Upshaw v. Alameda Cnty.

• Decision Date: 27 March 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:18-cv-07814-JD
• Citation: 377 F.Supp.3d 1027
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: Tikisha UPSHAW, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ALAMEDA COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

377 F.Supp.3d 1027

Tikisha UPSHAW, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.ALAMEDA COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:18-cv-07814-JD

United States District Court, N.D. California.

Signed March 27, 2019

Yolanda Huang, Law Offices of Yolanda Huang, Oakland, CA, Dennis Cunningham, Law Office of Dennis Cunningham, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Gregory B. Thomas, Burke, Williams & Sorensen LLP, Oakland, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER RE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Re: Dkt. No. 19

JAMES DONATO, United States District JudgePlaintiffs are women pretrial detainees housed in jails maintained and operated by defendants Alameda County and the Alameda County Sheriff's Office. Plaintiffs brought a class action complaint under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging that defendants violated their constitutional rights through jail procedures that deprived them of a minimal level of nightly sleep. Dkt. No. 1. The challenged procedures include a "pill call" to give medications to detainees that starts at 2:30 a.m. followed by breakfast service at 4:00 a.m., and cell checks every 30 minutes at night using flashlights and overhead lights. Pending resolution of the Section 1983 claims on the merits, plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction to prohibit these and other practices that prevent sleep. Dkt. No. 19. The request for an injunction is granted in part.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Upshaw is housed in the Santa Rita Jail facility, where she has been in detention for over 26 months as she waits for her trial. Dkt. No. 19-4 ¶ 9. Plaintiff Stewart is also housed in the Santa Rita Jail and has been waiting for her trial for over six months. Dkt. No. 19-5 ¶ 1. Plaintiff Hernandez was released from custody and will not considered for purposes of the injunction motion.

The salient facts are undisputed. Declarations from deputy sheriffs who work the 5:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. shift in the jail establish that defendants maintain the following schedule as part of their standard operating procedures:

8:00 p.m.: Cell cleaning by inmates begins.

11:00 p.m.: Lights out, subject to delays for unfinished cleaning. Main lighting is dimmed but tier lighting in aisles outside cells stays on.

2:30 a.m.: Cell-by-cell pill call by a deputy and nurse for inmates with pre-breakfast medication requirements.

4:00 a.m.: Main lights turned on for breakfast service.

4:30 a.m.: Main lights dimmed but not extinguished after breakfast.

Declaration of Deputy Guerra, Dkt. No. 24-5 ¶¶ 2, 5-7, 11; Declaration of Deputy Burbank, Dkt. No. 24-2 ¶¶ 2, 5-7, 10.

In practice, then, defendants give detainees no more than five hours of lights-out time, and on occasion even less if cell cleaning isn't finished. That minimal time is further disrupted after just three-and-a-half hours by a team handing out prescriptions in the dead of night. Defendants also acknowledge that they make "mandatory" announcements over the public address system during the lights-out hours. Guerra Decl., Dkt. No. 24-5 ¶ 13. Plaintiffs have submitted declarations stating that they cannot sleep through these activities, and often get as little as three hours of uninterrupted sleep each night. See , e.g. , Declaration of Tikisha Upshaw, Dkt. No. 19-4 ¶¶ 9-10; Declaration of Tyreka Stewart, Dkt. No. 19-5 ¶ 1.

The sleep disruptions inherent in this standard schedule are compounded by a cell-by-cell safety and general observation check that deputies do every 30 minutes for 24 hours a day and seven days a week.

See Guerra Decl., Dkt. No. 24-5 ¶ 9. During nighttime hours, the deputies rely on ambient light to see into the cells, and may shine a flashlight in as well to make sure the detainee is not in distress. Deputies may also open the cell door and call the inmate's name. Id. ¶ 10; Burbank Decl., Dkt. No. 24-2 ¶ 9.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Preliminary injunctions are "an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right." Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 24, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). "A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he [or she] is likely to succeed on the merits, that he [or she] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his [or her] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Winter , 555 U.S. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 365 ; see also Garcia v. Google, Inc. , 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (same). In our circuit, a plaintiff may also obtain a preliminary injunction under a "sliding scale" approach by raising "serious questions" going to the merits of plaintiff's claims and showing that the balance of hardships tips "sharply" in his or her favor. A Woman's Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Becerra , 901 F.3d 1166, 1167 (9th Cir. 2018) ; Vanguard Outdoor, LLC v. City of L.A. , 648 F.3d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 2011). At "an irreducible minimum," the party seeking the injunction "must demonstrate a fair chance of success on the merits, or questions serious enough to require litigation." Airbnb, Inc. v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco , 217 F.Supp.3d 1066, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (citation omitted); see also Garcia , 786 F.3d at 740.

