Urella v. Pennsylvania State Troopers Ass'n

• Decision Date: 02 May 2008
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 07-3089.
• Citation: 628 F.Supp.2d 600
• Parties: Rocco P. URELLA, Plaintiff, v. The PENNSYLVANIA STATE TROOPERS ASSOCIATION and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

628 F.Supp.2d 600

Rocco P. URELLA, Plaintiff, v. The PENNSYLVANIA STATE TROOPERS ASSOCIATION and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 07-3089.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

May 2, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Frank J. Marcone, Law Offices of Frank J. Marcone, Upper Providence, PA, for Plaintiff.

Richardson Todd Eagen, Lightman Welby Stoltenberg & Caputo, Harrisburg, PA, Barry N. Kramer, Office of General Counsel, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants.

ORDER

JAN E. DuBOIS, District Judge.

AND NOW this 1st day of May, 2008, upon consideration of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (Document No. 4, filed August 28, 2007); Plaintiffs Response to the Motion to Dismiss Filed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Document No. 7, filed October 2, 2007); Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Commonwealth's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (Document No. 8, filed October 3, 2008); plaintiffs letter dated November 23, 2007 setting forth additional legal authority in support of his claims (Document No. 14); Defendant's, Pennsylvania State Troopers Association, Motion to Dismiss (Document No. 9, filed October 9, 2007); and Plaintiffs Response to the Motion to Dismiss Filed by the State Troopers Association (Document No. 15, filed November 28, 2007), the Court noting that in his Response plaintiff requests dismissal without prejudice of his Complaint against the Pennsylvania State Troopers Association,¹ for the reasons set forth in the attached Memorandum, IT IS ORDERED as follows:

1. Defendant Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and the Complaint against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for lack of jurisdiction;

2. Defendant's, Pennsylvania State Troopers Association, Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and plaintiffs Complaint against the Pennsylvania State Troopers Association is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;

3. The Clerk of the Court shall MARK the case CLOSED FOR STATISTICAL PURPOSES.

MEMORANDUM

I. INTRODUCTION

On July 27, 2007, plaintiff Rocco P. Urella, a resident of Florida, filed a Complaint against the Pennsylvania State Troopers Association ("Association") and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ("Commonwealth") alleging breach of contract, breach of trust, fraud, and violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his Complaint, plaintiff seeks money damages for retirement and health insurance benefits that he alleges the Commonwealth wrongfully withheld and an injunction prohibiting the Commonwealth from continuing to deny him and his wife health insurance coverage.

Presently before the Court are defendant Association and Commonwealth's Motions to Dismiss. Because plaintiff requests dismissal of his Complaint against the Association, the Court writes only to address its ruling with respect to defendant Commonwealth's Motion to Dismiss. In that motion, defendant Commonwealth contends that plaintiffs claims are barred by sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment. For the reasons set forth below, defendant Commonwealth's Motion to Dismiss is granted and plaintiffs Complaint against the Commonwealth is dismissed with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff joined the Pennsylvania State Police in 1938 and was eligible for retirement benefits by 1968, the year that he retired.² (Compl.¶ 3.) Plaintiffs retirement package provided a monthly stipend and complete medical and prescription drug coverage for both him and his family. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 8.)

On or about January 1, 1971, Governor Milton Shapp appointed plaintiff as Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police ("Commissioner"). (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff alleges that this was a position in the Governor's cabinet and not a position with the State Police. (Id.) Accordingly, plaintiff alleges that he was eligible to receive full retirement benefits for his State Police service while employed as Commissioner. (Id.)

During his tenure as Commissioner, the Commonwealth suspended payment of plaintiff's monthly pension stipend and his participation in the medical benefits portion of his retirement package. (Id. ¶¶ 7-8.) Defendant Commonwealth resumed paying plaintiffs monthly stipend upon the conclusion of his tenure as Commissioner in 1973. (Id. ¶ 11.) Defendant Commonwealth did not, however, reinstate plaintiffs medical coverage. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff alleges that he has demanded payment of the two years of benefits withheld during his tenure as Commissioner since at least 1973. (Id. ¶ 11.)

