Jennings v. Crosby

Decision Date29 September 2005
Docket NumberNo. 5:02CV174-RH.,5:02CV174-RH.
Citation392 F.Supp.2d 1312
PartiesBryan F. JENNINGS, Petitioner, v. James V. CROSBY, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

Martin James McClain, McClain & McDermott PA, Wilton Manors, FL, for Petitioner.

Curtis M. French, Attorney General State of Florida, Tallahassee, FL, Douglas

Thomas Squire, Attorney General, Daytona Beach, FL, for Respondent.

ORDER DENYING PETITION

HINKLE, Chief Judge.

By petition for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner Bryan F. Jennings challenges his state court conviction and sentence of death. I deny the petition.

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Facts. The relevant facts are set out in the trial court's sentencing order, as quoted by the Florida Supreme Court opinion addressing Mr. Jennings' first round of postconviction claims:

In the early morning hours of May 11, 1979, Rebecca Kunash was asleep in her bed. A nightlight had been left on in her room and her parents were asleep in another part of the house. The Defendant went to her window and saw Rebecca asleep. He forcibly removed the screen, opened the window, and climbed into her bedroom. He put his hand over her mouth, took her to his car and proceeded to an area near the Girard Street Canal on Merritt Island. He raped Rebecca, severely bruising and lacerating her vaginal area, using such force that he bruised his penis. In the course of events, he lifted Rebecca by her legs, brought her back over his head, and swung her like a sledge hammer onto the ground fracturing her skull and causing extensive damage to her brain. While she was still alive, Defendant took her into the canal and held her head under the water until she drowned. At the time of her death, Rebecca Kunash was six (6) years of age.

Jennings v. State, 583 So.2d 316, 318 (Fla. 1991).1

State Proceedings. Mr. Jennings was tried in the Circuit Court of Brevard County and was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnaping, and sexual battery. He was sentenced to death. See Jennings v. State, 413 So.2d 24, 25 (Fla.1982) (per curiam) (Jennings I). On direct appeal of those convictions, the Florida Supreme Court held that Mr. Jennings was deprived of a fair trial because his public defender refused to cross-examine a critical witness, believing that because the witness was represented by the public defender's office, cross-examination would violate the code of professional responsibility. See id. at 25-26. The Florida Supreme Court vacated the verdict and sentence. It remanded the case for a new trial. See id. at 27.

Mr. Jennings was retried in the Circuit Court of Brevard County and was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnaping, sexual battery, burglary of an occupied dwelling with assault, and aggravated battery. Again he was sentenced to death. Jennings v. State, 453 So.2d 1109, 1111 (Fla. 1984) (Jennings II). On direct appeal Mr. Jennings argued, among other things, that a confession he gave police shortly after the murder was obtained in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as enunciated in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). The Florida Supreme Court rejected this and his other claims, and it affirmed his convictions and sentence. See Jennings II. The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction based upon the admission of Mr. Jennings' confession. See Jennings v. Fla., 470 U.S. 1002, 105 S.Ct. 1351, 84 L.Ed.2d 374 (1985) (mem.). The Florida Supreme Court then remanded the case for a new trial. See Jennings v. State, 473 So.2d 204 (Fla. 1985).

Following a change of venue, Mr. Jennings' third trial commenced in Bay County, Florida, in March 1986. He was convicted of first-degree murder, two counts of first-degree felony murder, kidnaping with intent to commit sexual battery, sexual battery, and burglary.2 Following an advisory jury verdict voting 11 to one in favor of death, Mr. Jennings was again sentenced to death. See Jennings v. State, 512 So.2d 169, 171, 173 (Fla.1987) (per curiam) (Jennings III).3 The convictions and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. See id. at 176. The Florida Supreme Court did, however, reverse Mr. Jennings' sentences with respect to the crimes of sexual battery and kidnaping with intent to commit sexual battery because the trial court failed to certify him as a mentally disordered sex offender with respect to those crimes. See id. at 175-76.

Mr. Jennings then filed for postconviction relief in state court. His motion was denied, and the denial was affirmed on appeal, except that the Florida Supreme Court agreed that Mr. Jennings was entitled to see portions of the state's files as public records. See Jennings v. State, 583 So.2d 316 (Fla.1991) (per curiam) (Jennings IV). Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court extended the limitations period for Mr. Jennings to raise postconviction arguments that might arise upon review of the additional records. See id. at 319.

