US v. Stella Perez, Civ. No. 85-2197 (RLA).
Decision Date | 09 December 1993 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 85-2197 (RLA). |
Citation | 839 F. Supp. 92 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Edgar M. STELLA PÉREZ and Guillermo Alemañy Rivera, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
José M. Pizarro Zayas, U.S. Attorney's Office, Hato Rey, PR, Marlene F. Gibbons, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civ. Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, for plaintiff.
Pedro Varela, Harry Anduze Montaño, Hato Rey, PR, for defendants.
This action was instituted by the United States of America seeking damages and forfeiture penalties against Edgar M. Stella Pérez and Guillermo Alemañy Rivera under the provisions of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 ("FCA").
Plaintiff moved for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (docket Nos. 16, 17, 40, 49, and 61). The defendants opposed and requested the dismissal of the complaint, alleging, inter alios, that the government's action is time-barred under the provisions of the FCA (docket Nos. 35, 38, and 73). These motions were referred to the U.S. Magistrate Judge who issued his Report and Recommendation (docket No. 80). Both defendants opposed and plaintiff responded to defendants' objections (see docket Nos. 82, 84, 87, 88, 94, and 95).
The defendants contend that the government's claim is time-barred under the 6-year statute of limitations contained in the FCA, which reads, in its pertinent part, as follows:
31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1). We disagree with defendants' position.
On July 7, 1982 both defendants were charged in a nine-count indictment with violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 152, 371, and 1001. While affirming defendants' convictions, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit summarized the facts of this case in accordance with the criminal charges as follows:
United States v. Alemañy Rivera, 781 F.2d 229, 231 (1st Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1086, 106 S.Ct. 1469, 89 L.Ed.2d 725 (1986) (footnote added). Thereafter, on October 25, 1985, the government filed the instant complaint.
As stated earlier, suits instituted pursuant to the provisions of the FCA must be brought within 6 years from the date "the violation of section 3729 is committed...." 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1). Defendants contend that, for the purposes of the FCA, the violation was committed at the time the mortgage loan was defaulted, i.e., May 1, 1979, and hence, more than 6 years had elapsed by the time the complaint was filed in this case. In support of their argument, defendants cite Jankowitz v. United States, 533 F.2d 538 (Ct.Cl.1976); and United States v. Goldberg, 256 F.Supp. 540 (D.Mass.1966).
We find, however, the argument unconvincing in light of other cases on point, in addition to the fact that the cases cited by defendants can be easily distinguished.
In Jankowitz the court left for another day the determination of whether or not a cause of action accrues upon default or filing of request for benefits. Goldberg, on the other hand, essentially states that accrual does not occur at the time the application to qualify for benefits is submitted but rather when default takes place. It did not, however, explore any further into the difference between time of default and when demand for payment is made. This finding was also rejected in United States v. Stillwater Community Bank, 645 F.Supp. 18 (W.D.Okl. 1986).
The FCA applies to instances where monies, subsidies or other benefits are sought from the United States by means of false representations. It covers not only persons or entities which directly cause the government to pay fraudulent claims, but also those who assisted or participated in the fraudulent scheme. United States v. Veneziale, 268 F.2d 504 (3rd Cir.1959). See also United States v. Consolidated Industries, Inc., 720 F.Supp. 919, 921 (N.D.Ala.1989) () (citation omitted).
The mere submission of fraudulent documents to obtain a subsidy or a guarantee by a federal agency does not entail any economic injury to the government. It is not until a demand for payment is made that the economic injury materializes. United States v. Ekelman & Associates, Inc., 532 F.2d 545, 552 (6th Cir.1976) () (citations omitted). See also United States v. First Nat. Bank of Boston, 707 F.Supp. 1351, 1352 n. 2 (D.Mass. 1988) () (citations omitted); and United States v. Ettrick Wood Products, Inc., 683 F.Supp. 1262, 1263 (W.D.Wis.1988) () (citations omitted). In situations such as the one before us, where exposure of federal funds is channeled through a middle institution by way of a guarantee, the mere default by the debtor does not automatically trigger the obligation to pay on behalf of the United States. It is not until the lending institution or mortgage holder makes a claim for execution of the guarantee that federal funds are in fact at stake. Thus, it is at that time that the statute of limitations begins to run. United States v. Stillwater Community Bank, 645 F.Supp. at 19. Prior to that date, no claim for payment capable of affecting public funds has been made. See United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 309 n. 4, 96 S.Ct. 523, 528, 46 L.Ed.2d 514 (1976) () (citations and quotation marks omitted).
As plaintiff correctly points out in its motions, the government's obligation to pay did not arise until Merrill Lynch, Hubbard, Inc., the Hospital's mortgagee, assigned to HUD its claims under the mortgage on October 26, 1979. Thus, it was then that the 6 years under the statute of limitations started to run. Accordingly, the suit filed on October 25, 1985 was timely.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court will look beyond the pleadings to determine whether or not a factual dispute exists which requires that trial be held. If there are no genuine issues of material fact and movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the petition will be granted. Bird v. Centennial Ins. Co., No. 93-1363, 11 F.3d 228, 231 (1st Cir.1993).
"It is well established that a prior criminal conviction may work an estoppel in favor of the government in a subsequent civil proceeding." Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 568, 71 S.Ct. 408, 414, 95 L.Ed. 534 (1951) (citations omitted). "Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation." Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979) (citation and footnote omitted). ...
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