US v. Schultz
| Decision Date | 20 February 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. C 95-3011.,C 95-3011. |
| Citation | 917 F. Supp. 1320 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. George E. SCHULTZ, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Janet L. Papenthien, Assistant United States Attorney, Sioux City, Iowa, for United States.
Jane Kelly, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for defendant George E. Schultz.
Defendant's post-trial motions seek reversal of his convictions, after an eight day jury trial, involving his operation of a gambling business in central Iowa. His motions warrant the court's consideration of whether the government's identification of members of a five-person gambling business, four of whom the jury included as participants in this business by mere account designations in defendant's records, suffices to sustain defendant's conviction of conducting an illegal gambling business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955. In addition, defendant seeks a new trial on the grounds that statements by an alleged co-conspirator were improperly admitted. Defendant also asserts that much of the documentary evidence supporting the government's case was likewise improperly admitted into evidence because the government did not lay a proper foundation for this evidence. Although defendant failed to object to the admission of this evidence at trial, he alleges in his post-trial motion for new trial that the court committed "plain error" in admitting this evidence. The government has resisted defendant's renewed motion for judgment of acquittal and his motions for new trial.
On May 4, 1995, Defendant George E. Schultz was indicted on three counts of a four-count indictment, involving alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 1952, & 1955.1 The United States sought leave of court to dismiss Count Three of the indictment against George E. Schultz on October 13, 1995. The court granted the United States leave of court to dismiss Count Three against Schultz, and trial by jury began on October 17, 1995, on the remaining Counts One and Four of the indictment against Schultz.2 In Count One of the indictment, Schultz was charged with conducting an illegal gambling business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955. Count Four of the indictment charged Schultz with conspiring with other persons, known and unknown, to conduct an illegal gambling business or to use the telephone, a facility in interstate commerce, with intent to promote or carry on an illegal gambling business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.
At the close of the government's evidence, Schultz moved for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 on both counts of the indictment. The court reserved ruling on this motion. At the conclusion of all the evidence, Schultz renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal on both counts, and the court once again reserved ruling on Schultz's motion. After eight days of trial, on October 30, 1995, the jury found Schultz guilty of both Counts One and Four of the indictment. In the verdict form, the court posed specific interrogatories to the jury, requiring the jury to either (1) identify a period of more than thirty days during which Schultz conducted an illegal gambling business in substantially continuous operation, or (2) identify the date on which the illegal gambling business conducted by Schultz had gross revenues of $2,000 or more for that particular day. In response to these specific interrogatories, the jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Schultz had conducted an illegal gambling business which was in substantially continuous operation from November 1, 1993 to December 8, 1993. Although the verdict form did not require the jury to complete both these interrogatories, the jury also determined that on November 28, 1993, Schultz conducted an illegal gambling business which garnered gross revenues of $2,000 or more. In addition, the verdict form required the jury to identify by name or description the five or more persons, including the defendant, who were involved in the conduct of an illegal gambling business during either (1) the period of more than thirty days or (2) on the single day with gross revenues of $2,000 or more. In response to both alternatives, the jury identified the same six people: (1) Russ Kramer; (2) Harry Hull sic; (3) Paul Clergy; (4) Tim Sapp; (5) George E. Schultz; and (6) Gary Fall.
After the jury returned its verdict, Schultz renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal on the grounds that no reasonable jury could find the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Schultz conducted a gambling business involving the requisite five people under 18 U.S.C. § 1955, as charged in Count One. In addition, Schultz asserted that because the government failed to offer sufficient evidence of an agreement to commit an offense that, if completed, would violate federal law, no reasonable jury could convict Schultz of Count Four of the indictment. (Schultz's Memorandum, p. 2).
Schultz also moved for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, claiming most of the documentary evidence introduced at trial was improperly admitted, and that out of court statements made by Harry Hull which were used against Schultz were likewise improperly admitted into evidence. On November 20, 1995, the government filed a consolidated resistance to Schultz's motion for judgment of acquittal, his motion for new trial based on the improper admission of documentary evidence, and his motion for new trial based on the improper admission of Hull's out of court statements and subsequently filed a memorandum in support of its resistance. On December 18, 1995, Schultz filed a reply to the government's consolidated resistance. On January 25, 1996, the court ordered further briefing of the issue of the allegedly improper admission of documentary evidence. In compliance with the court's order, both Schultz and the government submitted supplemental briefs on that particular issue on February 5 and 6, 1996, respectively. With this procedural background in mind, the court turns to the consideration of Schultz's renewed motion for judgment of acquittal.
Schultz has raised several issues in support of his renewed motion for judgment of acquittal. Before addressing these issues, the court must first determine the standard of review governing this motion.
The case law governing motions for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed. R.Crim.P. 29 is well-settled and imposes a significant constraint on the district court's authority to overturn a jury's verdict. See United States v. Scott, 64 F.3d 377, 380 (8th Cir.1995) () (quoting United States v. Burks, 934 F.2d 148, 151 (8th Cir.1991)); United States v. Hood, 51 F.3d 128, 129 (8th Cir.1995) () (citing Burks, 934 F.2d at 151); Burks, 934 F.2d at 151. The jury's verdict must be upheld if a reasonably minded jury could conclude by some interpretation of the evidence a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Scott, 64 F.3d at 380 (quoting United States v. Erdman, 953 F.2d 387, 389 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1211, 112 S.Ct. 3009, 120 L.Ed.2d 883 (1992)); Hood, 51 F.3d at 129; United...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
U.S. v. Earles, CR 91-4016-MWB.
...1136, 1144-45 (N.D.Iowa 1997) (discussing the standards for new trial motions pursuant to FED.R.CRIM.P. 33); United States v. Schultz, 917 F.Supp. 1320, 1338-39 (N.D.Iowa 1996) (same). Thus, the rule specifically provides for a motion for a new trial on the ground asserted here, "newly disc......
-
Finding What Was Lost: Sorting Out the Custodian's Privilege Against Self-incrimination from the Compelled Production of Records
...that they are in fact the records of the business is a different question that the agent cannot address. In United States v. Schultz, 917 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D. Iowa 1996), the government's witnesses testified only that the documents it sought to introduce at trial were "consistent with" those......