Unt v. Aerospace Corp.

• Decision Date: 19 July 1985
• Docket Number: No. 82-6087,82-6087
• Citation: Unt v. Aerospace Corp., 765 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1985)
• Parties: 38 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 999, 37 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,427, 2 Fed.R.Serv.3d 524 Erik UNT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The AEROSPACE CORPORATION, United States Air Force, Space and Missile Systems Organization, and Air Force Systems Command, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1440

765 F.2d 1440

38 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 999,

37 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,427, 2 Fed.R.Serv.3d 524

Erik UNT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The AEROSPACE CORPORATION, United States Air Force, Space and Missile Systems Organization, and Air Force Systems Command, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 82-6087.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Jan. 7, 1985.

Decided July 19, 1985.

Daniel C. Lavery, Tarzana, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.

David Clark, Chase, Rotchford, Drukker & Bogust, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before SNEED, POOLE and FERGUSON, Circuit Judges.

POOLE, Circuit Judge:

Erik Unt appeals the trial court's judgment in favor of appellee Aerospace Corporation (Aerospace) on his first claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq. He also appeals the dismissal of his second claim for violation of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a, against appellees Aerospace, the United States Air Force (Air Force), Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO), and Air Force Systems Command. We affirm.

FACTS

On December 12, 1972, appellant Erik Unt, a naturalized citizen of the United States born in Estonia, was employed as a Level 1 member of the Aerospace technical staff. Aerospace is a California nonprofit corporation formed for the purpose of providing systems engineering and technical direction to the Air Force missile and space program.

In August 1975, Unt filed an informal internal grievance against Aerospace, claiming discrimination based on national origin. This discrimination allegedly was manifested by appellant's July 1975 performance review and the refusal of Aerospace to promote him to a Level 2 management position. Additionally, Unt applied for, but did not receive, promotion to various other higher level management positions in 1975. Aerospace contended that appellant lacked the requisite qualifications, whereas Unt charged discriminatory conduct.

Aerospace investigated Unt's grievance and found the charges to be unsubstantiated. This finding was discussed with Unt, at which time he agreed to abandon his grievance and pursue his disagreements through the Aerospace "open door policy," under which upper level management made themselves available to employees to solve employee problems. Subsequently, on December 15, 1975, Unt was given a 3.6% raise, which was lower than the average Aerospace employee raise of 8.5%. Three days later, he wrote letters to various high level Air Force officers and administrators regarding his dispute with Aerospace management over his performance.

Aerospace management considered Unt's letters inappropriate because they tended to reduce the effectiveness and credibility of the performance of Aerospace personnel in the Air Force-Aerospace joint program office, to which Unt was assigned. Consequently, management met with Unt and discussed the letters in light of Unt's overall performance. Specific suggestions for improvement were provided. Aerospace also conducted an internal investigation of the allegations contained in Unt's letters, and no wrongdoing at Aerospace was revealed.

In February 1976, appellant was notified of his probationary transfer from the Aerospace Global Positioning System (GPS) program office to the Guidance and Control support division. He was also instructed in writing not to communicate with SAMSO concerning Aerospace business matters or attend joint program office meetings without approval. Approximately two months later, Unt reinstated his internal equal employment opportunity (EEO) grievance, and in September 1976, he filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that he had been subject to acts of reprisal for complaining about Aerospace management.

A final decision pursuant to the Aerospace grievance procedure was rendered in February 1977 denying Unt's grievance. In June of that same year, Unt wrote to General Morgan, Commander of SAMSO, calling attention to claimed violations of the law by Aerospace management. Unt's charges were again investigated and found to be unsubstantiated. Appellant was dismissed on July 7, 1977, for making false allegations of management misconduct to SAMSO and for willful violation of instructions and the conditions of his continued employment.

