University Interscholastic League v. Buchanan

• Decision Date: 03 February 1993
• Docket Number: Nos. 3-92-108-C,3-92-161-CV,s. 3-92-108-C
• Citation: 848 S.W.2d 298
• Parties: 81 Ed. Law Rep. 1145, 1 A.D.D. 742, 3 NDLR P 263 UNIVERSITY INTERSCHOLASTIC LEAGUE and Bailey Marshall, Appellants, v. Bruce LaFeyette BUCHANAN, et al., Appellees. UNIVERSITY INTERSCHOLASTIC LEAGUE and Dr. Bailey Marshall, Appellants, v. Phillip Earl BOMAR, Jr., et al., Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 298

848 S.W.2d 298

81 Ed. Law Rep. 1145, 1 A.D.D. 742, 3

NDLR P 263

UNIVERSITY INTERSCHOLASTIC LEAGUE and Bailey Marshall, Appellants, v. Bruce LaFeyette BUCHANAN, et al., Appellees.

UNIVERSITY INTERSCHOLASTIC LEAGUE and Dr. Bailey Marshall, Appellants, v. Phillip Earl BOMAR, Jr., et al., Appellees.

Nos. 3-92-108-CV, 3-92-161-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas Austin.

Feb. 3, 1993.

Rehearing Overruled March 31, 1993.

William C. Bednar, Jr., Eskew, Muir & Bednar, Austin, for University Interscholastic League.

James R. Raup, McGinnis, Lochridge & Kilgore, Austin, for Austin Independent School Dist. and Dr. Jim Hensley.

Diane M. Henson, Graves, Dougherty, Hearon & Moody, Austin, for Bruce LaFeyette Buchanan and Phillip Earl Bomar, Jr.

Leonard J. Schwartz, Schwartz & Eichelbaum, P.C., Austin, for Dallas Independent School Dist. and Dr. Marvin E. Edwards.

Before CARROLL, C.J., and JONES and KIDD, JJ.

KIDD, Justice.

The University Interscholastic League and its Executive Director, Bailey Marshall,

                (collectively hereinafter the "UIL") appeal the judgment of the trial court granting a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the UIL's over-19 rule. 1  We will affirm the judgment of the district court
                

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Composed of representatives of Texas school districts, the UIL is a voluntary organization that regulates, among other things, the competitive athletics of the junior and senior high school student athletes in Texas. This case involves a challenge to section 400(a) of the UIL Constitution and Contest Rules (the "over-19 rule") which states: "Subject to the other sections of this subchapter, an individual is eligible to participate in a League varsity contest as a representative of a participant school if that individual ... is less than 19 years old on September 1 preceding the contest...."

The UIL states that the underlying purpose of the over-19 rule is to ensure the safety of the participating student athletes and the equality of competitors. It argues that one policy justification for the over-19 rule is the avoidance of potential injury which might result if younger, less developed high school students are required to compete against older students. Furthermore, the UIL argues that the over-19 rule discourages the practice of "redshirting," i.e., having students repeat grades so that they will be more mature and better athletes during their high school years. The UIL permits no exception to or waiver of the over-19 rule based on special circumstances of individual students.

Appellees, Bruce Buchanan and Phillip Bomar (the "Students"), obtained permanent injunctions allowing them to participate in the 1991 football season. The final judgments rendered in these causes stated that the over-19 rule violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp.1992) ("Section 504"), as applied to the Students. Section 504 provides in pertinent part:

No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United States, as defined in section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance....

29 U.S.C.A. § 794.

The factual bases for the permanent injunctions involving the Students are as follows.

Bruce Buchanan

Buchanan turned nineteen years old before he entered the twelfth grade at Travis High School of the Austin Independent School District ("Austin ISD"). Because he had learning disabilities, he had repeated the first and seventh grades. During ninth grade, Buchanan began participating in his school's football program. Although he was nineteen at the start of his senior year, Buchanan was below the average weight and height of his team members, and he never was a starter on the team.

Both Buchanan's mother and his Admission, Review and Dismissal (ARD) Committee ² requested a waiver from the over-19 rule. The UIL responded that there were "no rules which allow for a waiver of the 19-year-old rule." Buchanan instituted this lawsuit against the UIL and its director, and later joined Austin ISD and Dr.

Jim Hensley, the Superintendent of Austin ISD, as defendants in the suit to enjoin the enforcement of the rule.

