Universal Const. Co. v. Arizona Consol. Masonry & Plastering Contractors Ass'n

Decision Date23 January 1963
Docket NumberNo. 7387,7387
PartiesUNIVERSAL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, an Arizona corporation, Appellant, v. ARIZONA CONSOLIDATED MASONRY & PLASTERING CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION et al., Appellees.
CourtArizona Supreme Court

Ira S. Broadman, Phoenix, for appellant.

Levis, Roca, Scoville, Beauchamp & Linton, by John P. Frank, Phoenix, for appellees.

UDALL, Vice Chief Justice.

Appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiff Arizona Consolidated Masonry & Plastering Contractors Association (hereinafter referred to as Association) and plaintiff Orville Gannon (hereinafter referred to as Gannon) against defendant Universal Construction Company (hereinafter referred to as Universal) for breach of contract.

The Association, in accordance with its bylaws, conducted an activity called a 'bid depository' whereby it forwarded bids of subcontractors to general contractors who were themselves bidding on various construction projects. The subcontractor using the depository agreed to pay 1% of his bid to the depository if successful. Under the plan, the bids of the subcontractors were delivered in individual sealed envelopes by messenger, the United Parcel Service, to the general contractor. The envelopes each had attached a printed form which was removed by the messenger and returned to the bid depository after signing which reads:

'The undersigned Contractor or Company hereby acknowledges receipt of a bid from _____ on _____ Project, Association Job Number _____. In so doing, the undersigned agrees with the bidder and with the Arizona Consolidated Masonry and Plastering Contractors Association that he will use one of the masonry bids on this job forwarded to him through the services of this Association, assuming the bid contained herein complies with the bidding rules of said Association.

'________

'(Contractor)

'Time delivered _____

By ________

'(This line to be signed only if signature is by Authorized Agent or Contractor).'

In the instant case, Universal was one of several general contractors bidding on a construction project at Luke Air Force Base. It made no request to the Association for bids. However, on June 3, 1959, the Association undertook to deliver to Universal by United Parcel Service messenger bids of three subcontractors, among them that of plaintiff Gannon. The envelopes containing the printed form described above were received by Thomas P. Papandrews who had been employed by Universal as an estimator for less than one week. Papandrews signed the forms on the three envelopes 'Pap' and the messenger removed the forms for return to the Association. The Luke Field Project thereafter was awarded to Universal. However, a subcontractor who had not submitted a bid through the bid depository was given the work. Suit was instituted by the Association and Gannon to enforce the awarding of a contract to Gannon. The court sitting without a jury awarded judgment for $1,452.14 to Gannon for his loss of profits on his bid and judgment for $140.75 to the Association for its 1% commission. Universal appeals.

There was considerable evidence presented as to the method of operation of this 'bid depository' in particular as well as those of a similar nature in general. The issue to be answered, however, is whether under the facts of this case there was a valid and binding contract between the parties. Both Gannon and the Association rely on the form signed by Papandrews, described above, as constituting the contract of the parties. Thus the action is founded on a claimed contract to use Gannon's bid or one of the other bids submitted by the Association.

The Association and Gannon contend in effect that there are two separate agreements[93 Ariz. 7] --one between Gannon and Universal, and the other between the Association and Universal. Whereas Universal asserts that no contract was entered into between itself and either of these parties or, for that matter, either of the other bidders, and that since there was no contract there would be no cause of action against Universal.

With regard to that part of the judgment following plaintiffs' Count I in their complaint below granting the Association the sum of $140.75 for breach of its alleged contract with Universal we cite Arizona Constitution, Article 6, A.R.S.:

'Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have:

* * *

* * *

'3. Appellate jurisdiction in all actions and proceedings except civil and criminal actions originating in courts not of record * * *.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Also we quote from A.R.S. § 22-201(B):

'Justices of the peace have exclusive original jurisdiction of all civil actions when the amount involved, exclusive of interest and costs, is less than two hundred dollars * * *.' (Emphasis supplied.)

A justice of the peace court is not a court of record. Arizona Constitution, Article 6, § 30. Therefore, it follows that we were not to have appellate jurisdiction of any matter, save certain exceptions enumerated in Article 6, § 5 of the Constitution, unless the sum involved exceeds two hundred dollars.

The sum of $140.75 is not such sum as to give us appellate jurisdiction in this matter. See also Arizona Corporation Commission v. Mountain States T. & T. Co., 71 Ariz. 404, 228 P.2d 749 (1951) relating to the judiciary provisions preceding the 1960 amendment.

With regard to the alleged contract between Gannon and Universal we note that the first complaint filed in the action against Universal on December 9, 1959, alleged in Count II that 'It is impossible to specify which of these plaintiffs (referring to the three subcontractors who submitted bids) has thus been deprived because under the terms of the agreement the defendant was free to choose any one of them.' We are wholly in accord with this allegation insofar as it refers to the impossibility of determining who is deprived. The alleged contract states 'that he will use one of the masonry bids on this job forwarded to him through the services of the Association.' This leaves the choice in the defendant's hands. An amended complaint was filed on January...

To continue reading

Request your trial
10 cases
  • Mitchell v. Siqueiros
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • July 5, 1978
    ...and Co. v. Grafe and Associates, Inc., 90 Idaho 502, 414 P.2d 873 (1966). Accord, Universal Const. Co. v. Arizona Consolidated Masonry & Plastering Contractors Ass'n, 93 Ariz. 4, 377 P.2d 1017 (1963); Corbin-Dykes Electric Co. v. Burr, 18 Ariz.App. 101, 500 P.2d 632 (1972); Southern Cal. Ac......
  • Finney Co., Inc. v. Monarch Const. Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • June 14, 1984
    ...Inc. v. Glassman Construction Company, Inc., (D.C.Cir.1963), 319 F.2d 736; Universal Construction Company v. Arizona Consolidated Masonry & Plastering Contractors Ass'n, 93 Ariz. 4, 377 P.2d 1017 (1963); Merritt-Chapman and Scott Corporation v. Gunderson Brothers Engineering Corporation (9t......
  • AROK Const. Co. v. Indian Const. Services
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • February 11, 1993
    ...on AROK's subcontract bid or by listing AROK as the subcontractor in the bid. See Universal Const. Co. v. Arizona Consol. Masonry & Plastering Contractors Ass'n, 93 Ariz. 4, 8, 377 P.2d 1017, 1019 (1963) (a bid "does not ripen into a contract until voluntarily accepted by the offeree"); Cor......
  • City of Scottsdale v. Deem
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • August 24, 1976
    ...bid is in fact accepted. 1 Williston on Contracts, § 31 (3d ed. 1957). See also Universal Construction Co. v. Arizona Consolidated Masonry & Plastering Contractors Assoc., 93 Ariz. 4, 377 P.2d 1017 (1963). This authority is most persuasive when read in conjunction with the language of the C......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT