Univ. of Wash. v. City of Seattle

• Decision Date: 20 July 2017
• Docket Number: No. 94232-3,94232-3
• Citation: 188 Wash.2d 823,399 P.3d 519
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. CITY OF SEATTLE; DOCOMOMO US—WEWA; Historic Seattle ; and the Washington Trust for Historic Preservation, Appellants.

188 Wash.2d 823

399 P.3d 519

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, Respondent,

v.CITY OF SEATTLE; DOCOMOMO US—WEWA; Historic Seattle ; and the Washington Trust for Historic Preservation, Appellants.

No. 94232-3

Supreme Court of Washington.

Argued June 6, 2017

Filed: July 20, 2017

Roger D. Wynne, Patrick Downs, Seattle City Attorney's Office, 701 Fifth Ave., Ste. 2050, Seattle, WA, 98104-7097, David Alan Bricklin, Bricklin & Newman, LLP, 1424 4th Ave., Ste. 500, Seattle, WA, 98101-2258, for Appellants.

Patrick John Schneider, Steven James Gillespie, Jacqueline Constance Quarri, Foster Pepper PLLC, 1111 3rd Ave., Ste. 3000, Seattle, WA, 98101-3292, Karin Lisa Nyrop, Quentin R. Yerxa, Attorney General's Office—UW Division, 4333 Brooklyn Ave. N.E., Seattle, WA, 98195-9475, for Respondent.

Sandra Christine Adix, Attorney General's Office/Agriculture Di., 7141 Cleanwater Dr. S.W., P.O. Box 40109, Olympia, WA, 98504-0109, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington State Dep't of Archeology and Historic Preservation.

Keith Patrick Scully, Newman Du Wors LLP, 2101 4th Ave., Ste. 1500, Seattle, WA, 98121-2336, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Futurewise.

Bob C. Sterbank, Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 987, Snoqualmie, WA, 98065-0987, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington State Association of Municipal Attorneys.

YU, J.

¶1 The city of Seattle's (City's) municipal code includes a " ‘Landmarks Preservation Ordinance’ " (LPO), chapter 25.12 Seattle Municipal Code (SMC). SMC 25.12.010. Pursuant to the LPO, property with significant historical or cultural importance may be designated as landmark property. Once property has been nominated for potential landmark designation, the LPO restricts the owner's ability to make changes to that property. The University of Washington (UW) owns property in Seattle but contends that the LPO cannot apply to any property owned by UW (UW property). The City disagrees.

¶2 We must now resolve this disagreement. UW wanted to demolish a building on its Seattle campus, but that building was nominated for potential landmark designation pursuant to the LPO. UW therefore filed a declaratory judgment action asking for a judicial determination that the LPO cannot apply to any UW property as a matter of law.

¶3 As discussed below, all of UW's arguments either fail as a matter of law or cannot be decided in the first instance by a state court of general jurisdiction. Therefore, we reverse the trial court and remand for entry of summary judgment in favor of the City and DOCOMOMO US—WEWA (DOCOMOMO).¹

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶4 The basis for the controversy currently before us dates back nearly 20 years. In 2000, UW prepared a draft campus master plan (CMP) that made UW's position clear: "The City landmarks ordinance is a local ordinance which is inapplicable to University property because it conflicts with the [Board of] Regent[s'] exclusive authority over its buildings." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 99.

¶5 UW ultimately agreed to an amended CMP, which the City approved, that memorialized the parties' disagreement without resolving it: "By adopting and approving the Master Plan, neither the University nor the City of Seattle waives or concedes its legal position concerning the scope of either party's legal authority to control or regulate University property." Id. at 277; see also UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON MASTER PLAN: SEATTLE CAMPUS 125 (Jan. 2003), http://cpd.uw.edu/sites/default/files/master-plan/2003_CMP/uw-2003-campus-master-plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/9T66-LF3W].

¶6 Since UW adopted its CMP in 2003, the applicability of the LPO came up in connection with UW's 2010 renovation of Husky Stadium and with a 2011 nomination of the Sand Point Naval Air Station for potential landmark designation. In both of those situations, UW chose to voluntarily comply with the LPO process but was careful to note that such voluntary compliance "neither waives nor concedes its legal position with regard to the City's regulatory jurisdiction over the University as an agency of the State of Washington." CP at 176.

¶7 The facts alleged in UW's complaint in this case are uncontroverted. In 2015, UW's Board of Regents (Regents) identified the More Hall Annex (Annex) for possible demolition, to be replaced with a new Computer Science and Engineering Building (CSE II). The Annex had been constructed in 1961 to house UW's nuclear reactor. After the reactor was shut down in 1988 and UW's nuclear engineering program ended four years later, the Annex sat vacant and unused. On December 2, 2015, DOCOMOMO nominated the Annex for potential designation as a landmark pursuant to the LPO. While the process of choosing the site for CSE II continued, UW filed this declaratory action in King County Superior Court, seeking a ruling that the LPO cannot apply to UW property as a matter of law.

