US v. Clarke, 95-000161-01-CR-W-3.
| Decision Date | 17 May 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-000161-01-CR-W-3.,95-000161-01-CR-W-3. |
| Citation | 925 F. Supp. 1433 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Maude C. CLARKE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
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Pat McInerney, United States Attorneys Office, Kansas City, MO, for plaintiff.
Ronald Partee, Kansas City, MO, for defendant.
ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On March 3, 1996, the Honorable Robert E. Larsen, United States Magistrate Judge, issued his Report and Recommendation (the "Report") that determined, inter, that (1) there was probable cause to support Defendant's arrest, (2) Defendant was properly advised of her Miranda rights, and that she voluntarily waived those rights, (3) Defendant was not coerced into making a statement to law enforcement officials, (4) Defendant did not invoke her right to counsel until after she made incriminating statements to law enforcement officials, at which time all interrogation ceased, (5) Defendant's arrest pursuant to Mo.Rev.Stat. § 544.170 was a pretext to avoid compliance with Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and (6) law enforcement officers were required to, but did not, abide by the requirements of Rule 5(a).1
Both Plaintiff and Defendant have filed objections to the Report. The Court has reviewed the Report, the motions and responses that preceded the Report, the transcripts of the hearings held by Judge Larsen, and the parties' objections to the Report. The Court concludes that Judge Larsen's careful and thorough analysis of the law and his application of the law to the facts of this case are correct, and the Report is therefore adopted as the opinion of this Court. The Court reinforces Judge Larsen's legal conclusions with the following statement of law as set forth by the Eighth Circuit:
The requirements of Rule 5(a) and the teachings of the Supreme Court in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943) and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) are designed to frustrate law-enforcing officers from detaining the arrested person for an unnecessary period of time to enable the officer to extract a confession from the arrested individual. But this salutary principle is not applicable where the person under arrest is in the custody and under the control of local and not federal officers, unless, of course, the state officers are acting at the direction of or in concert with the federal officers, or there is collaboration between the federal and state authorities.
United States v. Morris, 445 F.2d 1233, 1236 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 957, 92 S.Ct. 322, 30 L.Ed.2d 273 (1971) (citing cases) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant's motion to suppress evidence of her confession because it was obtained pursuant to an unlawful detention.2 The parties have indicated that there may be other "fruits" of the detention; however, the Report does not specify anything beyond Defendant's confession. If the parties believe that there is other evidence that should be suppressed, they should bring the matter to Judge Larsen's attention in a timely fashion so that he can make a Report and Recommendation on the matter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS
Before the court are defendant Maude C. Clarke's motion and supplemental motion to suppress her oral statements made to state and federal law enforcement officials on June 22, 1995, on the grounds that (1) the initial stop of defendant's vehicle and the questioning of defendant went beyond a lawful Terry stop, (2) defendant's subsequent arrest was without probable cause, (3) all statements made by defendant were coerced, (4) defendant was not timely advised of her Miranda rights, (5) any waiver by defendant of her Miranda rights was involuntary, (6) the detention of defendant was improper and any statements given during her detention were tainted, (7) defendant's requests for counsel were not honored, and (8) defendant's arrest was solely for the purpose of coercing a statement from defendant and not for the purpose of initiating prosecution. I find that (1) because this was not purported to be an investigative stop, the dictates of Terry v. Ohio are inapplicable, (2) all of the information known by police at the time of defendant's arrest establishes probable cause that she was promoting prostitution, (3) there is no evidence in this record that defendant's statement was coerced, (4) because defendant was advised of her Miranda rights before she was questioned, the rights were timely given, (5) because there is nothing equivocal or ambiguous about "I have nothing to hide," and because defendant's actions in willingly answering the questions posed to her immediately after making that statement, defendant sufficiently waived her right to remain silent, (6) because all questioning ceased at the time defendant requested an attorney, her right to counsel was not violated, (7) defendant has not shown that she was unconstitutionally held "incommunicado," (8) the arrest of defendant pursuant to the Missouri 20-hour hold law was an unlawful pretext for investigative purposes, and the government intentionally circumvented procedures in place to protect defendant's constitutional rights, and (9) Rule 5(a) applies to this case because of the working arrangement between the state police and federal agents, and the requirements of Rule 5(a) were not met since defendant was never presented before a judge. Therefore, defendant's motion to suppress should be granted, and all information obtained as a result of her unlawful arrest as well as the fruits of that unlawful arrest should be suppressed.
On September 27, 1995, defendant was charged in a ten-count indictment with various crimes in connection with the alleged operation of a prostitution enterprise from her residence. On December 6, 1995, a thirteen-count superseding indictment was returned.
On November 1, 1995, defendant filed a motion to suppress statements obtained from her on June 22, 1995, and the fruits of such statements (document number 32), on the grounds that (1) the initial stop of defendant's vehicle and the questioning of defendant went beyond a lawful Terry stop, (2) defendant's subsequent arrest was without probable cause, (3) all statements made by defendant were coerced, (4) defendant was not timely advised of her Miranda rights, (5) any waiver by defendant of her Miranda rights was involuntary, (6) the detention of defendant was improper and any statements given during her detention were tainted.
On November 8, 1995, the government filed its response to defendant's motion (document number 41) in which it argues that both the initial stop of defendant and her subsequent arrest were supported by probable cause, that defendant was properly detained pursuant to Missouri's "twenty hour hold" law, and that defendant voluntarily waived her Miranda rights and did not at any time request an attorney.
On November 16, 1995, I held a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress statements. Defendant was present represented by Ronald Partee. The government was represented by Assistant United States Attorney Patrick McInerney. Three witnesses testified for the government and four exhibits were admitted. The witnesses were:
The exhibits were:
Subsequent to the hearing an extension of the date for filing pretrial motions was granted, and defendant filed a supplement to her motion to suppress statements (document number 148). In her supplemental motion, defendant argues that her statements should be suppressed on the additional grounds that her request for an attorney was not honored during her interrogation and that her arrest was effectuated without probable cause for the sole purpose of coercing a statement from her and not for the purpose of initiating her prosecution; and that she was held "incommunicado" in violation of law for the purpose of coercing an incriminating statement from her.
On March 4, 1996, the government filed its response to the defendant's supplemental suggestions (document number 157) reasserting its reliance on Missouri's 20-hour hold rule (Mo.Rev.Stat. 544.170) and arguing:
The "pick up orders" at issue were entered into the computer by Detective Rooney and were based on the same facts and circumstances as was the United States' application for a search warrant to search Maude Clarke's residence, the business location of the prostitution enterprise. Where the search warrant had sought to search the locus of the business, the pick up orders sought to detain, for the purpose of questioning, the women identified as employees of the business, all of whom were identified in the affidavit. (Document number 157, page 3.)
On the basis of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing, I submit the following findings of fact:
1. In approximately November 1994 a joint federal-state investigation involving defendant Maude Clarke who was suspected of running a prostitution business from her residence at 907 East 42nd Street, Kansas City, Missouri began (1Tr. at 9, 26, 27, 36, 63,...
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U.S. v. Sholola
...district court opinions in support of this proposition. We need not discuss the district court's decision in United States v. Clarke, 925 F.Supp. 1433, 1452 (W.D.Mo.1996), which was recently overturned by the Eighth Circuit. See 110 F.3d 612 (8th Cir.1997). Both United States v. Leal, 876 F......