US v. Aiken
Decision Date | 03 October 1991 |
Docket Number | Crim. No. 91-1243-P. |
Citation | 775 F. Supp. 855 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Eric Lamont AIKEN |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Andrew White, Asst. U.S. Atty., Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff.
Fred Warren Bennett, Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Md., for defendant.
Presently facing this Court is what appears to be an issue of first impression in the Fourth Circuit. Defendant in this case is charged by way of a Criminal Complaint and Affidavit with the offenses of possessing an unregistered firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) ( ), and being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On Friday, September 27, 1991, a detention hearing was held in this case before United States Magistrate Judge Paul M. Rosenberg. Judge Rosenberg ordered a detention hearing in this case because, in his opinion, Mr. Aiken was charged with a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A). Defendant has filed a Motion for Revocation of Detention Order contending that, as a matter of law, Mr. Aiken has not been charged with a crime of violence. The issue facing this Court is whether the crimes Mr. Aiken is charged with, namely a felon in possession offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) or a possession of an unregistered firearm offense in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), constitute "crimes of violence" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A). On October 2, 1991 at 4:00 p.m. this Court heard oral argument on this issue and is now prepared to rule.
The parties do not dispute that this is a case of first impression in the Fourth Circuit. As a starting point for its analysis, the Court will begin with the one Fourth Circuit opinion that does control this case. In United States v. Thompson, 891 F.2d 507 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1957, 109 L.Ed.2d 319 (1990), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined whether pointing a firearm at an individual constituted a "crime of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) defines a crime of violence as "any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense." (emphasis added). The majority in Thompson read the qualifying language "by its nature" as requiring courts to look solely to the "intrinsic nature" of the offense and not the accompanying acts of physical force committed by the defendant. Thompson, 891 F.2d at 509; see also id. at 511 (Phillips, J., concurring). In Thompson, the court determined that, under South Carolina law, pointing a firearm at a person is an offense that "by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force" will be used against another. Id. at 509.
This Court notes that the holding and rationale in Thompson is based entirely on that court's reading of the qualifying language found in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). The statute before the Court in the instant case contains the identical qualifying language. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) states that a judicial hearing shall be held "to determine whether any condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (c) of this section will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community — (1) upon motion of the attorney for the government, in a case that involves — (A) a crime of violence." 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)(B) defines the term "crime of violence" using the same language as section 16(b).
This Court is led to believe, therefore, that the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit would hold that this court is constrained by section 3142(f)(1)(A) to examine only the intrinsic nature of the offenses and not the actual conduct of the individual. The Court finds, however, that despite this restriction, the offenses with which the defendant has been charged constitute "crimes of violence." The Court finds the reasoning in a recent opinion from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States v. Dunn, 935 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir.1991) persuasive. In Dunn, as in the instant case, the defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (felon in possession) and 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) ( ). There, the court was again interpreting the language of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and found as a matter of law that possession of an unregistered firearm "`by its nature' involves a substantial risk of physical force against persons or property" and therefore satisfies the requirements of the statute. Id. at 1059.
The court in Dunn observed that not all firearms must be registered, only those that Congress has found to be "inherently dangerous and generally lacking usefulness, except for violent and criminal purposes, such as sawed-off shotguns...." Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5845). The court supported the reasoning of the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in United States v. Johnson, 704 F.Supp. 1398, 1401 (E.D.Mich.1988) that a felon in possession of a firearm, like an individual in unlawful possession of an unregistered firearm, involves a substantial risk of improper physical force under § 16(b), partly because of the blatant disregard for law displayed by that previously-convicted criminal. See Dunn, 935 F.2d at 1059; see also United States v. O'Neal, 910 F.2d 663, 667 (9th Cir.1990) (); United States v. Jones, 651 F.Supp. 1309, 1310 (E.D.Mich.1987) ().
This Court is also concerned that there is an increased risk that a criminally-inclined individual will be more likely to use a firearm already in his possession to commit another crime. Possession of a firearm is an ongoing crime; it is a status offense. A felon who has access to a firearm during a period of time may be more inclined to use it and, when he does, the consequences are greater than they would be if he did not have access to such a weapon. Several courts in other districts that have considered this issue share this concern. See United States v. Phillips, 732 F.Supp. 255, 262 (D.Mass.1990) (); Jones, 651...
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