USA. v. Willfong

• Decision Date: 21 December 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-10227,PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,DEFENDANT-APPELLANT,00-10227
• Citation: 274 F.3d 1297
• Parties: (9th Cir. 2001) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,, v. DUANE A. WILLFONG,
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1297

274 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 2001)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. DUANE A. WILLFONG, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

No. 00-10227

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Argued and Submitted May 16, 2001

Filed Dec. 21, 2001

Kenneth M. Bareilles, Eureka, California, and Duane Willfong, Pro per, for the defendant-appellant.

Miquel Rodriguez, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Sacramento, California, for the plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California William B. Shubb, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CR-99-240-WBS.

Before: John T. Noonan, Barry G. Silverman, Circuit Judges, and John W. Sedwick,^* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Silverman; Dissent by Judge Noonan

SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge:

Does a logger's refusal to desist logging operations on Forest Service land, after a Forest Service Law Enforcement Officer ordered him to do so at the behest of the Forest Service representative authorized to shutdown the logging operation, constitute "interfering with any forest officer engaged in or on account of the performance of his official duties in the protection, improvement, or administration of the National Forest System" under 36 C.F.R. §§ 261.3(a)? We hold that it does, and we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The evidence at trial established the following facts: Eel River Saw Mills entered into two contracts with the U.S. Forest Service for the purchase of timber in the Six Rivers National Forest. The events material to this case concern the sale of timber from the Crabtree parcel. Eel River Saw Mills hired appellant Willfong, an independent logging contractor, to perform the logging operations at the Crabtree site. The Forest Service designated Leonora Crippa as its sale administrator for the project to monitor the performance of the contract. The Forest Service delegated to Crippa the contractual authority to, among other things, issue an oral order to temporarily shutdown logging operations to prevent human or environmental injury.

Believing Willfong and his crew to be in breach of the logging contract at the site of the other sale (Tub Springs), and concerned about the skidding practices and the resulting damage to the area at Crabtree, Crippa notified Eel River Saw Mills on July 2, 1998, that skidding at the Crabtree sale was shutdown. The next day, Crippa went to Crabtree and observed that the logging operations were still going on. Crippa told Willfong that the skidding at Crabtree was supposed to have stopped and had to stop. Willfong refused to stop the skidding.

Uncomfortable with the increasingly tense situation, Crippa left the area, decided that all operations at Crabtree must be suspended, and contacted U.S. Forest Service Law Enforcement Officer John Allendorf. Crippa told Allendorf that she had issued a suspension order on a timber sale and that the order was being disobeyed. Crippa requested Allendorf's assistance in gaining compliance with the shutdown order. Allendorf knew that Crippa had the authority to issue a shutdown order.

Officer Allendorf followed Crippa to Crabtree, then went down to the sale area alone. He encountered Willfong and heard the sound of logging equipment. Allendorf told Willfong that an oral shutdown had been issued and that he would have to suspend operations until the matter of the suspension was resolved. Allendorf continued to try to secure Willfong's voluntary cooperation in ceasing operations, but Willfong stated that he would not shut down. Allendorf warned Willfong that he could be arrested, but Willfong still refused to shut down his operation. Allendorf offered to cite-and-release him if would cooperate in shutting down. Willfong refused. Allendorf then placed Willfong under arrest. After being arrested, Willfong encouraged his crew to keep on with their logging operation, saying words to the effect of"I don't want you guys to shut down. Just keep working."

Willfong was charged with two violations: Threatening, resisting, intimidating, or interfering with a forest officer, in violation of 36 C.F.R. §§ 261.3(a); and unauthorized timber cutting, in violation of 36 C.F.R. §§ 261.6(a). At trial before U.S. Magistrate Judge Craig M. Kellison, Willfong was acquitted of unauthorized timber cutting, but found guilty of interfering with a Forest Service officer. He was placed on probation and fined $250.00. Willfong appealed his conviction to U.S. District Judge William B. Shubb, who affirmed Judge Kellison's decision.

II. JURISDICTION

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§§§ 1291 and 1294. We review a trial court's interpretation of a regulation de novo. United States v. Hoff, 22 F.3d 222, 223 (9th Cir. 1994). Because Willfong appeals his conviction, this court views the record in the light most favorable to the Government to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Arbo, 691 F.2d 862, 866 (9th Cir. 1982).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Allendorf's Order Took Place in the Performance of His Official Duties

36 C.F.R. §§ 261.3(a) provides:

Threatening, resisting, intimidating, or interfering with any forest officer engaged in or on account of the performance of his official duties in the protection, improvement, or administration of the National Forest System is prohibited.

Willfong contends that he did not violate section 261.3(a) because, he says, the forest officer's order was unlawful. We disagree.

On appeal, after a finder of fact has convicted the defendant, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. E.g., United States v. Crawford, 239 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 2001). The evidence supports a finding that Allendorf was performing his duties in the administration of the National Forest at the time Willfong allegedly interfered with him. For purposes of 36 C.F.R. §§ 261.3(a), a forest officer is performing an "official duty" when the officer is on duty and performing an act that contributes to the protection, improvement, or administration of the National Forest. United States v. Ryberg, 43 F.3d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1995); 36 C.F.R. §§ 261.3(a). Clearly, Allendorf was on duty, performing his duties, and acting in his official capacity at all material times. He was not off on a "frolic of his own. " Ryberg, 43 F.3d at 1334. Allendorf carried out the directions of an official seeking to enforce the provisions of the Forest Service's logging contract. Since the Forest Service designated Crippa as the administrator of the contract, and Crippa sought Allendorf's help in enforcing the shutdown order, Willfong "cannot successfully argue that this kind of administrative deployment of Forest Service officers was not germane to the protective mission of the Forest Service." Id.

Willfong also argues that he could not have interfered with Allendorf because, he contends, Allendorf was attempting to enforce an invalid shutdown order. This argument fails for two reasons. In the first place, the evidence presented at trial indisputably established that Crippa had the authority to suspend the logging operations under the terms of the contract and the authority delegated to her by the Forest Service. Secondly, even if Crippa lacked such authority, Willfong nevertheless had no right to interfere with Allendorf. So long as Allendorf was performing his official duties in the administration of the Forest System, 36 C.F.R. §§ 261.3(a) prohibits anyone from interfering with those duties. By way of analogy, a person does not have the right to resist arrest even if the charges are false or the arrest unlawful. United States v. Cunningham, 509 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1975). It is undisputed that Allendorf relied in good faith on the validity of Crippa's shutdown order when he sought to enforce it. It was Crippa's job, not Allendorf's, to determine whether a temporary shut down order should be issued under the provisions of the administration contract. If Willfong disagreed with Crippa's order, he had the right to try to get it rectified. He did not have the right to interfere with the officer's enforcement of it.

B. Willfong's Refusal to Shut Down Crabtree Constitutes "Interference" under 36 C.F.R.§§ 261.3(a)

Willfong contends that the failure to obey a forest officer's order does not constitute "interference" with the officer as a matter of law. We disagree.

Courts have not expressly addressed what constitutes "interference" under 36 C.F.R. §§ 261.3(a). Without prior interpretation, this court should apply the common meaning of a word. See Hoff, 22 F.3d at 223. To"interfere" is to "oppose, intervene, hinder, or prevent." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 704 (3d College ed. 1998)." `[I]nterfere' has such a clear, specific and well-known meaning as not to require more than" the use of the word itself in a criminal statute. United States v. Gwyther, 431 F.2d 1142, 1144 n.2 (9th Cir. 1970). The plain meaning of "interfere" also comports with the purpose of the regulation, which is to regulate"the use of the National Forests and to preserve them from destruction." Ryberg, 43 F.3d at 1334; see also 16 U.S.C. §§ 551.

The lower courts' determination that Willfong's actions constituted interference is consistent with the plain meaning of the word. In failing to shut down the logging operation when ordered to do so by Allendorf, Willfong clearly hindered Allendorf's ability to perform his official duty. At the time of Allendorf's shut down order, Willfong and his crew actively were logging trees. Allendorf's ability to execute the shut down order depended upon Willfong and his crew taking affirmative steps to cease operations. Willfong interfered with Allendorf in refusing to stop what he and his crew were doing. Willfong did not merely do nothing. He refused to stop doing something -in this case, to stop his logging in the face of an officer's official attempt to stop it.

This situation is...