US v. Rodriguez
Decision Date | 09 August 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 88-00088-01-CR-W-6.,88-00088-01-CR-W-6. |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Andres RODRIGUEZ, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Dan Stewart, Asst. U.S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff.
John R. Cullom, Kansas City, Mo., for defendant.
Defendant, having been convicted of selling cocaine base ("crack"), has filed posttrial motions for a judgment of acquittal, a new trial, and a declaration that the Sentencing Reform Act is unconstitutional. The Government's briefing adequately responds to the motions and they will be denied, with limited additional commentary.
In the present case the defendant presents a renewed due process argument by stating in his motion that the Sentencing Guidelines violate due process "by levying contrived, artificial sentences to defendants that in no manner match the crime committed." It is further stated that the punishment to be assessed under the Guidelines has "no reasonable correlation to the crime committed or extenuating or mitigating circumstances a judge unconstrained by these guidelines might consider."
Defendant has not been sentenced, and there is no issue specified that relates to the Guidelines as applied. Under the authority of United States v. Frank, 682 F.Supp. 815 (W.D.Pa.1988), it would be soundly ruled that an abstract, blanket assertion of due process violations cannot be raised by this defendant. Frank ruled there was a violation of due process in the assumed preclusion of consideration of "pending state court charges and ... (defendant's) family situation...." 682 F.Supp. at 818. I might well agree with the result of Judge Ziegler's analysis, and give some appropriate weight to the factors mentioned, but I would do so under the Guidelines rather than in spite of the Guidelines. While family and community ties are not "ordinarily relevant" to a departure, I am satisfied such considerations are not absolutely barred, and thus I would not have reached the constitutional issue. See Sentencing Guidelines, § 5H1.6, and 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) ( ). In the only instance when I have departed from the Guidelines to minimize a sentence I did so because of a special family situation created by the need to imprison both parents for crimes that were serious, but not so grave as to make it unreasonable to consider the effect of imprisonment on defendants' small children. Having taken such factors into account before, I see nothing in the Guidelines making them inappropriate to consider in rare instances. As I construe them, the Guidelines simply require that there be no routine, controlling use of family situations, as by seldom or never imprisoning the mother having custodial responsibilities for small children.
My review of the recent due process cases fails to convince me I should now sustain a blanket due process objection to the Guidelines. Without attempting to note all the cases, it seems that some of the more impressive adverse decisions invoking due process are United States v. Brittman, 687 F.Supp. 1329 (E.D.Ark.1988); United States v. Brodie, 686 F.Supp. 941 (D.D.C.1988); United States v. Ortega Lopez, 684 F.Supp. 1506 (C.D.Cal.1988) (majority opinion); and United States v. Bolding, 683 F.Supp. 1003 (D.Md.1988). Notable opinions rejecting a blanket due process challenge include the forceful dissent in Ortega Lopez, supra; United States v. Seluk, 691 F.Supp. 525 (D.Mass.1988); United States v. Belgard, 694 F.Supp. 1488 (D.Ore.1988); United States v. Landers, 690 F.Supp. 615 (W.D.Tenn.1988); United States v. Kerr, 686 F.Supp. 1174 (W.D.Pa. 1988); and United States v. Alves, 688 F.Supp. 70 (D.Mass.1988). Without further discussion I conclude that the invalidating decisions relying on due process have not convinced me to reconsider the Mistretta decision, and the defendant's constitutional arguments are therefore rejected.
The trial in this case turned on identification of the seller by two law enforcement officers who made independent purchases a few minutes apart. Defendant objects to testimony that the seller made a threat as one of the officers was leaving. For reasons discussed at trial, I believe the statement was admissible. Even if not admissible, however, it could have had no prejudicial effect simply because it could have created hostility toward the actual seller. If defendant was not the seller, the possibility of hostility toward someone else could not affect defendant.
The trial occurred some months after the sales in question. The only identification of defendant by the witnesses was in the courtroom. Neither side tested the strength of the identification by asking...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
U.S. v. Guerrero
...court improperly considered the effect of Princey's crimes on her family and increased her sentence as a result. In United States v. Rodriguez, 691 F.Supp. 1252 (W.D.Mo.1988), aff'd, 881 F.2d 1080 (8th Cir.1989), which defense counsel principally relies upon in his brief, the district court......
-
US v. Jimenez
...2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979)). This court will not sustain a blanket due process objection to the guidelines. See United States v. Rodriguez, 691 F.Supp. 1252 (W.D.Mo.1988). Thus, I will scrutinize only the guidelines' impact on this defendant's due process Defendant argues that the applicat......
-
U.S. v. Bogle
...sentencing guidelines constitutional: United States v. Weidner, --- F.Supp. ----, 1988 WL 83854 (N.D.Ind.1988); United States v. Rodriguez, 691 F.Supp. 1252, (W.D.Mo.1988); United States v. Whitfield, 689 F.Supp. 954 (D.Minn.1988); United States v. Hickernell, 690 F.Supp. 272 (S.D.N.Y.1988)......
-
U.S. v. Prestemon, 89-5543
...(no departure despite support of spouse and step-children), aff'd mem., 885 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.1989); United States v. Rodriguez, 691 F.Supp. 1252, 1253 (W.D.Mo.1988) (reference in dicta to another case in which court held it was not unreasonable to consider "special family situation" when b......