The merits determination here is made in the context of plaintiffs' status as state pretrial detainees. The parties focused almost entirely on the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment for those convicted of an offense, but plaintiffs are not in jail after a trial and conviction. As pretrial detainees, they are entitled to the protections of the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the specific substantive guarantees of the federal Constitution. Bell v. Wolfish , 441 U.S. 520, 535-37 and n.16, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) ; Pierce v. Cnty. of Orange , 526 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2008). The Eighth Amendment establishes a constitutional floor in the sense that a jail condition deemed to be cruel and unusual would necessarily amount to an impermissible punishment of a pretrial detainee, but plaintiffs have rights beyond those afforded to the duly convicted. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a broader class of interests than the Eighth Amendment, and proscribes any conduct that amounts to punishment, cruel or otherwise, of a person detained before trial. Bell , 441 U.S. at 535-37, 99 S.Ct. 1861 ; Chappell v. Mandeville , 706 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2013) ; Pierce , 526 F.3d at 1205.

Keeping jails safe and secure is, of course, a legitimate and important governmental interest, and the expert judgment of the agencies and officers about the policies and procedures needed to achieve that goal should be respected. Bell , 441 U.S. at 546-47, 99 S.Ct. 1861 ; Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington , 566 U.S. 318, 326, 132 S.Ct. 1510, 182 L.Ed.2d 566 (2012). To amount to a punishment, the pretrial detention condition must cause harm that exceeds or is independent of the inherent discomforts of confinement, and must be rationally unrelated to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective or be excessive in relation to that purpose. Kingsley v. Hendrickson , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2473-74, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) ; Demery v. Arpaio , 378 F.3d 1020, 1030 (9th Cir. 2004). In the absence of evidence of an express intent to punish, "it may be possible to infer a given restriction's punitive status ‘from the nature of the restriction.’ " Pierce , 526 F.3d at 1205 (quoting Valdez v. Rosenbaum , 302 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2002) ).

Because plaintiffs' constitutional claims are presented under Section 1983, plaintiffs must show that the challenged conditions were part of a policy, custom or practice officially adopted by defendants. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y. , 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). They must also establish that the policy or custom "evince[s] a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the constitutional right and [is] the ‘moving force behind the constitutional violation.’ " Rivera v. County of L.A. , 745 F.3d 384, 389 (9th Cir. 2014). Constitutional deprivations that are the product of mere negligence or accident are not actionable. Kingsley , 135 S.Ct. at 2472.

With respect to the record before the Court, each side filed a blizzard of objections to the other's declarations and other evidence. The rules of evidence do not strictly apply to preliminary injunction proceedings, and the Court will use its broad discretion to evaluate the record as it currently stands. Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm't Mgmt., Inc. , 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 n.5 (9th Cir. 2013) ; Johnson v. Couturier , 572 F.3d 1067, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009). In any event, the findings and conclusions here are based mainly on undisputed facts.

DISCUSSION

There is no question that running a jail is an extremely difficult task, and the discretion of the sheriff's department to solve problems and protect the health and safety of detainees should be treated with a substantial measure of deference. It is equally true that detention in jail is not expected to be a pleasant or comfortable experience. See Rhodes v. Chapman , 452 U.S. 337, 347-49, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981).

But the Constitution does not permit inhumane treatment of duly convicted prisoners, Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), all the more so for pretrial detainees who have not had their day in court. And when the state takes a person into custody for any reason, the Constitution imposes a duty to provide for the detainee's basic human needs. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 489 U.S. 189, 199-200, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). Conditions of confinement that deprive detainees of those needs or "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" violate the Constitution. Wilson v. Seiter , 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (quoting Rhodes , 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392 ).

Defendants do not dispute that "sleep undoubtedly counts as one of life's...