University of South Carolina v. Mehlman
| Decision Date | 07 December 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 18280,18280 |
| Citation | 139 S.E.2d 771,245 S.C. 180 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Appellant, v. Ralph E. MEHLMAN and Mehlman, Inc., Respondents. |
Daniel R. McLeod, Atty. Gen., Joseph C. Coleman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Columbia, for appellant.
McLeod & Singletary, Walter S. Monteith, Columbia, for respondents.
The University of South Carolina, the appellant herein, instituted this condemnation proceedings, pursuant to Section 25-101 et seq. of the 1962 Code, against Ralph E. Mehlman and Mehlman, Inc., the respondents herein, to acquire title to a certain lot of land located at the northeast corner of Main and Blossom Streets in Columbia, for the purpose of erecting thereon a dormitory to house students of the University.
The petition of the appellant sets forth that it is a State public body as defined by Section 25-102(3) of the 1962 Code, having been created under and existing by virtue of Section 22-104 et seq. of said Code. The petition sets forth the name of the appellant, a sufficient description of the property, a statement that its acquisition is necessary for a public works project, which is described therein, a statement that the proceedings were instituted under the aforesaid statute, and a suitable prayer for relief. Section 25-105. To the foregoing petition the respondents filed their verified return and by the third defense thereof assert that the 'Public Works Eminent Domain Law', as is contained in Section 25-101 to 140, inclusive, is special legislation, in contravention of Article III, Section 34, subdivision 9, of the 1895 Constitution of this State. Specifically, the respondents contend that by reason of Section 25-139 of the Code, such being a part of the 'Public Works Eminent Domain Law', and making such inapplicable to the seven Counties named in said section, the entire Act is unconstitutional because it is a special law when a general law can be made applicable.
The question of whether the 'Public Works Eminent Domain Law' was unconstitutional as being special legislation prohibited by Article III, Section 34, subdivision 9, of the Constitution, came on to be heard before the Honorable John Grimball, Resident Judge of the Fifth Circuit, who, by his order dated September 1, 1964, held that the 'Public Works Eminent Domain Law' was void and unconstitutional because such was in direct contravention of the aforesaid Article of the Constitution. The present appeal is from such order.
The appellant was first granted the power of eminent domain by an Act of the General Assembly approved March 16, 1926. 34 Stats. 980. This Act was codified as Section 5714 in both the 1932 and 1942 Codes. It was codified as Section 22-108 in the 1952 Code. It was provided in the original Act and the subsequent Code sections through 1952 that the procedure to be used and the authority granted was the same as that given to municipal corporations, as such is contained in Section 59-201 et seq., of the 1952 Code.
The General Assembly, at its 1953 Session, in the permanent provisions of the general appropriation Act, Section 96, subsec. a thereof, which was approved April 28, 1953, 48 Stats. 606, provided:
The General Assembly, also at its 1953 Session, by an Act approved May 9, 1953, 48 Stats. 368, struck out Sections 22-101 to 22-120 of the 1952 Code, relating to the University of South Carolina, and enacted in lieu thereof sections designated as 22-101 to 22-105, inclusive. The right of condemnation given to the University was contained in Section 22-105 of the new Act, and provided:
It thus appears that the appellant could have exercised the power of eminent domain as was authorized in Section 22-105 next above quoted, or in its discretion, it could make use of the procedure set forth in the 'Public Works Eminent Domain Law', Section 25-101 et seq., of the 1952 Code, by authority of Section 96, subsec. a of the Acts of 1953, above quoted. However, it appears that Section 22-105, 1952 Code, as amended, was deleted when the 1962, Code was adopted, and the provision that the power of eminent domain granted to the appellant to be exercised as provided for municipal corporations was not carried over into the 1962 Code. Instead, there appears in the 1962 Code, Section 22-107, authority for the Trustees of the appellant, in their discretion, to make use of the provisions of the 'Public Works Eminent Domain Law' to 'condemn land for corporate purposes' as was authorized by Section 22-104(8) of the 1962 Code.
The 'Public Works Eminent Domain Law' was enacted into law on July 17, 1935. 39 Stats. 1268. It provided for the condemnation of real property in this State by the agencies therein mentioned and engaged in any public works project and provided for the procedure to be used in condemning land for the purposes stated. This Act is now codified in the 1962 Code as Sections 25-101 to 25-140, inclusive. The provision of this Act is inapplicable to the seven counties mentioned in Section 25-139 thereof. Section 25-140 of this Act provides that the powers conferred by said 'Public Works Eminent Domain Law' 'shall be in addition and supplemental to and not in substitution for the powers conferred by any other law.'
Article I, Section 17, of the 1895 Constitution of this State, provides that: 'Private property shall not be taken * * * for public use without just compensation being first made therefor.' This section is applicable where private property is taken for public use by the State, or by any of its agencies. The State may delegate to its agencies the right to exercise its power of eminent domain and may, by statute, prescribe the manner and enact procedure by which private property may be condemned for public use, together with the means by which just compensation is to be made. City of Spartanburg v. Belk's Department Store, 199 S.C. 458, 20 S.E.2d 157; Smith v. City of Greenville, 229 S.C. 252, 92 S.E.2d 639, and South Carolina State Highway Department v. Miller, 237 S.C. 386, 117 S.E.2d 561.
We are called upon to pass upon the constitutionality of an Act passed by the General Assembly. In determining this question, it is a well settled rule in this State that a statute will, if possible, be construed so as to render it valid; that a legislative Act will not be declared unconstitutional unless its repugnance to the Constitution is clear and beyond reasonable doubt; that every presumption will be made in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment; that it will be declared unconstitutional only when its invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of the Constitution; that all reasonable presumptions must be made in favor of the validity of the Act; and that the Constitution of South Carolina is a limitation upon, rather than a grant of, legislative power. Clarke v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, 177 S.C. 427, 181 S.E. 481; Nolletti v. Nolletti, 243 S.C. 20, 132 S.E.2d 11.
The right and power of condemnation by the University was delegated to it by Section 22-104(8) of the Code rather than by...
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...the issue of special legislation in regard to the Public Works Eminent Domain Laws is concerned, the case of University of South Carolina v. Mehlman, 245 S.C. 180, 139 S.E.2d 771, disposes of this issue. Mehlman contended that the Public Works Eminent Domain Laws was special legislation bec......
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