In September 1978, Unt received a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC. He filed this action on December 22, 1978. The court dismissed the Privacy Act claim against Aerospace on May 23, 1979, and against Frank Bane, SAMSO Contract Management Officer, on June 8, 1979. The federal defendants (Air Force, SAMSO, and Air Force Systems Command) were similarly dismissed on September 3, 1980. The remaining Title VII claims against Aerospace were tried by the bench. Unt's Title VII claim for national origin discrimination was dismissed at the close of his case in chief. This ruling was not appealed. At the conclusion of trial, the parties submitted written final argument and proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the remaining claim of retaliation. On November 4, 1982, the court issued its judgment in favor of Aerospace. Unt subsequently moved to amend the court's findings and conclusions, but this motion was denied as untimely. A timely notice of appeal was filed on December 3, 1982. We assume jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, we are presented with two main issues. First, we must determine whether the district court's finding that appellant failed to establish his claim of retaliatory discrimination was clearly erroneous. Second, we must consider whether the district court abused its discretion in dismissing appellant's second cause of action under the Privacy Act against all defendants. Because we find the actions of the district court appropriate in each case, we affirm.

I. RETALIATORY DISCRIMINATION

Both Aerospace and Unt contend that we should apply the abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the district court decision that Unt was not the subject of retaliatory discrimination. The complex issue of retaliation, however, involves a factual inquiry into the employer's motivation and intent. Thus, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) applies, and we will set aside the trial court's finding on retaliation only if it is clearly erroneous. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288-90, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1790-91, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (intent to discriminate under Sec. 703(h) of Title VII is a pure question of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard); Nicholson v. Board of Education Torrance Unified School Dist., 682 F.2d 858, 864 (9th Cir.1982) (employer's motivation for dismissing employee is a factual finding reviewed under clearly erroneous standard). Appellant challenges both the form and the substance of the trial court's findings. We will examine each challenge separately.

A. Form of Findings

Appellant first argues that the findings of fact adopted by the district court are insufficient because they (1) fail to clearly indicate the facts supporting the court's ultimate legal conclusions, (2) are conclusory and vague, and (3) are almost identical to the proposed findings submitted by Aerospace a year earlier.

Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ¹ requires the court, in all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, to "find the facts specially." The court must state findings sufficient to indicate the factual basis for its ultimate conclusion. Kelley v. Everglades Drainage District, 319 U.S. 415, 422, 63 S.Ct. 1141, 1145, 87 L.Ed. 1485 (1943). "Statements conclusory in nature are to be eschewed in favor of statements of the preliminary and basic facts on which the District Court relied. Otherwise, their findings are useless for appellate purposes." Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24 n. 8, 73 S.Ct. 956, 962 n. 8, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) (citation omitted). The findings must be "explicit enough to give the appellate court a clear understanding of the basis of the trial court's decision, and to enable it to determine the ground on which the trial court reached its decision." United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d 851, 856 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 193, 78 L.Ed.2d 170 (1983) (citations omitted); Nicholson, 682 F.2d at 866; Lumbermen's Underwriting Alliance v. Can-Car, Inc., 645 F.2d 17, 18 (9th Cir.1980); Fluor Corp. v. United States ex rel. Mosher Steel Co., 405 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1014, 89 S.Ct. 1632, 23 L.Ed.2d 40 (1969).

The district court's findings certainly are not well done. They consist mainly of mere conclusions, preceded only by an unhelpful chronology of events. They do not articulate specific factual bases for the trial court's boilerplate determination that Aerospace's actions were justified by "legitimate business reasons." Nonetheless, while it is a close case, we do not believe we must remand for more detailed findings, for despite the factual shortcomings, the basis for the court's decision is clear. The record gives substantial and unequivocal support for the ultimate conclusion that Aerospace's actions against Unt were indeed justified, and thus that no retaliatory motive was involved.

Appellant also urges error in the trial court's adoption of findings very similar to those proposed by Aerospace. We have previously disapproved of the mechanical adoption of findings and conclusions prepared by the victorious party. Lumbermen's Underwriting Alliance v. Can-Car, Inc., 645 F.2d at 18. The verbatim adoption of findings suggested by a party is not automatically objectionable, however, so long as those findings are supported by the record. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Company, 376 U.S. 651, 656, 84 S.Ct. 1044, 1047, 12 L.Ed.2d 12 (1964) (citing United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323...