US v. Boeing Co.

Decision Date17 February 1987
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 86-0829-A.
Citation653 F. Supp. 1381
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. The BOEING COMPANY, Melvyn R. Paisley, Thomas K. Jones, Herbert A. Reynolds, Harold Kitson, Jr., and Lawrence H. Crandon, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

Henry E. Hudson, U.S. Atty., Dennis E. Szybala, Asst. U.S. Atty., Alexandria, Va., Gordon A. Jones, Joan E. Hartman, Ronald H. Clark, Dept. of Justice, Civ. Div., Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.

Robert S. Bennett, Dunnells, Duvall, Bennett & Porter, Benjamin S. Sharp, Perkins & Coie, Washington, D.C., Gerald F. Treanor, Jr., Venable, Baetjer, & Howard, McLean, Va., Philip Lacovara, Hughes, Hubbard & Reed, Washington, D.C., John A.C. Keith, Blankingship & Keith, Fairfax, Va., for defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

HILTON, District Judge.

Findings of Fact

1. The Boeing Company ("Boeing") is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware. The corporate headquarters are located at 7755 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. Boeing maintains an office and conducts business within the geographical limits of the jurisdiction of this Court.

2. Defendant T.K. Jones ("Jones") is a resident of the State of Washington; Defendant Melvyn Paisley ("Paisley") is a resident of the Commonwealth of Virginia; Defendant Herbert A. Reynolds ("Reynolds") is a resident of the State of Washington; Defendant Harold Kitson, Jr. ("Kitson") is a resident of the State of Washington; Defendant Harold Crandon ("Crandon") is a resident of Brussels, Belgium.

3. Boeing traditionally has encouraged public service by its employees. Some forms of public service, such as service in state or local government, do not require a complete severance of the individual's employment relationship with Boeing. Boeing has made financial arrangements with its employees who accept positions in state and local government, such as paid leave, in an effort to diminish the personal economic incentives associated with public service.

4. Over the past twenty years, the Department of Defense has regularly solicited highly qualified employees from Boeing for government service. The government repeatedly has asked Boeing to assist it in identifying such qualified employees, and has specifically requested that Boeing encourage these employees to accept positions in the Federal government.

5. Boeing has a long-standing practice of making severance payments to individuals who terminate their employment with the Company in order to enter government service. In making these payments, Boeing has endeavored to encourage its employees to serve their government and provided a mechanism to completely sever all financial ties between Boeing and the departing employee.

6. During the period from 1962-1982, Boeing made at least twenty-one severance payments to individuals who terminated their employment with the Company in order to enter government service.

7. Boeing has repeatedly disclosed to the United States government, including responsible officials of the Department of Defense, the fact of these payments and the circumstances under which they are made. One such disclosure letter specifically noted that severance payments were calculated with reference to the differential between the financial benefits that would accrue to the employee if he remained with Boeing, as compared with those that would accrue to the employee if he accepted the anticipated government position.

8. Despite actual knowledge of Boeing's practice of making severance payments, the government has never objected to the practice, and on at least one occasion informed Boeing that a proposed severance payment was in compliance with the federal conflict of interest statutes.

9. During 1981 and 1982, each of the individual defendants was recruited from Boeing by the federal government for a position within the Department of Defense.

10. On or about May 19, 1981, Jones resigned from Boeing and, on or about June 1, 1981, he assumed the position of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces.

11. On or about October 31, 1981, Paisley retired from Boeing. On December 2, 1981, following Senate confirmation, Paisley was sworn in as Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Engineering and Systems. Paisley continues to serve in this position.

12. On or about July 22, 1981, Reynolds resigned from Boeing. On July 26, 1981, he became a consultant to the Defense Department and on October 4, 1981, received an appointment to the position of Deputy Director of Space and Intelligence Policy.

13. On March 5, 1982, Defendant Crandon resigned from Boeing. On or about March 8, 1982, he was appointed to the position of computer scientist with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") Air Command and Control Systems ("ACCS") Team in Brussels, Belgium. Crandon continues to serve in this position.

14. On August 1, 1982, Kitson retired from Boeing. Kitson served as a consultant to the Department of Defense from August 2, 1982, until September 1982, when he was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Command, Communications and Control Intelligence.

15. Boeing made severance payments to the five individual defendants on the following dates: T.K. Jones, May 19, 1981; Herbert R. Reynolds, July 22, 1981; Melvyn R. Paisley, October 1, 1981; Lawrence H. Crandon, March 5, 1982; and Harold Kitson, Jr., July 31, 1982.