In Count One of the Complaint, plaintiff alleges that the Commonwealth is liable for breach of contract. (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff seeks $158,000 for unpaid retirement benefits in that count. In Count Two, plaintiff alleges fraud and deception under state law and deception and a deprivation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. ¶¶ 14-21.) Plaintiff seeks $130,000 for unpaid medical benefits in that count. (Id. ¶ 19.) In Count Three, plaintiff seeks punitive damages under § 1983, alleging that defendant Commonwealth's past failure to pay plaintiff when he requested withheld retirement benefits is evidence of intentional and/or malicious conduct. (Id. ¶¶ 23-24.) Finally, in Counts Three and Four, plaintiff seeks an injunction under § 1983 prohibiting defendant Commonwealth from withholding medical and prescription drug coverage from him and his family. (Id. ¶¶ 24-30.)

On November 19, 2007, the Court held a preliminary pretrial conference during which it addressed the issues raised by the Complaint and defendants' Motions to Dismiss, and settlement. By Order issued that same date, the Court directed the parties to report to the Court on or before December 10, 2007 on the status of settlement discussions.

Thereafter, the parties regularly reported to the Court on the status of their settlement discussions and requested that they be granted additional time to continue those discussions. By letters dated March 25, 2008 and March 31, 2008, counsel communicated to the Court that settlement discussions had reached an impasse.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment is properly brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 693 n. 2 (3d Cir.1996). Rule 12(b)(1) provides that a court may dismiss a complaint for "lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter" of a case. Plaintiff has the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. See Carpet Group Int'l v. Oriental Rug Importers Ass'n, 227 F.3d 62, 69 (3d Cir.2000) (citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir.1977)).

"In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court first must determine whether the motion attacks the complaint on its face or on its facts." McCurdy v. Esmonde, 2003 WL 223412, *4 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 30, 2003). "A facial challenge under Rule 12(b)(1) argues that the complaint fails to allege subject matter jurisdiction, or contains defects in the jurisdictional allegations." Id. (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1250, at 212-18 (2d ed.1990)). In contrast, an "in fact" challenge under Rule 12(b)(1) disputes "the existence of certain jurisdictional facts alleged by the plaintiff[]." Carpet Group Int'l, 227 F.3d at 69.

Defendant Commonwealth's Motion to Dismiss is based upon Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and is therefore a "facial" challenge. See, e.g., Scott v. Com. Dept. of Public Welfare, 2003 WL 22133799, *2 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 28, 2003); Nelson v. Com. of Pa. Dept. of Public Welfare, 244 F.Supp.2d 382, 386 (E.D.Pa.2002). Accordingly, the Court must accept the allegations in the Complaint as true in ruling on the motion. See Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard: The Eleventh Amendment

"The Eleventh Amendment renders the States immune from `any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted ... by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.'" Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 517, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004). "It is clear . . . that in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment." Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984).

There are two general exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment's grant of sovereign immunity to states and state agencies. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755-56, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999); M.A. ex rel. E.S. v. State-Operated School Dist. of City of Newark, 344 F.3d 335, 345 (3d Cir.2003). First, Congress may abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity if it has "unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to" do so and acted "pursuant to a valid exercise of power." Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68, 106 S.Ct. 423, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985)); see also Nevada Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 155 L.Ed.2d 953 (2003). Second, states may waive their immunity and consent to be sued. Alden, 527 U.S. at 755, 119 S.Ct. 2240.³ A state's waiver of its sovereign immunity must "be unequivocally expressed." Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99, 104 S.Ct. 900. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that neither of the relevant exceptions to sovereign immunity is applicable to this case.

B. Plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims Against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Are Barred By Sovereign Immunity

42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives an individual of rights secured by the Constitution or by federal statute. The Supreme Court has held that Congress did not abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity in enacting § 1983. See Quern v. Jordan...