Mr. Jennings did raise a number of such claims. Following a summary judgment hearing and interlocutory appeal in 1994, and an evidentiary hearing in October 1997, the trial court denied all relief. Mr. Jennings appealed and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. See Jennings v. State, 782 So.2d 853 (Fla.2001) (Jennings V).

Federal Proceedings. Mr. Jennings filed the instant federal petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Briefing was ordered with respect to jurisdiction and venue. The state moved to dismiss, and the motion was denied. The action was held in abeyance pending the outcome of the state habeas petition Mr. Jennings was pursuing in the wake of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). The state habeas petition was denied and this action resumed. The state responded to the petition, and Mr. Jennings replied. The petition is ripe for adjudication.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The petition was filed after enactment of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") and is therefore subject to its terms. See, e.g., (Michael) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 429, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) ("Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition after AEDPA's effective date, so the statute applies to his case.") (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997)).

Under chapter 153, as amended by AEDPA, a writ can issue only if the state court's ruling "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2); (Terry) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). AEDPA "plainly sought to ensure a level of `deference to the determinations of state courts,' provided those determinations did not conflict with federal law or apply federal law in an unreasonable way." (Terry) Williams, 529 U.S. at 386, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-518, at 111 (1996)).

"Contrary To." A state court decision "is `contrary to' clearly established federal law if either (1) the state court applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law, or (2) when faced with materially indistinguishable facts, the state court arrived at a result different from that reached in a Supreme Court case." Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir.2001).4 See also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); (Terry) Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495.

"Unreasonable Application." A Supreme Court precedent has been "unreasonably applied" if "it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court case law but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of the petitioner's case [or] if a state court unreasonably extends, or unreasonably declines to extend, a legal principle from Supreme Court case law to a new context." Putman, 268 F.3d at 1241. The test is objective. (Terry) Williams, 529 U.S. at 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495 ("Stated simply, a federal habeas court making the `unreasonable application' inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable."). Accordingly, "a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495; see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843 (same).

"Unreasonable Determination." Factual determinations by the state courts are "presumed to be correct, and the petitioner can rebut this presumption only by clear and convincing evidence." Harrell v. Butterworth, 251 F.3d 926, 930-31 (11th Cir.2001) (citing Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1130 n. 58 (11th Cir.2000)). Therefore, Mr. Jennings must prove by clear and convincing evidence the unreasonableness of any challenged state court factual determinations. However, this statutory presumption of correctness "applies only to findings of fact made by the state court, not to mixed determinations of law and fact." Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 836 (11th Cir.2001). The presumption of correctness afforded factual findings extends to both trial and appellate state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Bui v. Haley, 279 F.3d 1327, 1334 (11th Cir.2002) (citing Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547, 101 S.Ct. 764, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981)).

III. EVIDENTIARY HEARING

An evidentiary hearing is not necessary in this case. Section 2254(e)(2) states that an evidentiary hearing may not be held if the petitioner has failed to develop the factual basis of his claim in state court proceedings (except under enumerated exceptional...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • Muhammad v. Tucker
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
    • November 9, 2012
    ...not in existence at the time that Mr. Muhammad was initially convicted and sentenced to death in 1975. See Jennings v. Crosby, 392 F.Supp.2d 1312, 1341 (N.D.Fla.2005) (Hinkle, J.) (explaining the history of the cold, calculated, and premeditated factor), aff'd sub nom. Jennings v. McDonough......
  • Gentry v. Sinclair
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington
    • September 15, 2008
    ...the same type of analysis that we employ to determine prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel cases."); Jennings v. Crosby, 392 F.Supp.2d 1312, 1324 (N.D.Fla.2005) ("Mr. Jennings' failure to demonstrate Brady materiality is fatal to any potential ineffective assistance claim based on......
  • Patel v. Dixon
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida
    • September 23, 2022
    ...6 correctness afforded factual findings extends to both trial and appellate state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Jennings v. Crosby, 392 F.Supp.2d 1312, 1318 (N.D. Fla. 2005), aff'd sub nom. Jennings v. McDonough, 490 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2007). B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel C......
  • Akins v. Dixon
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida
    • January 10, 2023
    ... ... trial and appellate state courts. 28 U.S.C. § ... 2254(e)(1); Jennings v. Crosby , 392 F.Supp.2d 1312, ... 1318 (N.D. Fla. 2005), aff'd sub nom. Jennings v ... McDonough , 490 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2007) ... ...

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT