USA. v. Young

Decision Date08 December 2000
Docket NumberNo. 00-4092,00-4092
Citation248 F.3d 260
Parties(4th Cir. 2001) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NATHAN DANTE YOUNG, Defendant-Appellant. Argued:
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, District Judge.

(CR-99-201)

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] COUNSEL ARGUED: Joseph John McCarthy, DELANEY, MCCARTHY, COLTON & BOTZIN, P.C., Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Justin W. Williams, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Alessandra DeBlasio, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Luttig wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Michael joined. Judge Widener wrote a concurring opinion.

OPINION

LUTTIG, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Nathan Young was convicted of interstate kidnapping, interstate stalking, and two counts of causing the death of a person through the use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm Young's convictions.

I.

On September 13, 1997, the decomposed body of 19-year-old Diana Medina ("Diana") was recovered near an eastbound exit ramp to Interstate 66 in Fauquier County, Virginia. J.A. 633-36. When her body was discovered, she was clothed only in a t-shirt and bra. J.A. 685. The uncontradicted evidence at trial established that on the evening of September 9, 1997, four days prior to the recovery of her body, Diana was shot ten times with a Bersa .380 caliber automatic pistol, dragged by the legs more than 37 feet, and placed behind a tree near a wire fence. J.A. 633, 677, 770.

On the day of the murder, appellant Nathan Young drove Diana from her home in Clinton, Maryland, to her sister's residence in Washington, D.C. J.A. 564-67. When they arrived, Vanida Medina ("Vanida"), Diana's sister, walked up to the passenger-side window of Young's automobile and noticed that there was a gun on the dashboard. J.A. 568. After Vanida inquired about the gun, Young grabbed it off the dashboard and stashed it either in the passenger compartment or on his person. J.A. 570. Diana and Young then accompanied Vanida into her residence to watch a movie. J.A. 570-72. After watching the movie for several minutes, the three decided to go to McDonald's for lunch. As they got into Young's car, Vanida, who sat in the backseat of the car, accidentally knocked over a brown paper bag filled with approximately five boxes of bullets. J.A. 574-76. Young told Vanida that he used the bullets for practice at the shooting range. J.A. 577.

After returning to Vanida's house, the three resumed watching the movie. According to Vanida, Young kept "grabbing [Diana] by her waist and pulling her towards him." J.A. 579. During the course of the afternoon, Diana told Vanida on several occasions that she could not be late to work again. J.A. 580-81. Because Diana had forgotten her work uniform, Young agreed to drop her off at her home in Maryland prior to her shift. J.A. 582. Diana and Young left "a bit after four." J.A. 585. The last time anyone heard from Diana was when she telephoned the shift manager at Ledo Pizza in Clinton, Maryland shortly before 5:00 p.m. to let him know that she would be late for work. J.A. 611.

The following morning, Young's rental car was found completely engulfed in flames three-quarters of a mile from his grandmother's residence in Prince George's County, Maryland. J.A. 710-11, 724-25. Earlier that morning, Young had filed a report with local police stating that the car had been stolen, a story he later retracted at trial. J.A. 724-25.

Several days following the murder, Virginia State Investigators Carroll S. Miller and Robin Ebersole interviewed Young. J.A. 830. Young changed his story during the course of the interview. Initially, he told agents that after he left Vanida's house, he dropped Diana off near Ledo Pizza sometime between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. J.A. 834. The agents then specifically inquired as to whether or not the two had engaged in sexual relations. J.A. 836. In response to that question, Young altered his story and explained that rather than immediately dropping Diana off, they had first stopped at his house and unsuccessfully attempted sexual intercourse; according to Young, he was unable to sustain an erection. J.A. 836. Later that same day, Agent Miller arrested Young for the murder of Diana Medina. J.A. 847-48.

The Commonwealth of Virginia subsequently elected to take a nolle prosse on the charges against Young. A little more than a year later, a federal grand jury returned a superseding four-count indictment against him. J.A. 108-13. The indictment charged Young with kidnapping resulting in death, interstate stalking resulting in death, and two counts of causing the death of a person through the use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. J.A. 108-13.

