US v. Stevens, 93 Cr. 881 (LAP).
| Citation | 842 F. Supp. 96 |
| Decision Date | 11 January 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93 Cr. 881 (LAP).,93 Cr. 881 (LAP). |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Thomas Robert STEVENS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
The defendant in this case, Thomas Robert Stevens, is under indictment for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958. Before the Court is his motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of federal jurisdiction. Specifically, he contends that the facts alleged by the government do not establish any use by the defendant of a facility in interstate commerce, as required by the statute.
Section 1958, in pertinent part, prohibits the use of "any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with intent that a murder be committed in violation of the laws of any State or the United States ... as consideration for a promise or agreement to pay anything of pecuniary value." The requirement that the defendant use a facility in interstate commerce is jurisdictional. See United States v. Razo-Leora, 961 F.2d 1140, 1148 (5th Cir.1992). Thus, where no such use is present, an indictment under the statute must be dismissed.
In the present case, the government alleges that the interstate use requirement is satisfied by the defendant's placing of several telephone calls to a paging device ("beeper") leased from Metromedia, Inc.1 by one Oliver Kellman. Mr. Kellman is alleged to have been the intermediary between the defendant and a person believed by the defendant to be a "hit man."
Both the defendant and Mr. Kellman were in New York at the time the calls transpired. However, Metromedia's paging system operates such that calls to the Manhattan exchange assigned to Mr. Kellman's beeper were routed to a transmitting station in New Jersey, which sent radio waves out across New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut so that Mr. Kellman might be reached anywhere in the Tri-State area.2 In light of these facts, the government contends, calls to Mr. Kellman's beeper constituted use of a facility in interstate commerce so as to trigger federal jurisdiction. The fact that Mr. Kellman happened to receive the beeper signal in the same state from which it originated is of no significance.
The defendant's response is that the presence of the caller and the recipient in the same state makes all the difference in the world. Under Section 1958, he asserts, federal jurisdiction does not arise merely because one employs a facility that is capable of interstate use; rather, the facility must actually be used in an interstate manner. When the facility used is a telephone, the defendant continues, this means that the parties to the call must be physically located in different states. It is not enough that the electronic transmission of the call crosses state lines.
In support of its position that the location of the parties, and not signal path, determines the interstate or intrastate character of a telephone call, the defendant's counsel lays out a cogent and well-reasoned argument. Telephone calls, he explains, are no longer carried from point to point over telephone lines strung directly between them. Today, calls are transmitted Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 255, 109 S.Ct. 582, 585, 102 L.Ed.2d 607 (1989). In such a situation, counsel maintains, signal path is an improper way to determine the existence of federal jurisdiction. For one thing, it is unworkable. As the Supreme Court has recognized, "the number of possible paths, the nature of the electronic signals, and the system of computerized switching make it virtually impossible to trace and record the actual paths taken by the electronic signals which create an individual telephone call." Id.
Additionally, counsel argues, using signal...
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