US v. BD. OF ED. OF GARFIELD HIGHTS. CITY SCH. DIST., Civ. A. No. C75-689.

• Citation: 435 F. Supp. 949
• Decision Date: 04 October 1976
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. C75-689.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the GARFIELD HEIGHTS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

435 F. Supp. 949

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the GARFIELD HEIGHTS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. C75-689.

United States District Court, N. D. Ohio, E. D.

October 4, 1976.

Frederick M. Coleman, U.S. Atty., Cleveland, Ohio, Alexander C. Ross, Gerald F. Kaminski, Kaydell O. Wright, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.

John F. Lewis, John T. Meredith, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WILLIAM K. THOMAS, District Judge.

The Attorney General of the United States filed this lawsuit on August 5, 1975, alleging that the faculty and staff hiring and recruitment practices of the Garfield Heights City School District are in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the Fourteenth Amendment. The Attorney General bases his claim for jurisdiction in this court upon 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (giving district courts original jurisdiction in suits brought by the United States), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(b), and presumably also upon the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants, the Board of Education of Garfield Heights and James A. Harper, Superintendent of Schools, have jointly filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and/or for summary judgment. Defendants argue that this court lacks jurisdiction of the United States' claims and that the United States lacks standing to bring the claims under either Title VII or the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants also say that they are entitled to summary judgment on the undisputed facts of record.

The Attorney General in his complaint claims jurisdiction in this court over this action and in his brief asserts authority to sue. As seen, defendants challenge both this court's jurisdiction to hear the Attorney General's suit and his standing to bring the action. It is concluded that the question raised by the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially one of the Attorney General's standing to bring this action and it will thus be so treated. This question will now be considered.

I.

A.

Section 707 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6, the "pattern or practice" section of Title VII, from its inception has provided in subsection (a), that

(a) Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this subchapter . . . the Attorney General may bring a civil action in the appropriate district court of the United States . . ..

Defendants' motion is based in part upon the amendments to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act contained in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 107. Defendants more specifically rely on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c), which was added to section 707 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6, by the 1972 legislation and provides:

(c) Effective two years after March 24, 1972, the functions of the Attorney General under this section shall be transferred to the Commission, together with such personnel, property, records, and unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, and other funds employed, used, held, available, or to be made available in connection with such functions unless the President submits, and neither House of Congress vetoes, a reorganization plan pursuant to chapter 9 of Title 5, inconsistent with the provisions of this subsection. None has been submitted. The Commission shall carry out such functions in accordance with subsections (d) and (e) of this section.

Defendants argue that the foregoing language of subsection (c) of section 707

... withdrew the Attorney General's right to initiate pattern or practice litigation pursuant to Section 707 on March 24, 1974, seventeen months before this action was filed. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c).

Taking the language at its face value, indeed this appears to be the plain meaning of subsection (c). Nevertheless, the Attorney General argues:

The whole of Title VII and its legislative history demonstrate convincingly that the Attorney General retains the authority to file "pattern or practice" suits such as this one against public employers.

Before considering whether it is appropriate or necessary to examine the legislative history of subsection (c), it is helpful to test its apparent plain meaning by looking at related amendments to Title VII, also added by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. Subsection (e) added to section 707 authorizes the Commission to investigate and act on charges of pattern or practice discrimination. However, "All such actions shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in section 2000e-5 of this title." In pari materia is the amendment to section 2000e-5, section 706(f)(1) of Title VII, that provides that upon the failure of EEOC's conciliation efforts

... the Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision named in the charge. In the case of a respondent which is a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, if the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission shall take no further action and shall refer the case to the Attorney General who may bring a civil action against such respondent in the appropriate United States district court. ... Emphasis added.

These related 1972 amendments to the Act reveal that while only the Attorney General can bring Title VII civil actions against governmental bodies, no such action — under either section 706 or section 707 of Title VII — can be commenced prior to the filing of charges with the EEOC and the failure of Commission conciliation efforts. Section 707(c), both when read separately and when construed together with related sections 707(e) and 706(f)(1), all adopted as amendments to the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, unambiguously shows that as of March 24, 1974, the Attorney General no longer had standing to bring an original action (i. e., without certification to him by the EEOC and before it completes attempts at conciliation) against state or municipal governmental agencies or political subdivisions.

B.

Since the relevant statutory language has a single and unambiguous meaning, there is no need to consider the legislative history which the Attorney General cites in his brief. As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently stated in H. Wetter Mfg. Co. v. United States, 458 F.2d 1033, 1035 (6 Cir. 1972):

We may not, under the guise of construction, find a Congressional intent that is contrary to the clear language employed by it. Where a statute is unambiguous, it should be given effect according to its literal language. ... Nor should we "... depart from the plain meaning of the section to bring about a uniformity which it is claimed Congress intended but failed to express."

See also United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648, 81 S.Ct. 1278, 6 L.Ed.2d 575 (1961); United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 83-84, 53 S.Ct. 42, 77 L.Ed. 175 (1932).

Relying on United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 315, 73 S.Ct. 706, 97 L.Ed. 1020 (1952) and United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1939) (similarly see Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 1938, 48 L.Ed.2d 434 (1976)), the Attorney General argues:

If an internal inconsistency exists within a statutory scheme or if a literal construction of words appear to conflict with the statutory purpose, reference to the legislative history is appropriate.

United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, quoted with approval in Train, supra, permits reference to legislative history to discern legislative intent "however clear the words may appear on `superficial examination.'" 426 U.S. at 10, 96 S.Ct. at 1942. Our previous analysis of the statutory scheme shows that the legislative meaning reflected therein is pervasive, not superficial. Nonetheless, we turn to the legislative history in search of the statutory purpose to see if it conflicts with the legislative intent reflected in the plain and unambiguous meaning of subsection (c) of section 707.

Committee reports are more authoritative sources of legislative history than floor debates. United States v. Int'l Union UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 585, 77 S.Ct. 529, 1 L.Ed.2d 563 (1957). The court must place primary reliance on the conference committee report on the 1972 legislation to ascertain if nonstatutorily expressed legislative intent conflicts with the legislative intent expressed in the statutory amendments themselves. Once again, however, the legislative intent is clear and unambiguous:

The Senate amendment provided for a transfer of the Attorney General's "pattern or practice" jurisdiction to the Commission two years after enactment. In the interim period there would be concurrent jurisdiction. The transfer would be subject to change in accordance with a presidential reorganization plan if not vetoed by Congress. The House bill left pattern or practice jurisdiction with the Attorney General. The House receded.

Joint Explanatory Statement of Managers at the Conference on H.R. 1746, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News pp. 2179, 2183-84 (1972). See also House Report No. 92-238, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News p. 2137 (1972) at pp. 2145-2149, ("Section 707 of the act has been amended by transferring the `pattern or practice' suit authority from the Department of Justice to the Commission.") and p. 2174. The congressional intent unambiguously evident in both the statutory language itself and the committee reports is in no way contradicted by the selected excerpts of floor debates cited by the Attorney General.¹

C.

There is apparently only one reported case which has directly dealt with the statutory ...