¶8 On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court ruled in favor of UW, determining that the LPO "has no application because the University is not a ‘person’ or ‘owner’ as defined in the LPO." Id. at 609. The trial court expressly did not consider any of the other issues presented. The City and DOCOMOMO appealed.²

¶9 The Court of Appeals, Division One, certified the case for our direct review, and our commissioner accepted certification pursuant to RCW 2.06.030 and RAP 4.4. Ruling Accepting Certification, Univ. of Wash. v. City of Seattle, No. 94232-3, at 2 (Wash. Mar. 9, 2017). We accepted amici briefings supporting the City from the Washington State Department of Archaeology and Historic Preservation, Futurewise, and the Washington State Association of Municipal Attorneys (WSAMA).

ISSUES³

¶10 A. Is the Regents' "full control" over UW property "except as otherwise provided by law," as expressed in RCW 28B.20.130(1), subject to limitation by applicable state statutes?

¶11 B. If so, is UW a "[s]tate agenc[y]" that must comply with local development regulations adopted pursuant to the Growth Management Act (GMA) in accordance with RCW 36.70A.103 ?

¶12 C. If so, is the LPO a local "development regulation^" that was "adopted pursuant to" the GMA in accordance with RCW 36.70A.103 ?

¶13 D. Is UW a property " ‘[o]wner’ " as defined by SMC 25.12.200 such that the LPO applies to UW's Seattle property?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶14 UW seeks a holding that the LPO can never apply to any UW property as a matter of law. There are no disputed material facts in this case, and all the questions presented require statutory and regulatory interpretation. Our review is thus de novo. Burns v. City of Seattle, 161 Wash.2d 129, 140, 164 P.3d 475 (2007).

¶15 State statutes and local ordinances are subject to the same interpretive rules.

Faciszewski v. Brown, 187 Wash.2d 308, 320, 386 P.3d 711 (2016). Where the meaning of a statute or ordinance is plain and unambiguous, we must "give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent." Burns , 161 Wash.2d at 140, 164 P.3d 475. "Plain meaning is discerned from viewing the words of a particular provision in the context of the statute in which they are found, together with related statutory provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole." Id.

ANALYSIS

¶16 UW and the City have been grappling over the LPO's applicability to UW property since the City first adopted the LPO in 1977. State v. City of Seattle, 94 Wash.2d 162, 164-65, 615 P.2d 461 (1980). There is no question that UW's Seattle property includes historically and culturally significant resources. The debate has always centered on who has the authority to control those resources.

¶17 The last time we addressed this issue directly was in 1980. The court held that the LPO could not apply to a portion of UW property as a matter of constitutional law. Id. at 166, 615 P.2d 461. In the present case, however, the questions presented are based on the interpretation of statutes and regulations that have been substantially amended since City of Seattle was decided, so we must reconsider the ultimate question of whether the LPO can apply to UW property in light of the current statutory language.

¶18 We hold that City of Seattle has been superseded in part by statute and that the LPO can, at least in some circumstances, be applied to UW property in Seattle. We therefore reverse and remand for the entry of summary judgment in favor of the City and DOCOMOMO.

A. The Regents' control over UW property is subject to limitation by applicable state statutes

¶19 Both UW and its Regents are creatures of statute, with "no powers that are not conferred by statute, and none that the legislature cannot take away or ignore." State v. Hewitt Land Co ., 74 Wash. 573, 580, 134 P. 474 (1913). The first Washington State Legislature established "the University of Washington" and "vest[ed]" its governance in the Regents. LAWS OF 1889, ch. 12, §§ 1, 3, at 395, 96. Beginning in 1909, the legislature expressly granted the Regents "full control of the university and its property of various kinds." LAWS OF 1909, ch. 97, § 5, at 240.

¶20 That statutory language had not been amended when City of Seattle was decided in 1980, and the statute's strong, unequivocal language was a key factor in our decision. City of Seattle, 94 Wash.2d at 165, 615 P.2d 461 (citing former RCW 28B.20.130 (1977)). We began with the principle that municipal ordinances such as the LPO cannot apply where they conflict with state statutes pursuant to article XI, section 11 of the Washington Constitution. Id. at 166, 615 P.2d 461.

¶21 Two state statutes were at issue in City of Seattle . The first was former RCW 28B.20.130(1), which, as noted, gave the Regents " ‘full control of the university and its property of various kinds.’ " Id. at 165, 615 P.2d 461. The court also considered former RCW 28B.20.392(2)(b)(ii) (1969), which specifically gave the Regents the authority to " ‘to raze, reconstruct, alter, remodel or add to existing buildings,’ " id. at 166, 615 P.2d 461, in the "Metropolitan Tract," which is "the original 10-acre parcel of land endowed to Washington...