Urena v. Roy

• Decision Date: 16 May 2022
• Docket Number: 1:22-CV-2384 (LTS)
• Parties: AMAURY URENA, Plaintiff, v. YANA A. ROY; ALVARADO; DARCEL D. CLARK, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

AMAURY URENA, Plaintiff,
v.
YANA A. ROY; ALVARADO; DARCEL D. CLARK, Defendants.

No. 1:22-CV-2384 (LTS)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

May 16, 2022

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Laura Taylor Swain Chief United States District Judge

Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee who is currently held in the George R. Vierno Center on Rikers Island, filed this pro se action asserting that the defendants have violated his federal constitutional rights.^[1] Plaintiff sues: (1) Yana A. Roy, Plaintiff's criminal defense attorney; (2) Justice Alvarado of the New York Supreme Court, Bronx County; and (3) Darcel D. Clark, the Bronx County District Attorney. Plaintiff seeks damages, and asks this Court to: (1) order the state court in which Plaintiff's criminal proceedings are pending to allow Plaintiff to testify before a grand jury; and (2) order Plaintiff's release from confinement on Plaintiff's own recognizance, due to an “untimely indictment.” (ECF 2, at 5.) The Court construes Plaintiff's complaint as asserting claims for damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as claims for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

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By order dated April 25, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.^[2] For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses this action.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest, ” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

2

Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id. But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, ” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges the following in his complaint: On November 17, 2021, a criminal complaint was filed against Plaintiff in the New York Supreme Court, Bronx County. Plaintiff was scheduled to testify before a grand jury six days later, on November 23, 2021, and he was brought to a Bronx courthouse on that date, but was not brought before a grand jury to testify. Plaintiff later asked his defense attorney, Yana A. Roy, why he had not been brought before a grand jury to testify. Roy told him that his “right to indictment by [a] grand jury was waived.” (ECF 2, at 4.) Plaintiff disputed Roy's decision to waive that right because he had not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily agreed to waive that right; he had “never consulted with [Roy] about matters of [his criminal] case or about a defense strategy.” (Id.) Plaintiff was indicted on December 10, 2021.

Plaintiff states that he has been injured “due to the deprivation of [his] constitutional right[] of due process[, ] which resulted in the deprivation of [his] liberty.” (Id. at 5.)

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DISCUSSION

A. Justice Alvarado

The Court must dismiss Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages and injunctive relief against Justice Alvarado under the doctrine of judicial immunity. Under this doctrine, judges are absolutely immune from civil suit for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). “[E]ven allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2009). This is because “[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation....” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994). Moreover, Section 1983 provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

There are only two sets of circumstances in which judicial immunity does not apply: (1) when a judge takes action that is outside the judge's judicial capacity; or (2) when a judge takes action, that, although judicial in nature, is in the absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12. Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven, 579 F.3d at 210. Plaintiff's allegations suggest that neither of these exceptions applies here. Moreover, “the scope of [a] judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims under Section 1983 for damages and injunctive relief against Justice Alvarado arising from Justice Alvarado's actions while presiding over Plaintiff's pending state court criminal proceedings in the New York Supreme Court, Bronx

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County, are therefore dismissed under the doctrine of judicial immunity, ^[3] 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), and, consequently, as frivolous, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); see also Mills v. Fischer, 645 F.3d 176, 177 (2d Cir. 2011) (claims dismissed because of judicial immunity are frivolous for the purpose of the IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915).

B. Darcel D. Clark

The Court must dismiss Plaintiff's claims under Section 1983 for damages against Bronx County District Attorney Darcel D. Clark under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity. Prosecutors, like Clark, are immune from civil suit for damages for actions committed within the scope of their official duties where the challenged activities are not investigative in nature but, rather, are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Giraldo v. Kessler,

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694 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir....