US v. Bramble

Decision Date21 July 1995
Docket NumberCrim. No. 95-00150 DAE.
Citation894 F. Supp. 1384
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Ronald BRAMBLE, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Mark E. Recktenwald, Asst. U.S. Atty., U.S. Attorney's Office, Honolulu, HI, for plaintiff.

Hayden Aluli, Honolulu, HI, for defendant.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT

DAVID ALAN EZRA, District Judge.

The court heard Defendant's Motions on May 30, July 10, July 19, and July 20, 1995. Hayden Aluli, Esq., appeared on behalf of Defendant Bramble; Mark E. Recktenwald, Assistant United States Attorney, appeared on behalf of Plaintiff, the United States of America ("government"). After reviewing the motions and the supporting and opposing memoranda, as well as assessing the credibility of the testimony at the hearing, the court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Suppress and DENIES Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment.

BACKGROUND

In May 1993, Bramble placed an advertisement in a newspaper offering to sell four sea otter pelts for $4,000 per pelt. The sale of sea otter pelts is prohibited by the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1372(a)(4) and 1375(b).1 Agents of the Fish & Wildlife Service (FW) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMF), posing as potential buyers, contacted Bramble and arranged to meet with him on the Big Island. FW Agent Carroll Cox and NMF Agent Tommy Friel traveled to the Big Island, contacted Bramble, and arranged to meet Bramble at his home.

On May 27, 1993, at approximately 3:30 p.m., the Agents arrived at Bramble's home. He invited them in and proceeded to display the purported sea otter pelts to them. Agent Cox agreed to purchase the pelts for $3,500. During the course of this meeting, Bramble mentioned to the Agents that he also had other wildlife parts in the house. Bramble brought out portions of a bald eagle, a golden eagle, a red-tailed hawk, and a great horned owl. Possession of all of these wildlife parts is prohibited.2

Agent Friel testified that while Bramble went to retrieve the other wildlife parts to show Agent Cox, Friel sat at, or stood near, the dining room table. Friel testified that he noticed an amber vial which appeared to contain white residue powder, and that from past experience Friel believed the vial contained cocaine. Friel testified that he brought this to Agent Cox's attention. Friel also testified that when Bramble returned with the box containing the bird parts the Agents identified themselves. They told Bramble that sale and possession of the wildlife parts was illegal, and took custody of the animal parts. Bramble signed a release for this. They did not place him under arrest or handcuff him at this time.

After this, the relevant time frame becomes somewhat confused. Bramble states in his memorandum that after identifying themselves, the Agents continued to question him. Agent Friel testified that the Agents asked Bramble about the vial containing the white powder residue. Bramble told them it belonged to his nephew. See also Government's Exhibit 3. Agent Friel testified that they called for assistance from the Hawaii County Police at this time, although the time frame of this is also somewhat unclear.

Hawaii County Police Officer Almeida arrived at approximately 4:00 p.m. Agent Friel and Agent Cox both testified that Cox read Bramble his Miranda rights. They both testified that Bramble said he understood his rights and did not need an attorney present. Almeida testified that he was present when Bramble was read his rights and signed the waiver of rights form at 4:32 p.m. See Exhibit A attached to the Government's Opposition.

Almeida testified that he determined he should search the residence and asked Bramble for permission. Almeida also testified that he told Bramble that he could go and get a search warrant if Bramble was not inclined to allow them to search the house. Bramble asked how long this would take and seemed concerned about his dogs' well-being when told it would take several hours. Almeida testified that he never heard anyone threaten Bramble or his dogs. Almeida also testified that prior to the search of Bramble's house, Bramble told the officers that there were no guns in the house. Almeida stated under oath that he never drew his gun, nor did he see anyone else do so.

