Uu v. Scott

• Decision Date: 10 July 2014
• Parties: In the Matter of SUSAN UU., Appellant, v. SCOTT VV., Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

119 A.D.3d 1117

990 N.Y.S.2d 655

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 05229

In the Matter of SUSAN UU., Appellant,

v.SCOTT VV., Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

July 10, 2014.

Moran & Gottlieb, Kingston (Andrea Moran of counsel), for appellant.

Bousquet Holstein, PLLC, Syracuse (Victor L. Prial of counsel), for respondent.

Daniel Gartenstein, Kingston, attorney for the child.

Before: PETERS, P.J., ROSE, EGAN JR., LYNCH and DEVINE, JJ.

LYNCH, J.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Ulster County (McGinty, J.), entered June 11, 2013, which, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct. Act article 5, denied petitioner's motion to vacate a prior order of the court.

Petitioner and Christopher H. married in 2000 and three children were born during the marriage, including Olivia H. (born in 2001). They divorced in 2008 and, pursuant to the judgment of divorce, which incorporated without merging a stipulation of settlement, it was adjudged, among other things, that they have three children, including Olivia; they were given joint custody of the children, with primary physical custody with petitioner and parenting time with Christopher H., who was ordered to pay child support for the children. In 2012, petitioner commenced this paternity proceeding pursuant to Family Ct. Act article 5 seeking, among other relief, a declaration that respondent is the biologicalfather of Olivia, then 12 years old.¹ Respondent moved to dismiss the paternity petition based upon, among other grounds, the collateral estoppel effect of the judgment of divorce ² ( seeCPLR 3211[a][5] ). Petitioner did not respond to that motion, although Olivia's attorney opposed the requested relief. Family Court granted respondent's motion based upon principles of collateral estoppel; no appeal was taken from that order. Petitioner thereafter moved, pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1), to vacate that order. Family Court denied the motion, concluding that its prior order of dismissal of the paternity petition “was not issued on default but rather [was issued] on the merits.” Petitioner now appeals from the order denying her motion to vacate.

As an initial matter, respondent contends that petitioner may not appeal the denial of her motion to vacate the order dismissing her paternity petition since the dismissal order was decided on the merits, rather than on petitioner's default; accordingly, he contends, her only recourse was to appeal the order of dismissal, which she failed to do. He further argues that the motion to vacate was a pretext in that it was in actuality a motion to reargue, the denial of which is not appealable. We disagree with both contentions.

Having failed to respond in any manner to respondent's motion to dismiss, petitioner could not claim to be “aggrieved” by the ensuing order (CPLR 5511; see David D. Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 7B, CPLR C5511:1 at 128). As such, she was precluded from appealing the order of dismissal on her default ³ and her sole remedy was to move to vacate the order entered upon her default ( seeCPLR 5015[a][1]; Matter of County of Albany [Bowles], 91 A.D.3d 1132, 1133, 936 N.Y.S.2d 763 [2012];M & C Bros., Inc. v. Torum, 75 A.D.3d 869, 870, 907 N.Y.S.2d 78 [2010];Matter of Meghan H., 15 A.D.3d 802, 803, 790 N.Y.S.2d 280 [2005],appeal dismissed4 N.Y.3d 845, 797 N.Y.S.2d 415, 830 N.E.2d 313 [2005];Matter of Ashley X., 200 A.D.2d 911, 911, 608 N.Y.S.2d 886 [1994] ). Thus, the order denying the motion to vacate is appealable by petitioner and Family Court should have addressed the merits of her motion to vacate the dismissal order. Since the record is sufficient to resolve the merits of petitioner's motion to vacate, on which all parties have been heard, we will address it in the interest of judicial economy ( see Winney v. County of Saratoga, 252 A.D.2d 882, 884, 676 N.Y.S.2d 356 [1998] ). Even assuming that petitioner's submissions on the motion demonstrate a reasonable excuse for her default, we find that she failed to demonstrate a meritorious defense to respondent's motion to dismiss. While “the quantum of proof needed to prevail on a [motion to vacate based upon excusable default] is less than that required when opposing a summary judgment motion” ( Abel v. Estate of Collins, 73 A.D.3d 1423, 1425, 901 N.Y.S.2d 749 [2010];see Dodge v. Commander, 18 A.D.3d 943, 945, 794 N.Y.S.2d 482 [2005] ), petitioner still must set forth a “prima facie meritorious defense to the [motion to dismiss]” ( Dodge v. Commander, 18 A.D.3d at 946, 794 N.Y.S.2d 482). That is, she was required “to set forth sufficient facts [or legal arguments] to demonstrate, on a prima facie basis, that a defense existed” ( Matter of Toyota Motor Credit Corp. v. Impressive Auto Ctr., Inc., 80 A.D.3d 861, 863, 915 N.Y.S.2d 657 [2011] ). This petitioner failed to do.

To invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel as a defense to petitioner's paternity petition, respondent was required to establish “(1) ... that an identical issue was necessarily decided in a prior action which is decisive of the present action, and (2) that the party to be precluded [here, petitioner,] must have had a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior decision said to be controlling” ( Marotta v. Hoy, 55 A.D.3d 1194, 1196, 866 N.Y.S.2d 415 [2008];see D'Arata v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 76 N.Y.2d 659, 664, 563 N.Y.S.2d 24, 564 N.E.2d 634 [1990] ). We find that “[t]here can be no question that the [identical] issue of [Olivia's] paternity was decided in the [prior] divorce [judgment] when the specific finding was made” that she is the child of petitioner and Christopher H., petitioner's husband at the time of Olivia's birth and who is listed on her birth certificate as her father (Matter of Sandra I. v. Harold I., 54 A.D.2d 1040, 1041–1042, 388 N.Y.S.2d 376 [1976];see Jeanne M. v. Richard G., 96 A.D.2d 549, 549–550, 465 N.Y.S.2d 60 [1983],appeals dismissed60 N.Y.2d 858, 470 N.Y.S.2d 142, 458 N.E.2d 383 [1983]61 N.Y.2d 637, 471 N.Y.S.2d 851, 459 N.E.2d 1288 [1983] ).⁴ Such a finding was a necessary prerequisite to the order of support, as only a parent may be ordered to pay support for his or her child ( see Jeanne M. v. Richard G., 96 A.D.2d at 550, 465 N.Y.S.2d 60;Matter of Sandra I. v. Harold I., 54 A.D.2d at 1041, 388 N.Y.S.2d 376;see also Matter of Melissa S. v. Frederick T., 8 A.D.3d 738, 739, 777 N.Y.S.2d 774 [2004],lv. dismissed3 N.Y.3d 688, 785 N.Y.S.2d 9, 818 N.E.2d 650 [2004];see generallyDomestic Relations Law § 240; Family Ct. Act § 413[1][a]; cf. Matter of Nacey v. Nacey, 116 A.D.2d 933, 934, 498 N.Y.S.2d 231 [1986] ).

Although we are mindful that the judgment of divorce was premised upon a stipulation of settlement between the parties, we find that preclusion is appropriate. The Court of Appeals has held that “collateral estoppel effect will only be given to matters actually litigated and determined in a prior action” ( Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449, 456, 492 N.Y.S.2d 584, 482 N.E.2d 63 [1985] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ), and commented that “[a]n issue is not actually litigated if, for example, there has been a default, a confession of liability, a failure to place a matter in issue by proper pleading or even because of a stipulation ” ( id. at 456–457, 492 N.Y.S.2d 584, 482 N.E.2d 63 [emphasis added] ). However, it has been recognized that “[a] stipulation may ... be binding in a subsequent action between the parties if the parties have manifested an intention to that effect” (Restatement [Second] of Judgments § 27, Comment e). Here, petitioner instituted the divorce action in which she pursued and obtained an award of custody and child support for Olivia pursuant to a stipulation of settlement placed on the record, and included in the judgment of divorce. By so doing, petitioner manifested her intention to resolve these issues, which are predicated on paternity, in the divorce action. In this context, the stipulation should be treated as conclusive ( see Matter of Hua Fan v. Wen Zong Yu, 91 A.D.3d 952, 952, 937 N.Y.S.2d 625 [2012];Matter of Timothy J.T. v. Karen J.H., 251 A.D.2d 1036, 1036, 673 N.Y.S.2d 989 [1998],appeal dismissed, lv. denied92 N.Y.2d 891, 678 N.Y.S.2d 590, 700 N.E.2d 1227 [1998] ).

Furthermore, respondent is entitled to assert collateral estoppel notwithstanding the fact that he was not a party to the divorce action, as “mutuality is not required” ( Marotta v. Hoy, 55 A.D.3d at 1196 n. 3, 866 N.Y.S.2d 415;see Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 291, 441 N.Y.S.2d 49, 423 N.E.2d 807 [1981];S.T. Grand, Inc. v. City of New York, 32 N.Y.2d 300, 304, 344 N.Y.S.2d 938, 298 N.E.2d 105 [1973];Schwartz v. Public Adm'r of County of Bronx, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 70–71, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 246 N.E.2d 725 [1969] ). With regard to the second prong of the collateral estoppal defense, petitioner must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the previously decided issue, and it was her burden, in order to defeat the application of collateral estoppel, to demonstrate that she did not have that opportunity ( see D'Arata v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 76 N.Y.2d at 664, 563 N.Y.S.2d 24, 564 N.E.2d 634). Petitioner was represented by counsel in the divorce action, and she has not alleged...