US v. Cervantes

• Decision Date: 29 June 1995
• Docket Number: Crim. No. 94-348 (JAF).
• Citation: 897 F. Supp. 24
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Frank CERVANTES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

897 F. Supp. 24

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Frank CERVANTES, Defendant.

Crim. No. 94-348 (JAF).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

April 20, 1995.

Order on Reconsideration June 29, 1995.

Asst. U.S. Attorney Warren Vazquez, Guillermo Gil, U.S. Attorney, District of Puerto Rico, San Juan, PR, for plaintiff.

Carlos A. Vazquez-Alvarez, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Benicio Sanchez-Rivera, Federal Public Defender, District of Puerto Rico, San Juan, PR, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

FUSTE, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Defendant, Frank Cervantes, seeks dismissal of charges for assault of a prison official on grounds that the government has violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. We refuse to dismiss the action, concluding that ordinary administrative segregation does not constitute "arrest" for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1988).

II. Facts

On August 6, 1994, defendant allegedly assaulted a prison official in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 111, 1114 (1988), while serving a twenty-five-year sentence at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico (hereinafter "MDC-Guaynabo"). On November 9, 1994, a Federal Grand Jury indicted defendant with the named crime, and a warrant for defendant's arrest was issued the following day. Then, on December 20, 1994, the government issued a request for the production of the prisoner, who had since been transferred to Talladega, Alabama, where he was being held in administrative segregation. On January 5th, the Bureau of Prisons moved defendant to a prison in Oklahoma. Finally, defendant was returned to Puerto Rico, where he continues to be held in administrative segregation.

The U.S. Attorney's Office received notice on January 19, 1995, that defendant had been returned to MDC-Guaynabo. It was not until March 8, 1995, however, that defendant was formally "arrested for the purpose of responding to a federal charge." At arraignment the following day, Cervantes complained that the government had violated his right to a speedy trial. Counsel was appointed and the arraignment continued for resolution of defendant's speedy trial claim.

Defendant's motion to dismiss, now before the court, argues that, for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (1988), "arrest" occurred when the defendant was placed in administrative segregation on August 6, 1994. The indictment of November 9, 1994, would, then, have come later than sixty days from the date of "arrest", in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (1988).

III. Speedy Trial Act¹

Section 3161 of Title 18 attempts to protect a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial by prohibiting the government from keeping an individual under arrest without bringing charges in a timely fashion. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1988). In particular, subsection (b) requires that,

any information or indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges. If an individual has been charged with a felony in a district in which no grand jury has been in session during such thirty-day period, the period of time for filing of the indictment shall be extended an additional thirty days.

18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (1988). Violation of this provision results in mandatory dismissal of the action against the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (1988).

Defendant's claim rests upon the assertion that administrative segregation constitutes an "arrest" for purposes of Section 3161(b). We reject this claim because ordinary administrative segregation of a federal prisoner does not impinge upon the liberty interests with which the Sixth Amendment is concerned. We agree with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Duke, 527 F.2d 386 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 952, 96 S.Ct. 3177, 49 L.Ed.2d 1190 (1976), that United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971), establishes the standard for evaluating, claims of pre-accusation delay. In explaining the significance of arrest for purposes of the Sixth Amendment, the Marion Court observed that,

arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with defendant's liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends....

Id. at 320, 92 S.Ct. at 463.

Of course, pre-indictment administrative segregation raises none of the concerns articulated by the Marion Court. See Duke, 527 F.2d at 389. Pre-accusation segregation does not further disrupt the defendant's life, nor can it possibly create "anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation." Id. We have no reason, therefore, to treat administrative segregation as an arrest.

Supporting this conclusion is our understanding of the purpose of administrative segregation. As noted in Duke, administrative segregation is a tool of prison administration that ordinarily has nothing to do with criminal prosecution in our courts. Id. at 390.

Used as a method of disciplining or investigating inmates who break prison regulations, of protecting certain inmates from members of the general population, and of providing a general cooling-down period for inmates involved in events that could disrupt the general population, administrative segregation accompanying the breach of a prison regulation is in no way related or dependent on prosecution by the federal government of an inmate for that same offense as a violation of federal criminal law.

Id. Nothing in defendant's claims before this court suggests that his administrative segregation constituted an abuse of authority such that we need be concerned with prosecutorial manipulation. Instead, administrative segregation appears to have been employed for its proper purpose, the defendant having demonstrated violent behavior that appears to have warranted segregation from the general population of prisoners.

In adopting the reasoning of Duke, we join courts of the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits in concluding that administrative segregation does not trigger section 3161(b). See United States v. Harris, 12 F.3d 735 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Daniels, 698 F.2d 221, 223 (4th Cir.1983); United States v. Mills, 641 F.2d 785 (9th Cir.1981); United States v. Blevins, 593 F.2d 646, 647 (5th Cir.1979) (per curiam); U.S. v. Manetta, 551 F.2d 1352 (5th Cir.1977); United States v. Smith, 464 F.2d 194 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1066, 93 S.Ct. 566, 34 L.Ed.2d 519 (1972); United States v. Reid, 437 F.2d 1166 (7th Cir.1971). It is precisely those situations in which a prisoner has proven worthy of segregation from the general prison population that we hope the prosecutorial process is not frustrated by the mechanics of prison administration. Neither, of course, would we want prison safety compromised in the name of prosecutorial success. Accordingly, we employ the date upon which defendant was arrested, March 8, 1995, to calculate the period specified by section 3161.

Of course, once we have designated the date of actual arrest pursuant to the issued warrant as the date upon which the statutory clock begins to run, it becomes immediately apparent that section 3161(b) does not apply to defendant's case. At first glance, section 3161(b) seems to create a right of action for those who have not been arrested within thirty days following an indictment. Of course, the statute creates no such right. Section 3161(b) aims to prevent the government from keeping an individual under arrest without formal charges, not to create a Boolean nightmare in which a defendant has the dubious right to be arrested within thirty days of indictment. In this case, arrest came after, not before, indictment so the concerns that underlie section 3161(b) are not raised. Accordingly, we deny defendant's claim based upon section 3161(b).

IV. Sixth Amendment

The Sixth Amendment itself, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, provides a remedy for those who have been subject to improper prosecutorial delay. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that in "all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury...." U.S. Const. amend. VI. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), continues to guide judicial inquiry into claimed violations of this Sixth Amendment, guarantee, directing the court to examine, the "length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." Where the court finds a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, it must dismiss the charges with prejudice. Id.

Though the government has been careful to discuss the four factors of Barker in its opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss, see Docket Document No. 12, at 7, we find that defendant has failed to state a claim under the Sixth Amendment. Claimed violations of the Sixth Amendment receive analysis separate from violations of the Speedy Trial Act. United States v. Gonzalez, 671 F.2d 441 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2279, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); see also United States v. Yunis, 705 F.Supp. 33, 35 (D.D.C.1989). However, defendant makes no mention of a Sixth Amendment claim independent of the Speedy Trial Act. Nor does the defendant make mention of Barker, its four-factored analysis, or jurisprudence that would support a claim on the facts presented. Since defendant has failed to allege or support a general claim for violation of the Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial, we need not further pursue an analysis under either Barker or Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992).²

V. Conclusion

Defendant's motion to dismiss under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) is DENIED.

IT IS SO...