopted by the supreme court").
II.
Because the assorted documents attached to the complaint do not constitute an express written contract sufficient to overcome sovereign immunity, the trial court should have dismissed the breach of contract claim. Our review is de novo. DeSantis v. Geffin, 284 So.3d 599, 602 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).
Outside of claims brought under the federal or state constitutions, sovereign immunity bars suit against the State.[2]This is an absolute rule with only two exceptions. The first is in Florida's constitution itself, which expressly vests the Legislature with the authority to waive the State's immunity by general law. Art. X, § 13, Fla. Const. ("Provision may be made by general law for bringing suit against the state as to all liabilities now existing or hereafter originating.").[3] The second exception is of judicial creation: When the State contracts with a private entity, then "the defense of sovereign immunity will not protect the state from action arising from the state's breach of that contract." Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Dep't of Corr., 471 So.2d 4, 5 (Fla. 1984).
Certain principles govern each exception. Any legislative waiver of sovereign immunity (under the first exception), "must be clear and unequivocal." Rabideau v. State, 409 So.2d 1045, 1046 (Fla. 1982). It also "must be construed narrowly in favor of the government." Hardee Cnty. v. FINR II, Inc., 221 So.3d 1162, 1165 (Fla. 2017); see also Spangler v. Fla. State Tpk. Auth., 106 So.2d 421, 424 (Fla. 1958) ( ). And for waiver-by-contract, there must be an express, written agreement that is legislatively authorized (that is, the state entity had statutory authority to enter the contract, thereby waiving sovereign immunity and binding the State). Pan-Am Tobacco Corp., 471 So.2d at 6.
Rojas (on behalf of a class of similarly situated students) seeks to sue the University, a state entity, and recover "fees for on-campus services that were not provided to students." To pierce the State's immunity, then, Rojas must identify an express written contract expressly addressing the University's obligation to provide such on-campus services. He has not done so, instead offering up a hodge-podge of documents that fails to clear this basic hurdle.
Absent from the series of documents is any language obligating the University to provide specific, on-campus services to any student during any specific time. Nor is there any language that can be read to obligate the University to a refund of fees when any such services are paused, limited, or outright cancelled.
A walk through the attachments makes this clear. Although Rojas attached a copy of the University's financial liability agreement,[4] all that it does is expressly condition a student's right to enroll upon that student's agreement to pay tuition, fees, and any other amounts that may come due. It then walks through the student's obligation to keep track of what is owed and details the University's ability to recover delinquent debts should the student not honor the agreement to pay. The agreement does mention the University's provision of "educational services," but this general phrase falls far short of conveying an express promise by the University to provide in-person or on-campus services to a student at any specific time.
Next is an estimate of tuition and fees for the 2019-2020 academic year, along with Rojas's tuition statement showing he paid his tuition and fees for the Spring 2020 semester. This confirms he paid the fees he seeks to recover but, like the financial agreement, it contains no language obligating the University to provide any specific in-person or on-campus services.
The complaint also cites to various University webpages that contain general statements or descriptions of various on-campus amenities. Without a signature or ratification by any person authorized to enter contracts that bind the University (and thus, the State), we question whether such gratuitous informational statements on a university's website could be legally binding for purposes of waiving sovereign immunity. In any event, though, the ones relied on here lack any language obligating the University to provide any specific service at any specific time.
Finally, Rojas points to section 1009.24, Florida Statutes, as imposing "implied conditions [into] UF's express contracts with its students." Yet this statute does not salvage Rojas's claim. To the contrary, the statute provides universities with discretion over the specific use of the fees, which are mandatory for all students as an incident of enrollment. See § 1009.24(2), Fla. Stat. (). The Legislature has provided direction to the University through this statute as to the amount of fees as well as general descriptions of certain categories of services the fees may (or may not) go towards. See, e.g., § 1009.24(10)(b), Fla. Stat. ( ). But no provision of section 1009.24 directs the University to provide a specific service or requires that a service be provided in person or on campus.
III.
Given all of this, we cannot conclude that the University entered an express written contract with Rojas that obligated it to provide specific services at a specific time in a specific way. We therefore reverse the portion of the trial court's order denying the University's motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim. We affirm the rest of the order.
We are sympathetic to Rojas and all other students whose on-campus...
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