US v. Wedzeb Enterprises, Inc.
Citation | 809 F. Supp. 646 |
Decision Date | 09 December 1992 |
Docket Number | No. IP 90-1877C.,IP 90-1877C. |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. WEDZEB ENTERPRISES, INC.; William E. Daniels; Westinghouse Electric Corporation; General Electric Company; Doerr Electric Corporation; Sprague Electric Company; Crouse-Hinds Company; and Federal Signal Corporation, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Harold Bickham, Asst. U.S. Atty., Indianapolis, IN, Richard Stewart, Thomas P. Carroll, Environmental Enforcement Section, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, Dorothy Attermeyer, Asst. Regional Counsel, U.S. E.P.A., Region V, Chicago, IL, for plaintiff.
Jan Feldman, Joseph A. Strubbe, Pope & John, Ltd., Chicago, IL, Joseph B. Carney, John R. Schaibley III, Baker & Daniels, Michael R. Fruehwald, Sherry W. McGrath, Barnes & Thornburg, Warren D. Krebs, Parr, Richey, Obremskey & Morton, Indianapolis, IN, Kent M. Frandsen, Lebanon, IN, for defendants.
ENTRY
This matter arises under "CERCLA" (the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (hereinafter "CERCLA" or the "Act"), otherwise known as "Superfund" to those not conversant in the jargon of the nation's environmental laws, which is a scheme to clean up waste sites that imminently threaten the public's health and wellbeing. The incident which brings these parties before the Court is the release of PCBs into the environment more than a decade ago at a warehouse in Lebanon, Indiana.
This Entry disposes of five (5) pretrial motions. First, the United States seeks summary judgment as concerns the CERCLA liability of William E. Daniels and Wedzeb Enterprises, Inc. Second, General Electric Company, Doerr Electric Corporation, Sprague Electric Company, Crouse-Hinds Division of Cooper Industries, and Federal Signal Corporation (collectively the "Manufacturer Defendants"), move for summary judgment on the issue of their CERCLA liability. Third, these same defendants move the Court to strike Exhibits 6 and 7 of the declaration of Thomas P. Carroll, plaintiff's counsel. Fourth, the United States asks the Court to strike various defenses of Westinghouse, Inc., and finally, Westinghouse moves for summary judgment on the question of its CERCLA liability. For the reasons set forth below, the Government's motion for summary judgment is denied, the Manufacturer Defendants' motions are denied, the Government's motion to strike defenses of Westinghouse is granted in part, and the motion of Westinghouse for summary judgment is denied.
William E. Daniels ("Daniels") is the President of Wedzeb Enterprises, Inc. ("Wedzeb") (collectively the "Defendants"), a concern which he formed in 1974. Daniels has remained Wedzeb's President from the time of its incorporation until present, as well as its sole shareholder since 1975. Wedzeb distributes air conditioning, heating and refrigerating component parts. Beginning in the early 1980s, it amassed large quantities of electrical gear from the General Electric Company, Doerr Electric Corporation, Sprague Electric Company, Crouse-Hinds Division of Cooper Industries, Federal Signal Corporation, and Westinghouse. Much of the inventory that Wedzeb collected from these parties contained hazardous substances, including polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs"), dioxin, and chlorinated furans.
In February 1981, Daniels entered into a contract to purchase a warehouse on 312 Ballard Street in Lebanon, Indiana ("the site"). Starting on or about April 1, 1981, Daniels leased the warehouse to Wedzeb, which began to move electrical components into the warehouse, including tens of thousands of PCB-laden capacitors. In all, seventy-seven tons of material was stored at the Ballard Street property. Apparently, Daniels did not directly supervise storage activities at the site, as this was the responsibility of Wedzeb employees. See Daniels Deposition, April 29, 1992, at 58; James Cleary Deposition, January 30, 1992, at 33.
