Uribe v. State, A18A0582

• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
• Citation: 346 Ga.App. 264,816 S.E.2d 113
• Docket Number: A18A0582
• Parties: URIBE v. The STATE.
• Decision Date: 13 June 2018

346 Ga.App. 264
816 S.E.2d 113

URIBE
v.
The STATE.

A18A0582

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 13, 2018

816 S.E.2d 114

Monte Kevin Davis, Atlanta, for Appellant.

Rosanna M. Szabo, Lawrenceville, SAMUEL RICHARD d'ENTREMONT, for Appellee.

MERCIER, Judge.

346 Ga.App. 264

Mateo Uribe appeals from the trial court's order denying his motion for discharge and acquittal on statutory speedy trial grounds under OCGA § 17-7-170, contending that the order is erroneous and that the court erred in denying his motion without first holding an

346 Ga.App. 265

evidentiary hearing, in violation of his constitutional right to due process.¹ For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

1. We disagree with Uribe's contention that the trial court's findings were erroneous. "The denial of a statutory speedy trial demand presents a question of law which this Court reviews de novo." Rogers v. State , 340 Ga. App. 24, 795 S.E.2d 328 (2016) (citation

816 S.E.2d 115

omitted). "When we consider the meaning of a statute, we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant. When a statute contains clear and unambiguous language, such language will be given its plain meaning and will be applied accordingly." Williamson v. State , 295 Ga. 185, 186 (1), 758 S.E.2d 790 (2014) (citations and punctuation omitted).

OCGA § 17-7-170 (a) sets forth the required form for a statutory speedy trial demand in a non-capital case:

A demand for speedy trial filed pursuant to this Code section shall be filed as a separate, distinct, and individual document and shall not be a part of any other pleading or document. Such demand shall clearly be titled "Demand for Speedy Trial" ; reference this Code section within the pleading; and identify the indictment number or accusation number for which such demand is being made[.]

(Emphasis supplied). OCGA § 17-7-170 (b) provides that "[i]f the defendant is not tried when the demand for speedy trial is made or at the next succeeding regular court term thereafter, provided that at both court terms there were juries impaneled and qualified to try the defendant, the defendant shall be absolutely discharged and acquitted of the offense charged in the indictment or accusation."

Dismissing a criminal case pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170 is an extreme sanction, one which may be invoked only if the defendant has strictly complied with the statute. ... OCGA § 17-7-170 confers a statutory right upon persons accused of a crime to demand trial, and because the penalty imposed by this statute against the state is so great, it must be strictly construed.

Eagles v. State , 269 Ga. App. 462, 464-465 (1), 604 S.E.2d 294 (2004)

346 Ga.App. 266

(citations and punctuation omitted) (applying a former version of OCGA § 17-7-170 and finding that a speedy trial demand was a nullity because it was filed prior to the defendant being indicted or accused, in violation of the statutory requirements).

The relevant facts in this case are mostly undisputed. Following the binding over of Uribe's case from the Recorder's Court of Gwinnett County to the State Court of Gwinnett County, the State filed an accusation on February 1, 2017, charging Uribe with driving under the influence of alcohol (less safe), driving under the influence of alcohol (per se), speeding, and failure to maintain lane, which offenses allegedly occurred on June 10, 2016. On February 15, 2017, Uribe's counsel filed several pleadings, including a document entitled "Defendant's Waiver of Formal Arraignment, Entry of ‘Not Guilty’ Plea and Demand For Jury Trial" (the "demand"). The text of that pleading is as follows:

NOW COMES Defendant and hereby waives formal arraignment, enters a plea of "not guilty" to all pending charges, and demands a trial by jury pursuant to Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XI (a) and Art. I, Sec. I, Par. I of the Georgia Constitution, as well as the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and under OCGA § 17-7-170. Having served the Prosecutor with a copy of this demand within the present term or the next term of this court, the Defendant prays that he/she be acquitted and discharged of any and all offenses charged/arising herein in the event a trial is not had within that time period.

On July 28, 2017, Uribe filed his "Motion for Discharge and Acquittal Pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170" (the "motion"), arguing that because he had not been tried in the same term in which he filed his demand or in the next succeeding term, he was entitled to discharge and acquittal. Uribe contends on appeal that, along with the motion, he filed a rule nisi and requested a hearing. However, the record...