US v. Thomas

• Decision Date: 12 March 1992
• Docket Number: No. 6:91 CR 52.,6:91 CR 52.
• Citation: 787 F. Supp. 663
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Merrick Bill THOMAS, Jr., Milton Rodriguez Valencia, and Victoriano A. Minotta.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

787 F. Supp. 663

UNITED STATES of America v. Merrick Bill THOMAS, Jr., Milton Rodriguez Valencia, and Victoriano A. Minotta.

No. 6:91 CR 52.

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Tyler Division.

February 24, 1992.

As Amended March 12, 1992.

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Stuart Platt, Asst. U.S. Atty., Tyler, Tex., for plaintiff.

David Cunningham, Houston, Tex., F.R. "Buck" Files, Jr., Tyler, Tex., for defendants.

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION

JUSTICE, District Judge.

Early on the morning of August 4, 1991, a Sunday, defendants Merrick Bill Thomas, Jr., Milton Rodriguez Valencia, and Victoriano A. Minotta were stopped on a highway near Carthage, Texas, by an officer of the Texas Department of Public Safety for alleged safety-belt law violations. At the present time, they are awaiting trial on federal felony cocaine trafficking charges that could result in their incarceration for life. Defendants challenge the law enforcement actions by which the evidence against them was obtained as being violative of the Fourth Amendment and Texas law. They have moved for the suppression of all incriminating evidence. A nine-hour hearing was held on December 30-31, 1991, and a total of nine briefs were filed relating to the factual and legal issues surrounding the events of August 4, 1991. While the process through which the cocaine secreted in defendants' automobiles was discovered cannot be described as flawless, all evidence seized from the defendants is admissible against them at their trial, with one exception.

I. The Stop of the Vehicles

A. Factual Background

Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper Barry Washington routinely patrols the highways in Panola County, Texas, particularly U.S. 59 and the loop bypass of the city of Carthage. On Sunday morning, August 4, 1991, Thomas Knight, a civilian, rode along with the officer. At about 8:30 a.m., Washington turned his patrol car onto U.S. 59 south, and pointed out to his passenger that a vehicle proceeding northbound, and about to turn on to southeast loop 59, was being driven by a man, later identified as defendant Thomas, who appeared not to wear his safety belt, as required by Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6701d, § 107C (West 1992). Defendant Thomas, an African-American, was driving a late model, brown automobile.

Because of construction work on the highway, the trooper was required to drive south on U.S. 59 for a considerable distance before he could turn his vehicle around to pursue the apparent safety-belt law violator. Washington thereupon exited U.S. 59 north onto the loop, and activated his emergency lights. Washington's and Knight's accounts of what they observed next differ in noteworthy respects. According to Knight, they perceived two almost identical brown vehicles travelling side by side, with Thomas' vehicle in the right hand lane. Knight remembers that the second vehicle, occupied by defendants Valencia (the driver) and Minotta (a passenger), then veered to the right, clearing the passing lane. Knight testified that Valencia then slowed his vehicle to allow the officer to get in between the two cars. Knight recalls that Washington motioned the second vehicle to turn off the highway onto the shoulder, as he passed it.

For his part, Washington recollects that he first saw the vehicles one behind the other in the passing lane, proceeding at a slow rate of speed, with Thomas' vehicle in the lead. As he approached in the left lane, Washington claims that the second vehicle refused to yield, blocking his path. The officer states that after Thomas' auto moved into the right-hand lane, he passed the second car on the right, where he could observe that the passenger, Minotta, was not wearing his seat belt.¹ Washington recalls that his seeing a brown 1987 Mercury Cougar with Tennessee plates followed by a 1988 brown Mercury Cougar LSI with a Tennessee paper tag aroused suspicions of illicit activity.

Having pulled in behind Thomas' car, Washington instructed Knight to watch the second vehicle in the patrol car's rear-view mirror. Washington and Knight concur that, immediately thereafter, they each saw Minotta throw a small package out his window, near a guard rail. Washington remembers motioning the second vehicle to stop at that time. The three vehicles came to a stop onto the side of the road, and the trooper positioned his patrol car between the two brown Cougars on the roadway shoulder.