Phillip Bomar

Bomar was also nineteen years of age at the start of his senior year. He had repeated his fourth and seventh grades, and was classified by his school district, Dallas Independent School District ("Dallas ISD"), as learning disabled. Like Buchanan, Bomar began playing football for his high school, Justin F. Kimball High School. Bomar was average in size compared to the other members of his football team and was a starting linebacker during his junior year of high school.

Bomar's mother and high school principal applied for a waiver of the over-19 rule for Bomar, which the UIL refused. In response, Bomar filed this action against the UIL, its director, Dallas ISD, and Dr. Marvin Edwards, the Superintendent of Dallas ISD.

CROSS-CLAIMS OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICTS

Both school districts filed cross-claims against the UIL, stating that the UIL's mandatory forfeiture rule caused them to violate the rights of the Students. Section 700(a)(2)(C)(ii) of the UIL Constitution and Contest Rules (the UIL's "mandatory forfeiture rule") provides that if a school allows a student who is finally determined ineligible to participate in a UIL contest under a court order, the school must forfeit all contests in which the student participated. In the past, the UIL has enforced the mandatory forfeiture rule to require that a school forfeit all of its contests in which the litigating student participated even though the student's participation was pursuant to a lawful court-ordered injunction. ³

In October 1991, the trial court issued temporary orders enjoining the enforcement of the over-19 rule against the Students and the mandatory forfeiture rule against Austin ISD and Dallas ISD. These two causes were then consolidated for purposes of trial and appeal. After a trial on the merits, the district court rendered a final judgment in favor of the Students and the school districts, enjoining the enforcement of the two rules.

From this judgment, the UIL appeals bringing forth four points of error.

IMPACT OF THE REHABILITATION ACT ON THE OVER-19 RULE

In order to obtain injunctive relief, an applicant must establish the existence of a wrongful act, imminent harm, and irreparable injury, and the absence of an adequate remedy at law. Hues v. Warren Petroleum Co., 814 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied); Priest v. Texas Animal Health Comm'n, 780 S.W.2d 874, 875 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1989, no writ). The decision to grant or deny a permanent injunction lies within the trial court's sound discretion, and appellate review is restricted to whether the action involved a clear abuse of discretion. Hues, 814 S.W.2d at 529; Priest, 780 S.W.2d at 875.

The UIL argues in its first two points of error that the trial court erred in granting the permanent injunctions against the over-19 rule and in awarding attorneys' fees. ⁴ In its first point of error, the UIL alleges that the rule does not discriminate solely on the basis of the Students' handicaps; the UIL maintains that the Students are ineligible due to their ages which are determined by their birth dates. The rule and its purposes, it contends, apply equally to both handicapped and non-handicapped students.

We agree that the UIL's enforcement of its over-19 rule as to these Students was not on the basis of a current handicap or because of a history of being handicapped. However, the record clearly demonstrates that both Students repeated grades in school because of learning disabilities. Had they not experienced difficulties in the classroom and progressed through school at a pace slower than most students, they would have turned nineteen after September 1 of their senior year and thus would have been age-eligible to participate in interscholastic athletics.

The United States District Court, in Doe v. Marshall, 459 F.Supp. 1190 (S.D.Tex.1978), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 622 F.2d 118 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 993, 101 S.Ct. 2336, 68 L.Ed.2d 855 (1981), ⁵ invoked a balancing test of the harms inflicted upon the various parties in its determination of whether to grant a preliminary injunction of a UIL rule. Id. at 1192. In the present cases, evidence demonstrated that the Students would benefit emotionally by participating in competitive athletics. The evidence did not show that these Students had been involved in redshirting or that they presented a danger to other student athletes; the concerns that made the rule necessary are not present in these causes and the UIL is not harmed. Thus, the equities before the trial court weighed in favor of enjoining the enforcement of the rule.

The United States Supreme Court has stated that "an otherwise qualified handicapped individual must be provided with meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee offers.... [T]o assure meaningful access, reasonable accommodations in the grantee's program or benefit may have to be made." Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301, 105 S.Ct. 712, 720, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985) (discussing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979)) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the United States Court of Appeals in Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1262 (5th Cir.1988), concluded that "our precedent requires that the 'reasonable accommodation' question be decided as an issue of fact...."

Although the UIL provides a waiver procedure for some eligibility rules, e.g., the four-year eligibility rule, it fails to furnish such a process for the over-19 rule. Since the UIL already utilizes a waiver procedure for some rules, the evidence indicates that instituting such a...