US v. Parcel I, Beginning at a Stake
| Decision Date | 07 February 1990 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 89-4211. |
| Citation | 731 F. Supp. 1348 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. PARCEL I, BEGINNING AT A STAKE, ETC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Guice G. Strong, Asst. U.S. Atty., Benton, Ill., for plaintiff.
Thomas Aaron Luther, Selmer, Tenn., pro se.
Charles O. Grigson, Austin, Tex., Ronald J. Giacone, Benton, Ill., Joseph H. Guffey, Husch Eppenberger Donohue Cornfeld & Jenkins, St. Louis, Mo., for defendant.
This matter is before the Court on the claimants' Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively to Transfer and their Motion to Quash Warrant of Arrest or Alternatively Return of Seized Property. As a preliminary matter, this Court GRANTS claimant's Motion to Consolidate in United States v. Selmar, Tenn. Property, 89-4222 (Document No. 14).
The claimants in these consolidated cases are Norma D. Surratt, Bobby Surratt, Ronald J. Surratt and Norman H. Louisan. All are related, directly or as an in-law, to Harley G. Surratt. Harley Surratt is a convicted drug conspirator, who was involved in what is commonly termed the Lanier drug conspiracy. Surratt contributed to the extravagant success of that conspiracy by providing semi-tractors, trailers, and drivers to transport tons of marijuana across the United States. Surratt also occasionally drove the trucks himself to transport both marijuana and drug money. He also drove drug kingpin, Randy Lanier, to Pennsylvania at a time when Lanier was a federal fugitive attempting to evade prosecution. Harley Surratt was handsomely compensated for his crimes.
The government contends that Surratt attempted to "launder" his drug money by purchasing real estate, businesses and chattels in his relatives' names. Specifically, the government contends that Surratt financed the purchases of the following: (1) a 64.54-acre farm, including a farmhouse and various improvements and equipment, which is in the name of claimant Bobby Surratt, (2) a one-acre tract of land, upon which Harley and claimant Norma Surratt built a house, (3) a 1986 Fleetwood mobile home which is now in the name of claimant Norman Louisan, (4) the business, accounts and chattels of Surratt Trucking Company, which are now in the names of Ronald and Norma Surratt, (5) various semi-tractors and trailers, and (6) the real estate and business comprising the Selmar, Tennessee, NAPA Auto Parts store, which is in the name of Bobby Surratt. The government further contends that the auto parts store was used to facilitate drug activity in that Harley Surratt used it to further launder his drug money.
The claimants maintain, however, that the property which the government is seeking to forfeit is their own property, untainted by Harley Surratt's ill-gotten gains, and that the government acted illegally in seizing it. Specifically, in their Motion to Quash, the claimants allege that they were given no pre-seizure hearing to contest the government's contention that the property, ostensibly in their names, was actually the property of Harley Surratt. They also argue that all of the property and claimants in these actions are located in Tennessee, and thus a Court sitting in the Southern District of Illinois may not exercise jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of this dispute.
In their Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively to Transfer, the claimants once again argue that this court lacks in rem jurisdiction. They further contend that: (1) this Court lacks in personam jurisdiction, (2) venue is improper in the Southern District of Illinois, (3) service of process with respect to claimants Norma Surratt, Norman Louisan and Bobby Surratt was improper, and (4) claimant Ronald Surratt was not served with process.
A. Jurisdiction
Subject matter jurisdiction in federal civil forfeiture actions is vested in United States District Courts by two different statutes. The first, 28 U.S.C. § 1345, grants exclusive jurisdiction in the district courts for all actions in which the United States is plaintiff. The second, 28 U.S.C. § 1355, provides that the district courts shall have original, exclusive jurisdiction of all actions or proceedings for forfeiture under any act of Congress. Here, the government is seeking forfeiture pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) and (a)(7). These subsections provide, in pertinent part:
Thus, this Court clearly has subject matter jurisdiction to hear forfeiture proceedings.
The claimants argue, however, that subject matter jurisdiction aside, this Court's territorial jurisdiction cannot extend to allow it to dispose of property located in Tennessee. The claimants are wrong. The territorial jurisdiction of a United States District Court in a forfeiture proceeding is limited only by the territorial borders of the nation and the applicable venue provisions. United States v. 5708 Beacon Drive, Austin, Tex., 712 F.Supp. 525, 527 (S.D.Miss.1988); United States v. Premises Known as Lots 50 & 51 Etc., 681 F.Supp. 309, 313 (E.D.N.C.1988); United States v. One 1974 Cessna Model 310R Aircraft, 432 F.Supp. 364, 366 (D.S.C.1977). Thus, in effect, the venue statute controls territorial jurisdiction in that it represents the only statutory limitation on the district court's power to hear the matter at issue. 5708 Beacon Drive, 712 F.Supp. at 527; One 1974 Cessna, 432 F.Supp. at 366. Here, the applicable venue statute is 21 U.S.C. § 881(j) which provides that venue is proper "in the judicial district in which the criminal prosecution is brought." The criminal prosecution underlying the instant forfeiture proceeding was brought in the Southern District of Illinois. Therefore, this Court has in rem jurisdiction over the property at issue.