16. At the time Boeing made and the individual defendants accepted the severance payments in question, the individuals were still employed by Boeing and had not yet entered into government service.

17. The severance payments made to the individual defendants were not contingent upon the individuals entering into federal government service, the position assumed in the federal government, the agency served in the federal government, their remaining in government service for any stated period of time, or their returning to Boeing at anytime in the future. Once the individual separated from the Company, the severance payment was his unconditionally, no matter what he did in the future.

18. At the time the individual defendants left Boeing, Boeing did not make any commitment to rehire them at any time in the future and the individuals made no commitment to return to Boeing. Although Boeing might have been willing ultimately to reemploy the individuals, it had no expectation that the individuals would return to the Company at the time that they terminated their employment.

19. The severance payments to these individual defendants were not made with the intent that the individuals would give Boeing preferential or other favorable treatment during the term of their government employment, and the payments were not understood by the individuals as such.

20. Staff personnel in the Industrial Relations Department performed calculations to arrive at a proposed severance payment for presentation to individuals within Boeing with final decision making authority. Those responsible for the ultimate decision were not aware of the specific calculation method followed by the Industrial Relations Staff, and approved severance payments to the individual defendants based on their determination that the proposed payment was reasonable and fair to the departing employee.

21. Boeing never asked the individual defendants to provide it with any preferential treatment or special advantages during their tenures with the government, and the individuals in fact never provided Boeing with any such preferential treatment or special advantage.

22. The severance payments made to the individual defendants were not intended by Boeing as a supplementation of their government salaries or as compensation for their government services. The individual defendants did not understand the severance payments to be compensation for their services to the government or a supplement to their government salaries.

23. The government supervisors of each of the individual defendants were and are fully satisfied that the individuals capably and honorably performed their public duties without bias and with independence and impartiality and have never engaged in or otherwise participated in a conflict of interest.

24. At no time has the Department of Defense taken any disciplinary or other adverse action against any of the individual defendants, although it has had actual knowledge of their previous employment by Boeing and their receipt of a severance payment from Boeing.

25. The severance payments were understood by the individual defendants to be partial compensation for the loss of benefits which they had earned as a result of their prior service with Boeing. They were informed by Boeing that the payment was a means of avoiding any possible conflict of interest by severing all financial connections with Boeing.

26. Before entering into government service, during the course of routine ethics reviews, Messrs. Jones and Paisley disclosed to attorneys in the Office of the General Counsel of the Department of Defense and the Navy, respectively, of the fact and amount of the severance payments which they received from Boeing. Jones also discussed his receipt of the Boeing severance payment with his government superiors, Under Secretary of Defense Dr. Richard DeLauer, and Dr. DeLauer's Executive Office, Colonel Kenneth Hollander. Jones was assured that he could accept the anticipated severance payment.

27. Messrs. Jones, Reynolds, Kitson and Paisley disqualified themselves from working on any Boeing-related matters as of September 1982. The disqualifications applicable to Messrs. Jones, Reynolds and Kitson remained in effect for the balance of the period of their government service. Mr. Paisley resumed participation in a Boeing-related project on September 17, 1984, at the express direction of Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman. In his government...

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4 cases
  • Crandon v. United States Boeing Company, Inc v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 27 Febrero 1990
    ...the individual petitioners. After a full trial, the District Court ruled against the Government on several alternative grounds. 653 F.Supp. 1381 (ED Va.1987). First, it held that § 209(a) had not been vio- lated because the payments were made before the recipients had become Government empl......
  • U.S. v. Paisley, s. 90-3510
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • 23 Marzo 1992
    ...by persons who, like appellees, were not government employees at the time the payments were made and received. United States v. Boeing Co., 653 F.Supp. 1381 (E.D.Va.1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 845 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.1988), rev'd sub nom. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 11......
  • U.S. v. Boeing Co., Inc., 87-2054
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • 7 Septiembre 1988
    ...on 18 U.S.C. Sec. 209(a), 1 a conflict of interest statute. At trial, the district court found for defendants. United States v. Boeing Co., 653 F.Supp. 1381 (E.D.Va.1987). The government appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in I. The Facts During 1981 and 1982, the federal government recr......
  • Andrews v. Education Ass'n of Cheshire
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
    • 17 Febrero 1987

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