Urban League of Rochester, N. Y. Inc. v. Monroe County

• Decision Date: 27 March 1980
• Citation: 49 N.Y.2d 551,427 N.Y.S.2d 593,404 N.E.2d 715
• Parties: , 404 N.E.2d 715 In the Matter of URBAN LEAGUE OF ROCHESTER, N. Y. INC., Appellant, v. COUNTY OF MONROE et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 593

427 N.Y.S.2d 593

49 N.Y.2d 551, 404 N.E.2d 715

In the Matter of URBAN LEAGUE OF ROCHESTER, N. Y. INC., Appellant, v. COUNTY OF MONROE et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 27, 1980.

Paul A. Fischer, Rochester, for appellant.

John D. Doyle, County Atty. (Joseph C. Pilato, Rochester, of counsel), for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT

JONES, Judge.

The Urban League of Rochester does not have legal standing to challenge the continuing authority of the Monroe County Manager to appoint members to the five-member county civil service commission without participation of the County Legislature.

Based on its analysis of the individualized statutory enactments with respect to the form of Monroe County government, the Urban League of Rochester contends that, while the appointment of a five-member civil service commission by the County Manager alone was authorized by State statute until 1974, in that year State authorization for that exceptional procedure was withdrawn. The Urban League argues that since 1974, in accordance with the general mandate of section 15 (subd. 1, par. (a)) of the Civil Service Law, there should have been a three-member commission, each of whose members should have been appointed by the County Manager, but only with the advice and consent of the County Legislature.

The Urban League instituted the present proceeding under CPLR article 78 for an order directing the appointment of a new Monroe County Civil Service Commission in conformity with its views as to the mandate of the Civil Service Law. Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the merits, and the Appellate Division, one Justice dissenting, affirmed. Without reaching the merits we now reverse and direct dismissal of the proceeding on the ground that the Urban League has no legal standing to institute this proceeding.

In recent years, the doctrine of standing to seek judicial review of State and municipal governmental action has received continuing attention in our court. The present case is the latest chapter in this saga and presents an appropriate occasion to indicate that there are outer limits to what has been an expanding concept.

In National Organization for Women v. State Div. of Human Rights, 34 N.Y.2d 416, 358 N.Y.S.2d 124, 314 N.E.2d 867 we held that a national organization "dedicated to eliminating discriminatory practices against women" (pp. 419-420, 358 N.Y.S.2d p. 127, 314 N.E.2d p. 869) representing a "class with a specific interest in the litigation in question" (p. 420, 350 N.Y.S.2d p. 127, 314 N.E.2d p. 869) had standing to challenge discrimination against females in the help wanted columns of a newspaper. In Matter of Burke v. Sugarman, 35 N.Y.2d 39, 358 N.Y.S.2d 715, 315 N.E.2d 772 we acknowledged the right of candidates for promotion on a civil service eligibility list to challenge civil service appointments made in alleged disregard of the list. Then in Matter of Douglaston Civic Assn. v. Galvin, 36 N.Y.2d 1, 7, 364 N.Y.S.2d 830, 835, 324 N.E.2d 317, 320, we accorded to an "appropriate representative association" the right "to act as the representative of the group (individuals, concededly aggrieved residents and property owners) whose rights it is asserting."

Then came Boryszewski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361, 363, 372 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625, 334 N.E.2d 579, 580 in which we expressly overruled prior cases in our court taking a more limited view and held that a citizen-taxpayer had standing "to test the constitutionality of a State statute authorizing the expenditure of State moneys". At the same time the Legislature enacted a new article 7-A of the State Finance Law authorizing citizen-taxpayers to bring legal proceedings to challenge the "wrongful expenditure, misappropriation, misapplication, or any other illegal or unconstitutional disbursement of state...