At 5:00 p.m., Bramble signed a waiver consenting to a warrantless search of his home. See Exhibit B attached to the Government's opposition. Friel stated that in order to search Bramble's home, Bramble was allowed to go into various rooms alone to control and restrain his several pit bulls.3 Friel testified that, fearing attack, he told Bramble that if Bramble let the dogs loose Friel would "cap" the dogs, meaning that he would shoot the dogs. Friel indicated that Bramble said he would not do so and in fact, the dogs were restrained and moved without incident. Friel also testified that Bramble told the officers that there were no guns in the house. However, the Agents recovered two, loaded guns (a .22 caliber rifle and a .42 caliber pistol).4 Friel testified that after finding these loaded weapons the Agents briefly handcuffed Bramble, removing the handcuffs periodically when Bramble was needed to subdue or move the pit bulls. Friel stated that when they were certain there were no more weapons in the house the Agents took off the handcuffs.

Bramble did not testify at the hearing. However, Bramble stated in his memorandum that one agent "flashed his gun at Bramble, and said he would `cap'" the pit bulls, which were roaming freely about the bedrooms and bathrooms of the house. Defendant's Memorandum in Support at 2. Bramble understood "cap" to mean the agent would shoot the dogs. Bramble alleges that in addition to this exchange, the agent also "threatened to put an electric dog collar on Bramble and laughed when Bramble cringed in fear." Id. Bramble states that the dog collar was "kept but not used for dog training." Id. at 5. The government denies that either the Agents or the police officer ever drew their weapons or threatened to place the dog collar on Bramble.

After waiving his Miranda rights Bramble made verbal and written statements about the wildlife parts in his home. He also admitted to buying and smoking marijuana. The officers also found marijuana, and marijuana plants, which Bramble admitted were his.

Bramble states in support of his motion that his written waivers of his right to remain silent and his right to be free from searches of his home absent a search warrant were not voluntarily given and any statements he made or evidence seized subsequent to his waiver should be suppressed.

DISCUSSION
I. Waiver of Miranda Rights

Before the government may introduce evidence of an incriminating statement made by a criminal defendant, it must prove a voluntary, knowing, intelligent waiver of defendant's Miranda rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S.Ct. 515, 522, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (proof of waiver must be by a mere preponderance of the evidence); United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 599 (9th Cir.1985).

A valid waiver of Miranda rights involves a two-part inquiry. First, the waiver must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421-23, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). Second, it must have been made with full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Id.

"Voluntariness" and "knowing and intelligent" are two distinct considerations to be analyzed separately in determining whether a Miranda waiver was coerced. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987). A waiver is "knowing and intelligent" if it is made "with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." Moran, 475 U.S. at 421, 106 S.Ct. at 1141. In evaluating the "voluntariness" of a confession, the court must determine, under the totality of the circumstances, whether "the government obtained the statement by physical or psychological coercion or by improper inducement so that the suspect's will was overborne." United States v. Leon Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir.1988). Personal circumstances are constitutionally irrelevant absent proof of coercion. Derrick v. Peterson, 924 F.2d 813, 818 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 853, 112 S.Ct. 161, 116 L.Ed.2d 126 (1991). The question of "voluntariness" of a Miranda waiver involves the same inquiry. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 169-170, 107 S.Ct. at 522-524.

The totality of the circumstances includes the background, experience, and conduct of defendant. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-75, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757-59, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). Factors to be considered to determine voluntariness include:

the youth of the accused; his lack of education or his low intelligence; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; the length of detention; the repeated and prolonged nature of questioning; and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep.

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). A signed waiver form is only one factor to be considered. Binder, 769 F.2d at 599. However, although it is not dispositive, a written waiver of Miranda rights is "strong" evidence that the waiver is valid. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373, 99 S.Ct. at 1757; United States v. Bernard S., 795 F.2d 749, 753 n. 4 (9th Cir.1986). There is a presumption against waiver, and the burden of showing a valid waiver is on the prosecutor. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373, 99 S.Ct. at 1757; Binder, 769 F.2d at 599.

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