Urella v. Kentucky Bd. of Medical Licensure
| Decision Date | 27 February 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-SC-798-DG,95-SC-798-DG |
| Citation | 939 S.W.2d 869 |
| Parties | Dr. Rocco URELLA, M.D., Appellant, v. KENTUCKY BOARD OF MEDICAL LICENSURE, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
J. Fox DeMoisey, DeMoisey & Smither, Louisville, for appellant.
C. Lloyd Vest, II, Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure, Louisville, for appellee.
Rocco P. Urella, M.D., appeals the revocation of his license to practice medicine in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The Court of Appeals reversed the Jefferson Circuit Court, which had entered judgment reversing the decision of the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure ("Board") to revoke Urella's license. For the reasons set out below, we affirm the Court of Appeals.
Urella began his medical career in the late 1970's in the state of New York. He was also licensed in Pennsylvania and Indiana before moving to Kentucky in 1989. In Urella's initial application for a Kentucky medical license, he indicated that he was not under investigation by any licensure authority. To maintain a medical license in Kentucky, all physicians are required to complete an "annual renewal" form with the Board. One of the propounded questions is whether there are outstanding disciplinary proceedings, or current investigations, in any other state. Urella responded in the negative on both his 1991 and 1992 renewal forms.
However, in filing his 1993 annual renewal form, Urella answered yes to the following question:
SINCE YOU LAST REGISTERED YOUR KENTUCKY LICENSE:
1. Have you been disciplined or denied; have you made an act of surrender or resignation; or are you currently under investigation in regard to any of the following:
a. medical or osteopathic licensure in any state or Canadian province;
x Yes No
In fact, Urella had surrendered his New York medical license on October 1, 1992, as the result of events surrounding the 1985 death of a nurse with whom Urella had a personal relationship. Apparently, after a New York Police Department investigation, no criminal charges were brought. Moreover, Pennsylvania authorities took no disciplinary action against Urella's license in Pennsylvania, where he was practicing, after a letter and interview in 1986 concerning the incident.
However, on October 18, 1991, the Office of Professional Medical Conduct for the New York Department of Health interviewed Urella concerning the 1985 events. Urella did not acknowledge this contact in his 1992 Kentucky annual renewal form, according to his testimony before the Board, due to his understanding that he would be notified by New York authorities within thirty (30) days of October 18, 1991, if disciplinary action was to be taken.
On August 10, 1992, the New York Department of Health issued a Statement of Charges against Urella's New York medical license. Two days later, Urella applied for permission to surrender his license on the grounds that he agreed "not to contest the specifications of professional misconduct set forth in the charges."
When Urella noted that he had surrendered his New York license on his 1993 application for renewal in Kentucky, the Board issued a Show Cause Order/Complaint on August 19, 1993. Urella appeared for an administrative due process hearing, with counsel, on November 4, 1993. The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") rendered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on March 1, 1994, concluding that sufficient grounds existed for the Board to take disciplinary action. After considering exceptions to the ALJ's report and oral arguments, the Board adopted the ALJ's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and rendered an order revoking Urella's Kentucky medical license.
The Jefferson Circuit Court found no basis for revocation of Urella's license and reversed the Board. Thereafter, a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the circuit court, finding substantial evidence in the record to support the Board's findings and conclusions. We granted discretionary review.
Urella advances two primary arguments in his appeal. First, he claims that the Board erred in concluding that surrender of his New York license amounted to "other disciplinary action" under KRS 311.595(16), 1 as charged in the Show Cause Order/Complaint of August 19, 1993. The statute provided as follows:
311.595. Denial, probation, suspension, or revocation of licenses and permits.
If the power has not been transferred by statute to some other board, commission, or agency of this state, the board may deny an application or reregistration for a license; place a licensee on probation for a period not to exceed five (5) years; suspend a license for a period not to exceed five (5) years; limit or restrict a license for an indefinite period; or revoke any license heretofore or hereafter issued by the board, upon proof that the licensee has:
(16) Had his license to practice medicine or osteopathy in any other state, territory, or foreign nation revoked, suspended, restricted, or limited or has been subjected to other disciplinary action by the licensing authority thereof. (Emphasis added).
The Board issued the Show Cause Order, pursuant to KRS 311.572, based upon documents from the New York State Board for Professional Medical Conduct. Those documents included the New York Statement of Charges dated August 10, 1992, containing seventeen (17) separate specifications; the Application to Surrender License signed by Urella on August 12, 1992; Urella's Statement Concerning Voluntary Surrender of New York License signed August 17, 1992; and an Order accepting the surrender of license dated October 1, 1992. The parties jointly introduced these documents at the hearing before the ALJ on November 4, 1993.
Urella's application to surrender his license stated, "I agree not to contest the specifications of professional misconduct set forth in the charges." His separate, unsworn, statement noted that he agreed to a voluntary surrender due to his relocation to Louisville, the inconvenience of traveling to New York for hearings, the costs of litigation, and the accompanying trauma to his family and the deceased's family that a hearing would produce. While he noted that he "would have difficulty disproving some of the charges," he also stated,
The parties expend considerable effort arguing whether the act of surrendering a medical license alone equates to "other disciplinary action" as referred to in KRS 311.595(16). The Board argues that Urella did not deny the truth of the charges, but merely refused to admit fault or wrongdoing. Urella argues that not all voluntary surrenders of licensure are disciplinary acts.
However, we believe applicable New York law to be dispositive of this issue. Disciplinary actions against medical licenses in New York are governed by N.Y. Public Health Law § 230(10) (McKinney 1990). Under New York's procedure, charges are filed after the director of the Office of Professional Medical Conduct and a majority of a committee determine a hearing is warranted. The matter then proceeds to a hearing and final decision and order, or the matter may be resolved by an informal resolution of the charges.
The N.Y. State Administrative Procedure Act § 301(5) (McKinney 1990) provides:
§ 301. Hearings
5. Unless precluded by statute, disposition may be made of any adjudicatory proceeding by stipulation, agreed settlement, consent order, default, or other informal method.
§ 307(1) provides:
§ 307. Decisions, determinations and orders
1. A final decision, determination or order adverse to a party in an adjudicatory proceeding shall be in writing or stated in the record and shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law or reasons for the decision, determination or order. (Emphasis added).
Consequently, findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary in a case where the order includes the "reasons for the decision, determination or order."
Dispositive of the issue is N.Y. Administrative Rules & Regulations, Uniform Hearing Procedures § 51.10 (McKinney 1990), which provides as follows:
§ 51.10 Stipulations and consent orders.
(c) In matters governed by Public Health Law, sections 230, 230-a, 230-b and 230-c, a licensee, who is under investigation or against whom a determination has been made that a hearing is warranted, as a condition for the satisfaction of all charges and potential charges, shall admit guilt to at least one of the acts of misconduct alleged, or shall agree not to contest the allegations, or shall assert that he or she cannot successfully defend against at least one of the acts...
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