At trial, the government called Ashon Henderson, Young's longtime friend, as a prosecution witness. During cross-examination, defense counsel asked a series of inflammatory questions suggesting that Henderson was the one who had abducted and murdered Diana. Of particular significance, counsel asked whether Henderson recalled any telephone conversations with Young in the month and a half prior to trial. Henderson responded that he could not recall any such conversations. J.A. 963. Henderson also denied shooting a round through his mattress with the murder weapon on the Sunday following the murder. J.A. 961.

At that point, defense counsel attempted to introduce an audiotape of the conversations between Henderson and Young in order to impeach Henderson. J.A. 968. Defense counsel had not previously provided a transcript or copy of the tape to the government and the government objected, arguing that counsel's conduct violated the court's discovery order.1 J.A. 974. The district court ruled that introduction of the tape during cross-examination did not violate the discovery order because it was being offered as an impeachment exhibit, not as part of Young's case-in-chief. J.A. 970, 973, 975.

The next morning, however, the district court admonished defense counsel for representing that there was an admission of guilt by Henderson on the tape when "there was no such thing." J.A. 989. While the court allowed defense counsel to play the tape outside the presence of the jury to refresh Henderson's recollection, it did not allow him to play the tape before the jury and limited counsel's impeachment of Henderson to the mattress incident; other statements made by Henderson during cross-examination were not directly contradicted by anything on the tape. J.A. 991.

During defense counsel's continued cross-examination of Henderson, he admitted that he recalled the conversations with Young prior to trial and stated that he remembered discussing the mattress incident, though he believed that the incident occurred months prior to the murder. J.A. 1061-62. At the conclusion of Henderson's crossexamination, the government rested.

In a continued effort to have the audiotape played, Young elected to call Henderson as a witness in his case-in-chief. The district court ruled that the tape was inadmissible because it both violated the court's discovery order and did not meet the requirements of Rule 403. J.A. 1299-1301. The district court did allow Young to question Henderson about any matter he wished regarding the tape and even read from the transcript if Henderson's testimony was inconsistent. J.A. 1300.

Nathan Young also took the stand in his own defense. Young testified that on the Sunday following the murder, Henderson confessed to the crime and described the murder to him in graphic detail. J.A. 1218. Henderson told him that he and Diana had had sex, and "[a]fterwards, she wouldn't stop crying." J.A. 1220. Henderson then panicked, grabbed Diana out of the car, and stuffed her in the trunk. J.A. 1220-21. After driving for several hours, Henderson stopped at a dark exit on the side of the road, opened the car's trunk, grabbed Young's gun, and turned on the night sight. J.A. 1221. Henderson told Young that he didn't want to go to jail for the rest of his life for rape, so he shot Diana and "he kept shooting until he thought the clip was empty." J.A. 1221. Henderson then grabbed Diana by the leg and pulled her over to the grass and bushes. J.A. 1222. Henderson disposed of Diana's clothing in some dumpsters in Washington and then burnt the rental car because "when he was obviously raping her . . . he ejaculated on the seat, and he had to get rid of it." J.A. 1223.

At the close of the defense case, the district court denied Young's motion for judgment of acquittal. J.A. 1337. The jury rendered a guilty verdict on all counts of the indictment, J.A. 1493-94, and the district court sentenced Young to life imprisonment on each count. J.A. 1660. Young then filed a timely notice of appeal challenging his convictions. J.A. 1663.

II.

Young argues on appeal that the district court erred in excluding the audiotape of the conversations between him and Henderson. First, Young contends that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the tape under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Alternatively, Young asserts that even if the tape was inadmissible on evidentiary grounds, due process required that it be played before the jury.

A.

We review the district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Hassouneh, 199 F.3d 175, 182 (4th Cir. 2000). Young attempted to introduce the tape of the conversations...

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