US MORTG. v. Laubach, 98,902.
| Decision Date | 01 July 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 98,902.,98,902. |
| Citation | 73 P.3d 887,2003 OK 67 |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
| Parties | U.S. MORTGAGE, Plaintiff, v. Donald D. LAUBACH, Denny L. Hurst, Defendants, William A. Strong, II, Carolyn E. Strong, and Defendants-Appellants, Oak Tree Home Owners Association, Inc., Defendant-Appellee. Marquis Marie Hurst and Eagleton, Nicholson, Pordos & Pardue, P.C., Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Donald D. Laubach, Third-Party Defendant, William A. Strong, II, Carolyn E. Strong, Third-Party Defendants-Appellants, and Oak Tree Home Owners Association, Inc., Third-Party Defendant-Appellee. |
Kelley L. Cornelius, Oklahoma City, OK, for Appellants William A. Strong II and Carolyn E. Strong.
W. David Pardue, Jeffrey M. Love, Oklahoma City, OK, for Appellees Marquis Marie Hurst and Eagleton, Nicholson, Pordos & Pardue, P.C.
Robert C. Smith, Jr., Oklahoma City, OK, for Appellee Oak Tree Home Owners Association, Inc.1
¶ 1 The issue presented by this appeal is whether Strong creditors' judgment lien retained its efficacy at the time the trial court was called upon to determine the order of priority among the competing liens. We answer in the negative.
¶ 2 U.S. Mortgage, the holder of a mortgage on Donald Laubach's (Laubach) real property located in Oklahoma County, brought a foreclosure suit after Laubach defaulted on the mortgage payments. U.S. Mortgage named as defendants Laubach and three lienholders—Denny Hurst, William A. Strong II and Carolyn E. Strong (Strong creditors) and the Oak Tree Home Owners Association, Inc. (Association).
¶ 3 Strong creditors obtained in Missouri a federal-court judgment against Laubach and registered it on 21 August 1995 in the U.S. District Court of the Western District of Oklahoma.2 They then perfected the federal-court judgment as a lien by filing an affidavit of judgment in the Oklahoma County Clerk's office on 3 September 1998. Danny Hurst obtained a judgment against Laubach in Blaine County on 18 January 1995. His lien was created by filing a Statement of Judgment in the Oklahoma County Clerk's office on 18 August 1999. He renewed his judgment against Laubach by filing a notice of renewal in the Blaine County Court Clerk's office on 14 December 1999 and recording a certified copy of the notice of renewal in the Oklahoma County Clerk's office the following day. Association claims an assessment lien on the same property.
¶ 4 At mid-litigation Denny Hurst assigned all his interest in the judgment (and judgment lien) to Marquis Marie Hurst (75%) and to Eagleton, Nicholson, Pordos, & Pardue (25%) (collectively called Hurst creditors or third-party plaintiffs). Hurst creditors were granted leave to intervene as third-party plaintiffs. They named Laubach, Strong creditors and Association as third-party defendants. Strong creditors cross-claimed against Laubach, Hurst creditors and Association. Association counterclaimed against Hurst creditors and cross-claimed against Laubach and Strong creditors.
¶ 5 U.S. Mortgage moved for summary judgment, arguing that it held a valid first lien on the property in suit. All of the parties except Laubach conceded U.S. Mortgage's priority status. Laubach objected to summary adjudication on the ground that there were material issues of fact as to the amount owed, the escrow paid and the amount of attorney's fees. Strong and Hurst creditors countered with separate summary judgment motions. Strong creditors claimed that, based on priority in time, their judgment lien is superior to that of Hurst creditors and of the Association.3 According to Hurst creditors (a) Strong creditors' lien had expired and was hence ineffective and (b) they had a second lien which is prior to that of Association. Association adopted Hurst creditors' position that Strong creditors' lien had expired. It also conceded that its assessment lien was inferior to that of U.S. Mortgage and Hurst creditors.
¶ 6 The trial court struck Strong creditors' answer to Hurst creditors' motion for summary judgment, declaring that it was filed one day late in violation of local court Rule 37.4 The trial court (a) gave summary judgment to Hurst creditors and denied Strong creditors' motion for like relief, (b) declared that Strong creditors obtained a Missouri federal-court judgment and registered it for enforcement as a domestic judgment on 21 August 1995 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, (c) declared that Strong creditors failed to file in the county clerk's office either a notice of renewal of judgment, a garnishment summons issued against the judgment debtor (Laubach) or a notice of income assignment on or before 21 August 2000, concluding that Strong creditors' judgment lien expired by operation of 12 O.S.Supp.1997 § 759(C)5 and was hence no longer efficacious, and (d) determined the order of priority among the liens upon the real property in suit—U.S. Mortgage (first lien), Hurst creditors (second lien), Association (third lien)—as well as the amount of Hurst creditors' and Association's lien, and (e) directed that Hurst creditors' lien be satisfied from the proceeds, if any remain, of the sale of the property in accordance with the order of priorities. The court denied Strong creditors' quest for new trial.
¶ 7 It is Strong creditors' appeal that stands retained for this court's disposition and is now under review.
¶ 8 Summary process—a special pretrial procedural track pursued with the aid of acceptable probative substitutes6—is a search for undisputed material facts which, sans forensic combat, may be utilized in the judicial decision-making process.7 Summary process is applied where neither the material facts nor any inferences that may be drawn from uncontested facts are in dispute, and the law favors the movant's claim or liability-defeating defense.8 Only those evidentiary materials which eliminate from trial some or all fact issues on the merits of the claim or defense afford legitimate support for nisi prius resort to summary adjudication.9
¶ 9 Summary relief issues stand before us for de novo examination.10 All facts and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant.11 Just as nisi prius courts are called upon to do, so also appellate tribunals bear an affirmative duty to test all evidentiary material tendered in summary process for its legal sufficiency to support the relief sought by the movant.12 Only if the court should conclude that there is no material fact in dispute and the law favors the movant's claim or liability-defeating defense is the moving party entitled to summary judgment in its favor.13
¶ 10 Strong creditors claim an enforceable judgment lien on the property, superior to the later-recorded liens of Hurst creditors and Association. According to Strong creditors their lien has not expired because the statutory five-year dormancy period14runs from the date the judgment lien was created (3 September 1998),15not the date the judgment was registered in Oklahoma (21 August 1995). Strong creditors argue that their judgment was kept from lapsing into dormancy by the issuance of several garnishment summons by the federal court clerk within the initial five-year life of their judgment. On 13 September 2002 they filed one of the garnishment summons in the Oklahoma County Clerk's office. Strong creditors claim that each garnishment summons renewed and extended the life of the judgment by five years from the date of its issuance. They argue that judgment liens are created by filing a statement of judgment with the county clerk (§ 706(B)) and are continued in force in accordance with § 759(C)16 by filing a general execution, renewal of judgment, or garnishment summons within five years of the judgment lien's perfection and then within five years after each filing of a general execution, renewal of judgment, or garnishment summons in the county clerk's office. Strong creditors base their view on a historical analysis of these statutes.17 Because their judgment lien was filed 3 September 1998, they claim it was still effective when the trial court was called upon to determine the order of priority among competing liens.
¶ 11 Hurst creditors counter that Strong creditors' 1998 lien expired on 21 August 2000, five years after their judgment was registered in the Western District of Oklahoma.They argue that Strong creditors have not succeeded in reviving their lien by recording an undated uncertified garnishment summons in the county clerk's office. This is so, they assert, because once the lien expired, Strong creditors were required to file a new statement of judgment in the county clerk's office to extend the lien's efficacy in accordance with 12 O.S.2001 § 706.18 According to Hurst creditors all judgments have an initial life of five years and the corresponding judgment lien that is perfected cannot exceed or outlive the life of the judgment which it secures. Even if we assume that Strong creditors' judgment had retained its efficacy by the issuance of successive garnishments, Hurst creditors argue that Strong creditors did not succeed in keeping their judgment lien alive because they failed to record in the county clerk's office (as required by § 759(C)) a certified copy of one of the three types of processes/execution. In other words, the life of a judgment lien is only as long as that of the judgment it secures. According to Hurst creditors, Strong creditors' construction of §§ 706, 735 and 759(C) violates these fundamental premises. We agree.
¶ 12 Strong creditors assert that this case presents a first-impression question whether the § 759(C) five-year dormancy period for a judgment lien begins to run upon the lien's perfection or upon the judgment's entry (or...
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