US v. Mwalumba

• Decision Date: 01 February 2010
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:08-CV-2088-G.
• Citation: 688 F. Supp.2d 565
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Mankengo MWALUMBA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

688 F.Supp.2d 565

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Mankengo MWALUMBA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:08-CV-2088-G.

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.

February 1, 2010.

Arthur Rizer, David J. Kline, Elianis N. Perez, US Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Susan L.S. Ernst, US Attorney's Office, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.

Joyce A. Shatteen, Law Office of Joyce Shatteen, Dallas, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

A. JOE FISH, Senior District Judge.

Before the court are the cross-motions for summary judgment of the plaintiff United States of America ("the plaintiff" or "the United States") (docket entry 21) and the defendant Mankengo Mwalumba ("the defendant" or "Mwalumba") (docket entry 22). For the reasons discussed below, the defendant's motion is denied, and the plaintiff's motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

This is a civil action brought by the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) to revoke its grant of citizenship to the defendant, who was admitted to United States citizenship on September 17, 1996. Complaint to Revoke Naturalization ("Complaint") at 1, 3; Certificate of Naturalization at 1, located in Appendix to Plaintiff's Brief for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Appendix") at 17. The complaint alleges that Mwalumba was statutorily ineligible to be naturalized as a citizen and that his naturalization can be revoked on either of two grounds: because it was illegally procured, or because it was procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation. Complaint at 4-8; see generally 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). Because the court ultimately finds that the United States is entitled to summary judgment on its claim that Mwalumba's citizenship was illegally procured, the court does not address the claim that Mwalumba's citizenship was procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation.

The following facts are relevant to the United States' claim that Mwalumba's naturalization was illegally procured. On March 22, 1999, Mwalumba entered into a plea agreement with the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Texas ("the Plea Agreement"). Plea Agreement in Case Number 3:98-CR-378-K ("Plea Agreement") at 1, located in Defendant's Appendix for Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support Thereof ("Defendant's Appendix") at 14. On July 2, 1999, pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, Mwalumba pled guilty to and was convicted of, inter alia, the following three felony offenses. See Judgment in a Criminal Case, Case Number 3:98-CR-378-K ("Criminal Judgment") at 1, located in Plaintiff's Appendix at 35; see also Presentence Report in Case Number 3:98-CR-378-K ("Presentence Report") at 1, located in Defendant's Appendix at 53. The first was Fraud and Misuse of I-94 Arrival/Departure Record Card in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) ("Fraud and Misuse I"). Mwalumba committed this offense on May 23, 1995. The second was False Statement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 ("False Statement"). Mwalumba also committed this offense on May 23, 1995. The third was Fraud and Misuse of Identification Document in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b) ("Fraud and Misuse II"). Mwalumba committed this offense on July 14, 1995. Criminal Judgment at 1, located in Plaintiff's Appendix at 35; Presentence Report at 1, located in Defendant's Appendix at 53.

The defendant's answer states that he denies the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint pertaining to these three offenses and notes that the "defendant was not charged with these offenses until on or about November 5, 1998 and was not convicted until July 2, 1999." Defendant's Original Answer at 2. This purported denial thus admits that Mwalumba was convicted of these three offenses and does not deny that Mwalumba committed the offenses of which he was convicted. In any event, the law in this circuit is that a prior guilty plea is sufficient to establish in subsequent civil litigation all facts that were essential to proving the elements of each crime. Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 722 n. 13 (5th Cir.1995) (en banc); Brazzell v. Adams, 493 F.2d 489, 490 (5th Cir.1974). Therefore, Mwalumba is collaterally estopped from denying in this case that he engaged in any of the conduct for which he was convicted. See In re Grothues, 226 F.3d 334, 339 (5th Cir.2000).

B. Procedural Background

Both the plaintiff and the defendant have moved for summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, disclosure materials on file, and affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2).¹ Material facts are those facts that the governing substantive law identifies as having the potential to affect the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). There is a genuine issue as to a material fact "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. The nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Company v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Instead, the nonmoving party must show that the evidence is sufficient to support the resolution of a material factual issue in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Company, 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)).

"To prevail in a proceeding to revoke naturalization, the Government must prove its case by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence, and leave no issue in doubt." United States v. Ekpin, 214 F.Supp.2d 707, 712 (S.D.Tex.2002) (citing Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 507, 101 S.Ct. 737, 66 L.Ed.2d 686 (1981)). This is a heavy burden, but if the government carries it a district court "lacks discretion" and "is compelled to enter a judgment of denaturalization." United States v. Jean-Baptiste, 395 F.3d 1190, 1192 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 852, 126 S.Ct. 113, 163 L.Ed.2d 124 (2005).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Revocation of Naturalization

1. Legal Standard

Title 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) provides that the order admitting a naturalized citizen to citizenship may be revoked and set aside and that the certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if the order and certificate were "illegally procured or were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation." The statute thus provides two independent grounds, either of which alone is sufficient to support revocation and cancellation. Jean-Baptiste, 395 F.3d at 1192-93. Here, the court only need consider the government's contention that Mwalumba's citizenship was illegally procured.

Citizenship is "illegally procured" within the meaning of § 1451(a) when it is procured by a person who was statutorily ineligible for naturalization. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 506, 101 S.Ct. 737. To be statutorily eligible for naturalization, an individual must, inter alia, demonstrate that during the time period prescribed by the statute he or she "has been and still is a person of good moral character." 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3). Ordinarily the statutory period during which good moral character is required begins five years before the date on which the person's application for naturalization is filed with the INS and ends on the date that the person takes the oath of allegiance and is naturalized as a United States citizen. Id. That five-year requirement is shortened to three years for persons who are married to United States citizens. See 8 U.S.C. 1430(a).

The concept of "good moral character" is defined by the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") and the regulations promulgated under it. Both the INA and the regulations include lists of specified acts and characteristics that automatically preclude a person from establishing good moral character. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1)-(9); 8 C.F.R § 316.10(b)(1)-(3)(ii). However, committing a listed act or exhibiting a listed characteristic is not the only way that a person can be shown to lack good moral character. Claims of good moral character are evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the elements enumerated in the INA and the regulations as well as "the standards of the average citizen in the community of residence." 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(2). A "catch-all" provision in the statutory scheme provides that non-enumerated acts or characteristics can, in the absence of extenuating circumstances, demonstrate that an applicant lacks good moral character. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) ("The fact that any person is not within one of the foregoing classes shall not preclude a finding that for other reasons such person is or was not of good moral character."); 8 C.F.R § 316.10(b)(3)(iii) (explaining that in the absence of extenuating circumstances an "applicant shall be found to lack good moral character if, during the statutory period, the applicant: ... (iii) committed unlawful acts that adversely reflect upon the applicant's moral character, or was convicted or imprisoned for such acts, although the acts" are not specifically enumerated in the statute or regulations).

One of the acts that the INA and its regulations specify as precluding a finding of good moral character is the commission of and conviction for a crime of moral turpitude. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(2)(i). The INA does not define the term "moral turpitude." Ekpin, 214 F.Supp.2d at 714. The determination of whether a crime involves moral turpitude turns on the inherent nature of the crime, not the circumstances under...