On May 2, 1981, a fire completely destroyed the warehouse, resulting in the release of hazardous substances into the environment. In January, 1984, EPA notified Wedzeb and Daniels of their liability for response costs under CERCLA, and requested that they pay the costs that the United States had incurred for its clean-up activities. In October, 1985, EPA issued an Administrative Order requiring Wedzeb to complete clean-up at the Site, though Wedzeb informed EPA three months later that it could not comply with the Administrative Order. See On-Scene Coordinator's Report, CERCLA Removal Project, at 5. In 1987, EPA conducted a removal action and incurred costs at the site to abate the immediate threat from contamination.
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 56(c). In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the judge's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or determine the truth of the matter, but it is instead to decide whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The burden rests squarely on the party moving for summary judgment to show "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If doubts remain as to the existence of a material fact, then those doubts should be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party and summary judgment denied. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. at 2511-12; Wolf v. City of Fitchburg, 870 F.2d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir.1989).
While the initial burden rests squarely on the party moving for summary judgment, the nonmoving party responding to a properly made and supported summary judgment motion still must set forth facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact and that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in its favor. See Wolf, 870 F.2d at 1329; Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d 102, 105 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 960, 104 S.Ct. 392, 78 L.Ed.2d 336 (1983). Denials contained in the pleadings or bald allegations that an issue of fact exists are insufficient to raise a factual issue. See Shacket v. Philko Aviation, Inc., 681 F.2d 506, 513 n. 8 (7th Cir.1982), rev'd on other grounds, 462 U.S. 406, 103 S.Ct. 2476, 76 L.Ed.2d 678 (1983). "The moving party is `entitled to a judgment as a matter of law' if the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.
The United States asks the Court to enter summary judgment against Daniels and Wedzeb on the issue of their liability for the release of hazardous substances at the site. Under CERCLA, four classes of persons may be held liable for the release of hazardous substances into the environment:
Liability under § 9607(a) may be avoided, however, if the defendant is able to invoke one of the defenses provided in § 9607(b). That section provides:
42 U.S.C. §...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
GJ Leasing Co., Inc. v. Union Elec. Co., Civ. No. 91-158-JPG.
...a hazardous substance, does not constitute a "disposal" subjecting the seller to CERCLA liability. United States v. Wedzeb Enterprises Inc., 809 F.Supp. 646, 656-657 (S.D.Ind. 1992). See also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Sonford Products Corp., 810 F.Supp. 1057, 1061 (D.Minn.1993) (sale of contamin......
-
Dana Corp. v. American Standard, Inc.
...96 S.Ct. 2074, 2078-79, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976); Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1074-75 (7th Cir.1982); United States v. Wedzeb Enterprises, Inc., 809 F.Supp. 646, 649 (S.D.Ind.1992). Summary judgment is appropriate "when the opposing party is unable to make a showing sufficient to prove a......
-
U.S. v. Capital Tax Corp.
...F.Supp.2d 356, 395 (E.D.Pa. 2003); K.C.1986 Ltd. P'ship v. Reade Mfg., 33 F.Supp.2d 820, 834 (W.D.Mo.1998). United States v. Wedzeb Enters., Inc., 809 F.Supp. 646, 652 (S.D.Ind.1992); Snediker Devs. Ltd. P'ship v. Evans, 773 F.Supp. 984, 987-88 (E.D.Mich.1991). Thus, it is difficult to dism......
-
K.C. 1986 Ltd. Partnership v. Reade Mfg.
...the doctrine of equitable title, it has been applied to find "ownership" under CERCLA. See, e.g., United States v. Wedzeb Enters., Inc., 809 F.Supp. 646, 652 (S.D.Ind.1992). Hardee's and K.C.1986 entered into the Ground Lease, which provides that the lease agreement is "[s]ubject to the sat......
-
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act: the correct paradigm of strict liability and the problem of individual causation.
...cause), motion for reconsideration granted on other grounds, 891 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Wis. 1995); United States v. Wedzeb Enter., Inc., 809 F. Supp. 646, 653 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (noting that defense not available where multiple causes of release possible and defendant does not prove sole cause)......