USA. v. Walton

• Decision Date: 06 April 1999
• Docket Number: No. 97-4498,CR-96-41,No. 97-4537,97-4498,97-4537
• Citation: 207 F.3d 694
• Parties: (4th Cir. 2000) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERIC ARTHUR WALTON, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELDRIDGE MAYFIELD, a/k/a Sippy, Defendant-Appellant. (). . Argued:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 694

207 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2000)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERIC ARTHUR WALTON, Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELDRIDGE MAYFIELD, a/k/a Sippy, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 97-4498 No. 97-4537 (CR-96-41).

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.

Argued: April 6, 1999.

Decided: March 27, 2000.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Wheeling.

Frederick P. Stamp, Jr., Chief District Judge.

COUNSEL ARGUED: Jay Thornton McCamic, MCCAMIC & MCCAMIC, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellant Walton; Gerald Grant Ashdown, WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Morgantown, West Virginia, for Appellant Mayfield. Paul Thomas Camilletti, Assistant United States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Bren Pomponio, Student Attorney, WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Morgantown, West Virginia, for Appellant Mayfield. William D. Wilmoth, United States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, WIDENER, MURNAGHAN, ERVIN,^* WILKINS, NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, MOTZ, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by published per curiam opinion. Chief Judge WILKENSON and Judge WILLIAMS wrote concurring opinions. Judge WIDENER wrotea dissenting opinion. Judge KING wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Judge MURNAGHAN, Judge WILKINS, and Judge TRAXEL joined. Senior Judge HAMILTON wrote a dissenting opinion.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

This case came to be argued before the en banc court on April 6, 1999. The judgment of the district court is hereby affirmed by an equally divided en banc court. Separate opinions follow seriatim.

AFFIRMED

PREFATORY NOTE:

On April 6, 1999, the en banc court heard argument in this case. While the case was under submission, Judge Ervin died, leaving the judgment of the district court affirmed by an equally divided en banc court. Chief Judge Wilkinson, Judge Niemeyer, Judge Luttig, Judge Williams, and Judge Michael continue to concur in what Judge Ervin wrote. Judge Motz concurs in the judgment.

ERVIN, Circuit Judge:

The question before this Court is whether a district court must comply with a jury's request for a definition of reasonable doubt in a criminal trial. Our current practice is well-established. We have never required a district court to define reasonable doubt to a jury. See United States v. Reives, 15 F.3d 42, 46 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207 (1994).

During its deliberations, the jury in the present case asked the district court for a definition of reasonable doubt. In accordance with our longstanding practice, the district court refused. On appeal, a panel of this Court affirmed.¹

We granted a rehearing en banc in this case to reconsider this issue. Finding no reason to change our current practice, we affirm.

I.

Eric A. Walton and Eldridge Mayfield (the "Defendants") were convicted by a jury for conspiracy to influence a petit juror and for aiding and abetting in the attempt to influence a petit juror. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2 (West 1969), 371 (West 1966 & Supp. 1999), 1503(a), (b)(3) (Supp. 1999). During its deliberations, the jury asked the district court for a definition of reasonable doubt. The district court refused.

On appeal, the Defendants argued that, because the jury may have been confused over the burden of proof and, therefore, may have convicted the Defendants upon a lesser showing than required by due process, the district court should have defined reasonable doubt for the jury. In support, the Defendants argued that our opinion in United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290 (4th Cir. 1995), compelled such a result.

A panel of this Court rejected the Defendants' argument, holding that "[t]he rule regarding reasonable doubt for the jury is well settled in this Circuit--a trial judge may define reasonable doubt only if the jury requests a definition; however, the trial judge is not required to provide a definition, even if the jury requests it." Walton, 1998 WL 879650, at *4. Finding "nothing in Oriakhi overruling or creating exceptions to the rule," id. at *5, the panel affirmed the Defendants' conviction.

Subsequently, the Defendants submitted a petition for rehearing en banc to this Court. The only issue raised in this petition was whether a district court should give a jury an instruction on the definition of reasonable doubt when requested. Granting the petition, we elected to rehear this case en banc.

II.

The issue before this Court is whether a district court should be required to give an instruction defining reasonable doubt when requested by a jury. This is a question of law that we review de novo. See United States v. Singh, 54 F.3d 1182, 1189 (4th Cir. 1995).

There is no constitutional requirement to define reasonable doubt to a jury. The Supreme Court has never required trial courts to define the term. In its most recent case addressing reasonable doubt, the Court stated that

the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course. Indeed, so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof.

Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (citations omitted).² The Court has even recognized that "[a]ttempts to explain the term `reasonable doubt' do not usually result in making it any clearer to the minds of the jury." Holland v. United States , 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (citation omitted).

As the panel observed in its original opinion, the well-established rule of this Circuit is that although the district court may define reasonable doubt to a jury upon request, the district court is not required to do so. Walton, 1998 WL 879650, at *4. According to our research, the First, Seventh, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits share our unwillingness to require the district court to define reasonable doubt.³ At least fifteen state courts also appear not to require a trial court to define reasonable doubt to a jury.⁴ In addition the foreign courts of England and Australia -with which we share a common lineage, the right to trial by jury, and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal trials -also do not require trial courts to define reasonable doubt to a jury.⁵

The rationale behind this rule is "our belief that efforts to define reasonable doubt are likely to confuse rather than clarify the concept. . . ." United States v. Williams, 152 F.3d 294, 298 (4th Cir. 1998). We are convinced "that the term reasonable doubt has a self-evident meaning comprehensible to the lay juror which judicial efforts to define generally do more to obscure than to illuminate." United States v. Headspeth, 852 F.2d 753, 755 (4th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 597 (1990).⁶

This rationale is challenged when, as in the present case, a jury specifically requests a definition of reasonable doubt. We understand that when a jury specifically requests a definition of reasonable doubt during deliberations, there is a risk that the jury may be confused over what standard of proof to apply in a criminal case. At the same time, we also appreciate the constitutionally-mandated importance of the reasonable doubt standard in a criminal trial. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970) ("Expressions in many opinions of this Court indicate that it has long been assumed that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required."). Nevertheless, we remain convinced that attempting to explain the words "beyond a reasonable doubt" is more dangerous than leaving a jury to wrestle with only the words themselves.⁷

In the end, only a jury can truly define reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt cannot be divorced from its specific context any more than the concepts of "reason" or a "reasonable person." Jurors differ in their own individual conceptions of reasonable doubt. During jury deliberations, these jurors debate whether or not the prosecution in the specific case before them has proven the guilt of a particular defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Through "the community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group's determination of guilt or innocence," Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970), the jury itself defines reasonable doubt and applies its own definition to the specific case before it.

The only definition of the standard of proof in criminal cases required by the Supreme Court remains "the necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 n.14 (1979). While we discourage further definition of the reasonable doubt standard, see Williams, 152 F.3d at 298, we continue to leave the final decision of whether to acquiesce to a jury's request and define reasonable doubt to the district court's discretion. See United States v. Patterson, 150 F.3d 382, 389 (4th Cir. 1998). Given the inherent risks, however, we refuse to require such a practice.

III.

Accordingly, since we find no reason to alter our current practice of not requiring a jury instruction defining reasonable doubt in criminal cases, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

WILKINSON, Chief Judge, concurring:

One picture can be worth a thousand words. And fewer words are sometimes better than many. So it is with "reasonable doubt." The majesty of the term has always been its brevity. It is not at all a bad thing for a jury to be left to work through its meaning. With longer instructions, one cannot tell which part the ear will choose to hear or the mind to accentuate. And that can make all the difference.

The principal dissent's proposed...