Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Thompson
Decision Date | 30 June 2000 |
Citation | 776 So.2d 81 |
Parties | UNIVERSAL UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY v. Robert THOMPSON. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Danny D. Henderson of Henderson & Butler, Huntsville, for appellant.
Trey Riley, Huntsville, for appellee.
The plaintiff, Universal Underwriters Insurance Company ("Universal"), appeals from a judgment on the pleadings entered in favor of the defendant, Robert Thompson. We hold that the trial court erred in entering the judgment on the pleadings because the pleadings show that there are genuine issues of material fact. Therefore, we reverse and remand.
The following facts are undisputed. On July 27, 1998, Thompson was an employee of Woody Anderson Ford, Inc. While working in the line and scope of his employment with Woody Anderson Ford, Thompson was injured while he was repairing the engine of an automobile owned by Woody Anderson Ford. The engine backfired, burning Thompson. Thompson recovered workers' compensation benefits as a result of the accident.
Subsequently, Thompson made a demand for uninsured-motorist insurance benefits, under Woody Anderson Ford's garage-liability policy; the automobile on which Thompson was working was uninsured. Universal, the issuer of Woody Anderson Ford's garage-liability policy, filed a declaratory-judgment action against Thompson, asking for a judgment declaring that, under the policy, it did not owe him uninsured-motorist coverage. Universal attached a copy of the policy as part of the complaint. Thompson moved for a judgment on the pleadings. Universal opposed his motion, arguing, among other things, that the motion was premature because there had been no discovery and genuine issues of material fact precluded the entry of a judgment on the pleadings. Universal presented the affidavit of C.W. "Woody" Anderson, the president of Woody Anderson Ford, Inc., which states, in pertinent part:
The trial court granted Thompson's motion. In its order, the trial court stated only, "No rejection having been instituted on the elective options form, the statutory minimum coverage applies to Robert Thompson." Universal appeals from that order.
When a motion for judgment on the pleadings is made by a party, "the trial court reviews the pleadings filed in the case and, if the pleadings show that no genuine issue of material fact is presented, the trial court will enter a judgment for the party entitled to a judgment according to the law." B.K.W. Enters., Inc. v. Tractor & Equip. Co., 603 So.2d 989, 991 (Ala.1992). See also Deaton, Inc. v. Monroe, 762 So.2d 840 (Ala.2000). A judgment on the pleadings is subject to a de novo review. Harden v. Ritter, 710 So.2d 1254, 1255 (Ala. Civ.App.1997). A court reviewing a judgment on the pleadings accepts the facts stated in the complaint as true and views them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 1255-56. If matters outside the pleadings are presented to and considered by the trial court, then the motion for a judgment on the pleadings must be treated as a motion for a summary judgment. See Rule 12(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. Otherwise, in deciding a motion for a judgment on the pleadings, the trial court is bound by the pleadings. See Stockman v. Echlin, Inc., 604 So.2d 393, 394 (Ala.1992).
The trial court's consideration of the garage-liability policy did not require conversion of Thompson's motion for a judgment on the pleadings into a motion for a summary judgment, because the policy was made part of the complaint and because Thompson admitted the genuineness of the policy in his answer. See Wilson v. First Union Nat'l Bank of Georgia, 716 So.2d 722, 726 (Ala.Civ.App.1998)(the trial court's consideration of documents attached to the complaint, whose identity and authenticity were not in dispute, did not require conversion of a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment) that . Likewise, the affidavit of Anderson did not require conversion of the motion for a judgment on the pleadings into a motion for a summary judgment, because the record is silent as to whether the trial court considered that affidavit. See Stockman, 604 So.2d at 394. The trial court, in its order, did not indicate whether it considered Anderson's affidavit, and the record on appeal contains no transcript of the hearing on Thompson's motion. Because the record gives no indication that the trial court considered matters outside the pleadings, we treat the motion as a motion for a judgment on the pleadings. Accordingly, we look only to the pleadings in determining whether the trial court erred in granting Thompson's motion.
Section 32-7-23, Ala.Code, 1975, provides:
"(a) No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in limits for bodily injury or death set forth in subsection (c) of Section 32-7-6, under provisions approved by the Commissioner of Insurance for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom; provided, that the named insured shall have the right to reject such coverage; and provided further, that unless the named insured requests such coverage in writing, such coverage need not be provided in or supplemental to a renewal policy where the named insured had rejected the coverage in connection with the policy previously issued to him by the same insurer."
(Emphasis added.) This Court has construed this statute as requiring "[u]ninsured protection ... in all automobile liability policies unless rejected" by the named insured. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Martin, 292 Ala. 103, 105, 289 So.2d 606, 608 (1974). To be legally effective, the named insured's rejection must be in writing. See Insurance Co. of North Am. v. Thomas, 337 So.2d 365, 369 (Ala. Civ.App.1976). Whether the named insured has rejected uninsured-motorist coverage is a question of fact. See Martin, 292 Ala. at 105, 289 So.2d at 607-08.
Beneath this last paragraph, certain types of coverages are listed on separate lines: "GARAGE"; "BASIC AUTO"; "AUTO LESSORS LIABILITY"; "DAILY RENTAL"; and "DESIGNATED INDIVIDUALS." To the right of each of these lines, the form provides boxes to...
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