Furthermore, the claimants' argument that this court cannot proceed because it lacks in personam jurisdiction over the claimants is totally without merit. This action is a proceeding in rem. In personam jurisdiction is not the basis for this Court's exercise of jurisdiction.
2. Venue
As noted previously, the venue statute which is applicable to this proceeding is 21 U.S.C. § 881(j). Section 881(j) provides that a forfeiture proceeding is proper in the judicial district in which the underlying criminal prosecution was brought. Here, the underlying criminal prosecution was brought in the Southern District of Illinois. Thus, the claimants' argument that venue is improper in this Court must fail.
3. Service of Process
The claimants also argue that service of process in this case was defective. They note that Rule E(3)(a) of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims provides that "process in rem and of maritime attachment and garnishment shall only be served within the district." Claimants argue that service of process is thus automatically invalid where the res is outside the district. The government admits that 21 U.S.C. § 881 does not explicitly provide for nationwide service of process. It argues, however, that § 881(j) displaces the supplemental admiralty rules and that nationwide service should be implied from the legislative history of § 881(j) and from the inherent purpose which § 881 is meant to serve. This Court finds the government's argument compelling. Since process is necessary to perfect statutory jurisdiction, the claimants' argument, if followed, would render § 881(j) a nullity. A statutory construction which would impute a useless act to Congress must be viewed as unsound and rejected. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir.1982). Accordingly, this Court finds that extraterritorial service of process is allowed, by implication, from the legislative history and purpose of § 881(j).1See generally, United States v. Premises Known as Lots 50 & 51 Etc., 681 F.Supp. 309, 313 (E.D.N.C.1988).
Claimant Ronald Surratt also alleges that he was never served with process in this matter. The Court file, however, contains a validly executed Process Receipt and Return which indicates that a United States Marshal or Deputy Marshal served Ronald Surratt on September 16, 1989. While this Process and Receipt is not conclusive proof of service, it is prima facie evidence of valid service and the claimant must do more than just allege, in a conclusory fashion, that he was never served with process. Taft v. Donellan Jerome, Inc., 407 F.2d 807, 808-809 (7th Cir.1969). Here, Ronald Surratt has offered no proof that he was not served with process, thus his claim that process was lacking must be rejected.
4. Notice and Hearing
The government relies on 21 U.S.C. § 881 as support for its argument that the claimants received all process that was due them in this particular forfeiture proceeding. The claimants argue that § 881 is unconstitutional because it allows the government to seize a person's property without notice or opportunity to be heard. The government did not, however, rely on § 881 in initiating the instant forfeiture proceeding. The process afforded the claimants exceeded that which is mandated by § 881 in that the government sought an ex parte review of the Warrants of Arrest before United States Magistrate Philip Frazier. Thus, the constitutionality of that procedure, rather than the one mandated by § 881, is the issue before the Court. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property
...States v. Leasehold Interest in Property Located at 850 S. Maple, 743 F.Supp. 505 (E.D.Mich.1990); United States v. Parcel I, Beginning at a Stake, 731 F.Supp. 1348 (S.D.Ill.1990). 13 Much of the same rationale was applied in Monsanto, where a federal grand jury indictment charged Monsanto ......
-
Tellevik v. Real Property Known as 31641 West Rutherford Street, Located in City of Carnation, Wash., and All Appurtenances and Improvements Thereon
...United States v. Leasehold Interest in Property Located at 850 S. Maple, 743 F.Supp. 505 (E.D.Mich.1990); United States v. Parcel I, Beginning at Stake, 731 F.Supp. 1348 (S.D.Ill.1990), these courts all relied upon United States v. Premises & Real Property, 889 F.2d 1258 (2d Cir.1989) (Livo......
-
U.S. v. 51 Pieces of Real Property Roswell, N.M., 92-1346
...of process. United States v. 953 E. Sahara, 807 F.Supp. 581, 581 (D.Ariz.1992) (Sec. 981(h)); 7 United States v. Parcel I, Beginning at a Stake, 731 F.Supp. 1348, 1351 (S.D.Ill.1990) (Sec. 881(j)); United States v. 2050 Brickell Ave., 681 F.Supp. 309, 314 (E.D.N.C.1988) (Sec. 881(j)). In ea......
-
US v. 8215 REESE ROAD, HARVARD, ILL.
...have found that the lack of pre-seizure notice and hearing violates due process. See U.S. v. Parcel 1, Beginning at a Stake, 731 F.Supp. 1348, 1353 (S.D.Ill.1990); U.S. v. Premises & Real Property at 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258, 1264 (2d Cir.1989). See also In re Application of Kings......