B. The Validity of the Vehicle Stops

1. The Articulated Grounds

The intentional stopping of an automobile by a police officer is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 1381, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 661, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 1400, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). As drivers of their respective vehicles, defendants Thomas and Valencia have standing to contest the legality of the stopping of their vehicles. United States v. Kye Soo Lee, 898 F.2d 1034, 1037-38 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Martinez, 808 F.2d 1050, 1056 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1032, 107 S.Ct. 1962, 95 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987). Although he was merely a passenger, Minotta has standing to challenge the stop of the car in which he was riding. United States v. Erwin, 875 F.2d 268, 269 n. 2 (10th Cir.1989); United Sate v. Portwood, 857 F.2d 1221, 1222 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1069, 109 S.Ct. 2073, 104 L.Ed.2d 638 (1989); United States v. Williams, 589 F.2d 210, 214 (5th Cir.1979), modified on other grounds, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980).

A stop based upon the violation of a traffic law for which custodial arrest is not permitted is analogous to the stops authorized by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Berkermer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436-440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3148-50, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). Such a stop need be supported only by an officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that the suspect is engaged in illegal activity. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2580, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). A traffic stop supported by probable cause may exceed the bounds of a Terry stop. McCarty, 468 U.S. 439 n. 29, 104 S.Ct. 3150 n. 29. Washington indisputably possessed probable cause to stop Thomas' vehicle for a safety belt violation. Even though Thomas testified he was wearing his safety-belt, he admitted the shoulder strap was behind him, so that it may have appeared to the officer that his safety belt was unfastened. The mere appearance of such a traffic violation was sufficient to justify the stop of Thomas' auto.

However, the factual situation surrounding the seizure of second vehicle is disputed. Washington testified he stopped the second car only after Minotta threw the package out of the window, at a time after the trooper had noticed the seat belt violation. Either Minotta's throwing the package or a seat-belt infraction unquestionably would have furnished reasonable suspicion to stop the car and investigate. However, Knight, the trooper's civilian passenger, recalls that Washington motioned for the second automobile to stop as they passed it, and before the drugs were thrown. Knight testified that he did not observe any traffic violations respecting the second car or its occupants.

There is no need to choose between the contrasting factual scenarios proposed by Washington's and Knight's testimony. Last term, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a seizure for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment does not occur until a person yields to a show of authority by a law enforcement officer. California v. Hodari D., ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991). In that case, the state admitted that the officer had no grounds to chase the suspect for the purpose of stopping him. However, during the chase, Hodari D. threw away a package of drugs, which did, of course, provide reasonable suspicion for a stop. The Court ruled that because no seizure had occurred until Hodari D. yielded, i.e., was tackled by the officer, the drugs were not the fruit of any illegal seizure. 111 S.Ct. at 1552.

Applying the Hodari principle to the traffic stop, even if officer Washington had directed the second vehicle to stop without reasonable, articulable suspicion, a Fourth Amendment seizure would not have occurred until the vehicle pulled off the road. Hodari D., 111 S.Ct. at 1561 (Stevens, J., dissenting). By the time the seizure of the vehicle occurred, the package had been thrown by passenger Minotta, and, therefore, the stop of the second car was legitimately supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion.

2. Were the Stops Pretextual?

Defendants argue that the stops of their vehicles were pretextual and, thereby, illegal, regardless of whether they wore their safety belts. Defendants are under the impression that because the applicable federal jurisprudence focuses on objective reasonableness, it offers no basis upon which to suppress a pretextual stop. Instead they urge that their seizures should be evaluated under Texas law, which, they insist, considers the subjective motivation of the officers making the stop. However, the status of pretext stops under both federal and Texas law is significantly more complicated than acknowledged by defendants. Moreover, the questions of whether and in what way Texas law can be utilized by a federal court ruling on a motion to suppress evidence are not susceptible to easy answer.

a. Federal Law

It is beyond dispute that under federal law, questions arising under the Fourth Amendment are to be answered with respect to objective reasonableness without regard to the officer's subjective motivation. See, e.g., Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2782-83, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978). "The fact that...